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2Abstract
This thesis analyses and compares the performance, performance persistence and
fund flows for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal
pensions over the sample period January 1980 to December 2007. Unit-linked per-
sonal pension funds are an illiquid investment from the investor’s perspective since
any invested capital is inaccessible until retirement whereas for unit trusts/OEICs
capital invested can be withdrawn at any time. Since decreasing returns to scale
from fund flows are the equilibrating mechanism in Berk and Green (2004) that
results in no persistence in performance the illiquid nature of unit-linked personal
pension funds should ensure more evidence of performance persistence in comparison
to unit trusts/OEICs.
I find significant evidence using performance ranked portfolio strategies that under-
lying portfolios that are only composed of unit-linked personal pension funds have
greater performance persistence than unit-linked personal pension funds that have
underlying portfolios that also include at least a unit trust/OEIC. This evidence is
consistent with Berk and Green (2004) since the illiquid nature of personal pension
funds results in an attenuated performance fund flow relationship restricting the
equilibrating mechanism. However, there are anomalies in the performance persis-
tence results in relation to Berk and Green (2004) but it could be due to the differ-
ential between the number of non-surviving unit trusts/OEICs and non-surviving
unit-linked personal pension funds.
I also find that the performance fund flow relationship based on abnormal returns
from a Carhart four factor model for both UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK
unit-linked personal pensions is convex but the performance fund flow relationship
is more attenuated for the unit-linked personal pension funds. For the worst per-
forming unit trusts/OEICs there are outflows on average whereas for unit-linked
personal pensions there are fund inflows on average. For performance persistence
3tests conditional on underlying portfolio fund flows unit trusts/OEICs that have the
worst performance but the lowest net fund flows in the ranking period have signifi-
cantly greater subsequent performance in comparison to the unit trusts/OEICs that
have the worst performance but the highest net fund flows in the ranking period.
This empirical evidence provides support for Berk and Green (2004) but for the
unit-linked personal pension funds the evidence is less convincing.
There is very little evidence that UK equity unit-trusts/OEICs or UK equity unit-
linked personal pensions produce abnormal returns. These results are robust across
the single index (CAPM) model, the Fama and French three factor model and the
Carhart four factor model for both conditional and unconditional models. There is
also no evidence that unit trusts/OEICs or unit-linked personal pension funds can
time the market. There is a significantly negative timing effect across unconditional
factor models which becomes insignificant for the conditional models. There is also
no evidence that unit trusts/OEICs have significantly different performance than
unit-linked personal pension funds.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The performance fund flow literature generally finds a convex relationship between
past performance and subsequent fund flows. Since the performance persistence lit-
erature generally finds little evidence of performance persistence, particularly when
using the Carhart four factor model, it questions why the empirical evidence suggests
investors chase performance when performance does not persist? Berk and Green
(2004) try to answer this by creating a rational equilibrium model of active portfolio
management, with no moral hazard or asymmetric information, that ensures man-
agers cannot consistently achieve abnormal returns as they are competed away due
to decreasing returns to scale from fund flows. In Berk and Green (2004) decreasing
returns to scale from fund flows is the equilibrating mechanism that results in no
persistence in abnormal returns. The primary motivation of this thesis is to em-
pirically test the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows by examining
and comparing the performance persistence and associated fund flows for both UK
equity unit-linked personal pension funds and UK equity unit trusts/open-ended
investment companies (OEICs). The Financial Services Authority (FSA) define an
authorised unit trust as:
“An authorised unit trust is a unit trust scheme that has been autho-
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rised by the Financial Services Authority. It must meet certain condi-
tions concerning its management structure and the type of investments
it can hold. Only authorised schemes can be sold to the general public
(the retail market).”
In comparison the FSA define an OEIC as:
“An open-ended investment company (OEIC) is a collective investment
scheme that is structured as a company with variable capital and satis-
fies the property and investment condition in section 236 FSMA. Once
authorised by the FSA, it is incorporated as a company under The Open-
Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1228).”
In essence unit trusts and OEICs are both opened ended investment products which
means investors buy and sell units/shares directly with the fund manager based on
underlying asset values rather than prices based on supply and demand. The main
differences between unit trusts and OEICs is of a legal nature with unit trusts set
up with a trust structure and OEICs set up with a corporate structure. For the
purpose of this research unit trusts/OEICs are treated as similar collective invest-
ment schemes where investors have no major restrictions on withdrawing capital
invested, although in some cases a back-end load may be charged. Unit-linked per-
sonal pension funds share similar features to unit trusts but differ mainly due to
their illiquid nature. Money invested in a personal pension fund is inaccessible until
retirement although it can be transfered across personal pension funds. Unit-linked
personal pensions are a defined contribution scheme which is defined by the Pensions
Regulator as:
“A scheme in which a member’s benefits are determined by the value of
the pension fund at retirement. The fund, in turn, is determined by the
contributions paid into it in respect of that member, and any investment
returns.”
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The Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows predicts that we will never
observe persistence in mutual fund performance because money flows into funds
that have performed well and out of funds that have performed badly. Thus Berk
and Green (2004) argue that this flow of money into successful funds will lead to
difficulties in managing the money successfully due to decreasing returns to scale.
Conversely they argue that for funds that have had poor performance, an outflow of
money will allow the fund to be managed more efficiently and the poor performance
will not persist. Berk and Green (2004) thus argue that performance is not persis-
tent because investors chase good performance and punish bad performance. Since
personal pensions have high switching costs and are a long term contractual savings
vehicle inaccessible until retirement the flow of funds in personal pensions should
not be as responsive to past performance as that of unit trusts/OEICs. Therefore
if the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows is correct we should find
more performance persistence in personal pensions. This is the central theme of the
thesis.
A number of recent papers including Berk and Tonks (2007) and Bessler et al.
(2010) have examined the performance fund flow relationship with the motivation
to empirically test Berk and Green (2004). I will add to this literature by empiri-
cally comparing unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions with a view
to testing Berk and Green (2004). A key difference in this thesis in comparison
to the previous papers empirically testing Berk and Green (2004) is the empha-
sis on underlying portfolios and flows rather than just concentrating on the funds
themselves. The rational for this concentration is the inference that diseconomies
of scale faced by fund managers is due to fund flows at the underlying portfolio
level. An empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) based on a comparative analysis
of the performance persistence and underlying portfolio fund flows for UK equity
unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pensions is a unique addi-
tion to the literature. In addition to analysing the performance persistence and fund
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flows for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions I also compare and
contrast the performance of both investment vehicles with a particular emphasis on
whether a differential in stock picking and market timing abilities exists between
unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions.
Research on UK unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds is im-
portant as the UK fund industry is a vital sector for the UK economy and society.
As at 2010 the Investment Management Association (IMA) estimate that UK au-
thorised unit trusts and OEICs have £569 billion of assets under management and
the Association of British Insurers (ABI) estimate that insurer-administered indi-
vidual pensions hold £475 billion in assets. In a US setting Cuthbertson et al.
(2010c) highlight that at the end of 2005 approximately 8,500 US mutual funds held
$8.9 trillion in assets which represented half of the world’s fund assets at the time.
Whilst these collective investment vehicles are large in size they are also incredibly
important for their investors since they allow an investor to obtain diversification
at low cost and the services of active fund managers, albeit at a cost, to provide an
expectation of superior returns. For investors in unit-linked personal pension funds
their retirement is dependent on the performance of the fund. Their future income
in retirement in nominal terms is not guaranteed prior to purchasing an annuity
so the performance of unit-linked personal pension funds over the long term is an
important area for academics to research to ensure investment practices and struc-
tures in the fund industry allow the current working population the best possible
chance of ensuring an adequate income in retirement. The empirical evidence in
this thesis on the performance, performance persistence and performance fund flow
relationship for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions will
hopefully improve our understanding of the UK collective investment industry.
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1.1 Motivation and Contributions
The first contribution of this thesis is to provide evidence on the performance of
UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pensions on a
risk-adjusted basis using various unconditional and conditional factor models with
and without market timing components. The sample period in this thesis extends
the empirical evidence on fund performance for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pension funds in relation to the existing literature. The thesis also offers
empirical evidence on whether the structure of the underlying portfolio impacts on
performance. Here, the structure of the underlying portfolio relates to the vari-
ous investment products the fund manager receives underlying portfolio fund flows
through. As discussed in detail in Section 3.2 the underlying portfolio can consist
of a combination of unit trusts/OEICs, personal pensions and life funds. In addi-
tion, the comparative analysis between the performance of unit trusts/OEICs and
unit-linked personal pension funds offers new empirical evidence on whether unit
trusts/OEICs significantly out or underperform unit-linked personal pension funds.
The second contribution and the main motivation of this thesis is an empirical test
of the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows. Unit-linked personal
pensions are an illiquid investment from the investors perspective since any capi-
tal invested in a unit-linked personal pension fund is inaccessible until retirement.
The performance fund flow relationship for unit-linked personal pensions should
therefore be more attenuated and in accordance with Berk and Green (2004), where
decreasing returns to scale from fund flows is the equilibrating mechanism, we should
observe more performance persistence in personal pensions. I provide evidence on
the level of performance persistence for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal
pensions using a variety of performance measures and performance persistence tests.
I also provide evidence for performance persistence based on the composition of the
underlying portfolio using the Morningstar FundID data variable as a proxy for
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the underlying fund. Since some personal pension funds share the same underlying
portfolio as unit trusts/OEICs the fund flows to these personal pension funds is not
restricted to personal pensions. By analysing personal pensions that only have an
underlying portfolio that includes personal pension funds with those personal pen-
sion funds that have an underlying portfolio that includes at least a unit trust/OEIC
I provide empirical evidence from a more stringent test of Berk and Green (2004).
The third contribution of this thesis is to provide evidence on the performance
fund flow relationship for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked
personal pensions. Since there is very little evidence on the performance fund flow
relationship for UK collective investment schemes another motivation of this thesis is
to provide new empirical evidence on the performance fund flow relationship for UK
equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds to fill a
gap in the literature. I also provide evidence from another empirical test of Berk and
Green (2004) using performance persistence tests conditional on underlying portfolio
fund flows.
The final contribution of this thesis is the creation of seven new datasets that I
have created to meet the aforementioned objectives of this thesis. They include
a survivor-bias free dataset for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs as well as datasets
that includes fund flow data for both UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity
unit-linked personal pensions.
1.2 Summary of Empirical Results
There is little evidence that UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked
personal pensions produce abnormal returns. Alphas are generally not significantly
different from zero and this finding is robust to conditional and unconditional factor
models. There is also no evidence that unit trusts/OEICs can successfully time
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the market and for unconditional factor models there exists a significantly negative
timing effect although it becomes insignificant in the conditional models. There is
also no evidence that the structure of the underlying portfolio impacts on perfor-
mance or that the performance of unit trusts/OEICs is significantly different from
the performance of unit-linked personal pension funds.
There is stronger evidence of performance persistence for unit-linked personal pen-
sions that have FundIDs, a proxy for the underlying portfolio, that only contain
personal pensions in comparison to unit-linked personal pensions that have Fun-
dID’s that include at least a unit trust/OEIC. This evidence supports the Berk and
Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows since the decreasing returns to scale fund
managers face from fund flows is more attenuated in personal pension funds due to
their illiquid nature. However, the evidence is conditional on the methodology used
with performance ranked portfolio tests offering the strongest evidence. There is
contradictory evidence using contingency tables but this potentially is due to win-
ner and loser funds in contingency tables being based on median performance not
capturing the differences in the extreme tails of the performance fund flow distribu-
tion.
The performance fund flow relationship is convex for both UK equity unit trusts/OEICs
and UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds although there is more convexity
in the performance fund flow relationship for unit trusts/OEICs. The difference
between the performance fund flow relationships for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-
linked personal pension funds is mainly concentrated in the extreme tails of the
performance fund flow distribution. The worst performing unit-trusts/OEICs ex-
perience a subsequent outflow on average whereas the worst performing unit-linked
personal pension funds experience subsequent fund inflows on average. Using per-
sistence tests conditional on underlying portfolio fund flows unit trusts/OEICs that
have the worst performance but the lowest net fund flows in the ranking period have
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significantly greater subsequent performance in comparison to the unit trusts/OEICs
that have the worst performance but the highest net fund flows in the ranking pe-
riod. This empirical evidence provides support for Berk and Green (2004) but for
the unit-linked personal pension funds the evidence is less conclusive.
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 contains a literature
survey concentrating on the UK and US markets, methodologies and hypotheses.
Chapter 3 concentrates on the institutional features of unit trusts/OEICs, unit-
linked personal pensions and fund flows. Chapter 4 details the construction of all
the datasets I use within the thesis. Chapter 5 assesses performance, Chapter 6
assesses performance persistence and Chapter 7 assesses fund flows for UK equity
unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds. Chapter 8
concludes and discusses further research.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey and Hypotheses
2.1 Portfolio Diversification and Rationale for Man-
aged Investment Funds
The vast size of the collective investment industry raises the important question, why
do investors invest in collective investment funds rather than investing directly in
securities themselves? In general two main reasons for the existence and importance
of collective investment schemes for investors are
• Diversification at low cost
• Higher expected returns given the risk taken
Diversification is one of the most important concepts of investment and modern
portfolio theory. On the assumption that investors are risk averse and mean variance
optimisers they will attempt to maximise portfolio expected return given the risk,
where risk is measured by the variance/standard deviation of returns. Expected
return and variance for any asset/portfolio can be calculated as follows
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Expected return =
n∑
i=1
wiE (ri) (2.1)
Variance =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wiwjσij (2.2)
where wi is the weight in asset i, E (ri) is the expected return on asset i and σij is
the covariance between the returns of assets i and j. By investing in a large number
of assets an investor can reduce the variance of the returns on the portfolio without
having to sacrifice expected return. In fact it is possible to reduce the variance of
the portfolio’s return whilst at the same time increasing expected return. The key to
diversification is the covariance term in Equation 2.2. The power of diversification
can be seen more clearly if Equation 2.2 is rearranged to separate the variance and
covariance terms and a weight of 1/n is invested in each asset.
Variance =
n∑
i=1
w2i σ
2
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
n variance terms
+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
i 6=j
wiwjσij
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n(n−1) covariance terms
(2.3)
Variance =
1
n2
n∑
i=1
σ2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
n variance terms
+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
i 6=j
(
1
n2
)
σij
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n(n−1) covariance terms
(2.4)
Variance =
1
n
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
σ2i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average variance
+
n− 1
n
 1
n (n− 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
i 6=j
σij

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average covariance
(2.5)
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Variance =
1
n
σi︸︷︷︸
→ 0 as
n→∞
+
(
1− 1
n
)
σij︸ ︷︷ ︸
→ σij as n→∞
(2.6)
Whilst the 1/n strategy is a naive investment strategy it clearly shows that as the
number of assets in a portfolio increases the variance of the returns of the portfolio
tend to the average covariance. Firm specific risk, the variance terms of the indi-
vidual assets, can be diversified away leaving only the undiversifiable market risk
represented by the average covariance term. Elton and Gruber (1977) and Statman
(1987) amongst others analyse how many stocks are required to achieve a diversi-
fied portfolio. The general consensus is around 30 stocks eliminates almost all the
firm specific risk relative to a particular benchmark/market portfolio. Adding more
stocks has a diminishing impact of reducing what little firm specific risk there is left.
Individual investors can diversify themselves but they would need sufficient capital
to purchase enough stocks to produce a diversified portfolio such that virtually all
firm specific risk is eliminated. Given the cost of buying such a large number of
securities and the transaction costs involved one option for investors is to invest
through a collective investment scheme. A collective investment fund pools together
the capital of many investors allowing a diversified portfolio to be obtained at low
cost through economies of scale. This allows investors to invest small amounts of
money but still obtain a diversified portfolio.
The second main reason for investing in collective investment funds is more contro-
versial and relates to the role and benefit of active investing by professional fund
managers. According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) investors, whether
individuals or professional fund managers, should not consistently be able to achieve
returns higher than predicted given the risk taken. If fund managers cannot earn
abnormal returns then it questions the role of active portfolio management and sup-
ports passive investment in index funds. Index funds, funds that track a particular
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market index, still provide a diversified investment for the investor but have much
smaller costs in comparison to active funds as they simply track a benchmark and
do not require the same level of resources active managers need to conduct detailed
investment analysis. In determining whether active fund managers outperform their
benchmark abnormal returns are generally used that account for the risk taken.
Earning abnormal returns are dependent on the asset pricing model used and as
pointed out by Roll (1977) is always a joint test of the efficiency of the market
and the accuracy of the asset pricing model used to calculate expected returns. The
question of whether active fund managers on average consistently produce abnormal
returns has been a key research area for academics and practitioners. This thesis
will extend the literature on abnormal performance of active fund managers by ex-
amining and comparing both UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal
pension funds.
2.2 Performance
Fund performance is an important area of research within finance with a central
theme questioning the value professional fund managers add especially when con-
sidering the compensation they demand. In this thesis I will provide new empirical
evidence on fund manager skill from unique largely survivor-bias-free datasets and
whether as a group unit trusts/OEICs and/or unit-linked personal pension funds
can deliver higher returns than expected given the risk taken. Fund performance
and performance persistence tests are also direct tests of the EMH. The EMH in
its semi-strong form states that it should not be possible to consistently generate
abnormal returns using information from past prices and publicly available funda-
mental information. Whilst fund managers can earn an abnormal return by chance
this should not be possible on average in an informationally efficient market. Tests
of performance and performance persistence of collective investment schemes is a
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particularly rigorous test of the EMH as if the market were not efficient it would
seem rational to assume that it would be professional fund managers who would be
likely candidates to be earning the abnormal returns.
Fund performance research in the academic literature saw a surge during the 1990s
which then lead to research reexamining the time dynamics of fund performance
using a variety of performance persistence tests. The vast majority of the research
on fund performance that is relevant has occurred within the past 20 years. This is
probably related to advances in computing power over the past two decades increas-
ing the ability of researchers to actually implement the advances in econometrics
to large datasets and the availability of survivor-bias free datasets, particularly in
the US. Current research in the literature reexamines both performance and perfor-
mance persistence using alternative econometric techniques such as bootstrapping
and false discovery rate. In addition the impact fund flows has on performance
persistence is a recent and important topic dominating the current literature. Nu-
merous papers are motivated by performance and performance persistence which is
in line with the motivation of this research. I will tackle each element separately,
first examining performance, then performance persistence and lastly fund flows and
their relationship with performance persistence.
2.2.1 Performance Methodologies and Hypotheses
The performance tests in the literature are generally based on risk adjusted/abnormal
returns rather than simple raw returns. If an analysis of fund performance is un-
dertaken with just raw returns the level of performance and persistence in that
performance is predominantly determined by the fund’s level of risk exposure rather
than fund manager skill. For instance, a fund manager that invests in very high risk
stocks would on average be expected to produce higher returns than a comparable
fund that invests in very low risk stocks particularly over a very long investment
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horizon. This does not imply that the fund manager who invested in low risk stocks
has no investment skill or investment skill inferior to that of the high risk fund
manager, it simply implies that the fund manager who invests in high risk stocks
would be expected to be rewarded for taking on the risk in the long term. For these
reasons risk adjusted/abnormal returns are invariably used in academic research on
fund performance and hence will be the predominant measure I use in this thesis1.
Factor models - unconditional
The seminal work of Jensen (1968) introduced the standard technique of uncondi-
tional alpha used today as a standard in portfolio performance measurement.
rpt − rft = αp + βpMKTt + γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + εpt (2.7)
Using the technique originally used by Jensen (1968) the excess return of each fund
(rpt − rft) at time t, is regressed against the four factors in Equation 2.7, where rpt
is the monthly return on fund p at time t and rft is the monthly return on the risk
free asset at time t. The Jensen’s alpha, α, for a fund p assesses the fund’s level
of abnormal performance. The MKT variable is the excess return on the market
(rmt−rft) at time t; SMBt is the size factor at time t, which is the difference between
the returns on a portfolio of small companies and the returns on a portfolio of large
companies; HML is the book to market factor at time t which is the difference
in returns between a portfolio of high book to market companies and low book to
market companies and MOM is the one year momentum factor portfolio at time t
originally cited in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). When λp = 0 in Equation 2.7 the
Fama and French three factor model is obtained. The CAPM model is obtained from
1See Blake and Timmermann (2002) for a detailed justification of the preferred use of risk
adjusted/abnormal returns instead of just raw returns in performance and performance persistence
tests.
2.2. PERFORMANCE 37
Equation 2.7 when γp = 0, δp = 0 and λp = 0. The factor loadings in Equation 2.7
are time invariant. If Jensen’s alpha, α, for a fund p is significantly positive it signals
evidence for a genuinely skilled fund manager whilst a significantly negative Jensen’s
alpha signals evidence for a poorly performing fund manager making investment
decisions to the detriment of fund value. Hence, investors are looking for positive
alpha funds where it infers that fund managers are making positive investment
decisions that are adding value to the fund.
The aforementioned standard market model i.e. CAPM, Fama and French (1992)
three factor model and Carhart (1997) four factor model are the most common
factor models used in the literature. The generally accepted interpretation of the
market and Fama and French factor models, particularly based on US data, is that
they represent risk factors or proxies to risk factors and their use justifies a risk
based interpretation. We can view the Carhart (1997) four factor model either
on a risk-adjusted basis or as a mechanical zero investment trading strategy as a
benchmark on which to evaluate fund performance. Fund management is a lucrative
industry with fund managers extracting large rents for their services so the Carhart
(1997) four factor model can be viewed as a strategy that one would expect a fund
manager to outperform to justify their compensation. Thus whether we take a
risk adjusted standpoint on the factor models or as a mechanical zero investment
strategy the aforementioned factor models are viewed as an appropriate method on
which to base the analysis of performance and performance persistence between unit
trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions.
Market Timing
The original Jensen technique to calculate alpha, whether from the market model
or from multi-factor models, does not distinguish between fund manager skill in
security selection and market timing. Skilled fund managers in addition to trying
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to select the most under priced stocks given the risk objective of the fund can also
increase returns by timing the market based on their expectations of future market
movements. Market timing is generally viewed as the ability of the fund manager to
profitability move from one asset class to another. Although in this research I limit
the investment objective of funds under analysis to equity funds only, fund managers
can still exhibit market timing skills by switching into defensive low beta stocks in
bear markets and aggressive high beta stocks in bull markets. If fund managers can
successfully time the market then returns to the fund will be high in bull markets
due to investment in aggressive stocks and still relatively high in bear markets due
to switching to defensive stocks.
The two most common tests for market timing used in the literature are those of
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981). The Treynor and
Mazuy (1966) test of market timing imposes a quadratic term in the factor model to
capture market timing. In the single factor model the quadratic term attempts to
capture the non linear relationship between excess fund returns and excess market
returns
Rpt − rf = αp + β (Rmt − rf ) + γp (Rmt − rf )2 + εpt (2.8)
If the estimate γp is significantly positive then it represents a convex upward slop-
ing regression line and indicates evidence of successful market timing by the fund
manager. The original Treynor and Mazuy (1966) tests find no evidence of mar-
ket timing although the size and scope of the mutual fund industry has developed
considerably since the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) study.
The Henriksson and Merton (1981) test for marketing timing uses the following
regression
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Rpt − rf = αp + β (Rmt − rf ) + δp (Rmt − rf )+ + εpt (2.9)
where (Rmt − rf )+ = Max (0, Rmt − rf ). If the estimate of δp is significantly positive
then it indicates evidence of successful market timing by the fund manager. In
essence both methods try to capture the non-linearity of fund managers performing
better than expected in bull markets and not performing as bad as expected in bear
markets.
Factor models - conditional
The factor loadings in the conditional factor models are assumed to be time invari-
ant. Ferson and Schadt (1996) extend the general unconditional factor models to
assess the ability of fund managers to add value through private market timing skill.
Ferson and Schadt (1996) develop a conditional beta model where a fund’s factor
betas depend on lagged publicly available information. To distinguish between the
private market timing skills of the fund manager and timing skills derived from pre-
dictable market or factor movements Ferson and Schadt (1996) create a conditional
beta model
Rpt − rft = αp + β0p (Rmt − rft) + β′1p [Zt−1 (Rmt − rft)] + εpt (2.10)
where Zt−1 is a vector of lagged information available at time t. Equation 2.10 can
also be modified to include the quadratic term from Treynor and Mazuy (1966)
to separate the public and private information used by a fund manager in market
timing.
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Performance Hypotheses
• Hypothesis 1
– UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pen-
sions do not on average earn significant abnormal returns or show evi-
dence of successful market timing.
Unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds both offer investors a di-
versified portfolio and active investment management. In an efficient market there
is no reason a priori to expect fund managers to produce on average abnormal re-
turns. If there is evidence that managers can on average earn abnormal returns
then it contradicts the EMH and suggests the market is informationally inefficient.
I examine the abnormal performance of unit trusts/OEICs and unit linked personal
pensions using both unconditional and conditional models using returns based on
bid-bid prices gross of tax to reflect the investment performance due to fund man-
agers investment decisions.
I also use the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) test to decompose unit trust/OEIC and
unit-linked personal pension fund manager performance into stock selectivity and
market timing components to evaluate their investment skill. I test this hypothesis
for robustness by using various factor models including the single (CAPM) model,
Fama and French four factor model and the Carhart four factor model across the
equity sectors of UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Smaller Compa-
nies and across the combined sample of all three equity sectors. If the empirical
evidence in this thesis supports Hypothesis 1 then it supports the EMH and ques-
tions whether it would be more beneficial for investors to use passive investment
schemes particularly as the returns in this thesis are gross of tax and based on bid
to bid prices.
• Hypothesis 2
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– There is no significant difference between the average abnormal returns
of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions.
Since the investment objectives for both the unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pension under analysis in this thesis are the same the difference in average
abnormal performance between unit trust/OEIC and unit-linked personal pension
fund managers is directly comparable. In fact many fund managers manage both
a unit trust/OEIC and a unit-linked personal pension fund which further supports
Hypothesis 2 which predicts that there should be no significant difference between
the average abnormal returns of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions
funds. In addition, when the datasets for the unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pension funds are based on the underlying FundID, where FundID proxies
for the underlying portfolio, the issue of the same fund manager being part of both
datasets is less of a problem. Using the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension
FundID Database2 I will also test whether fund managers who only manage unit-
linked personal pension funds have significantly different abnormal performance in
comparison to fund managers who manage funds that includes both unit-linked
personal pension and unit trust/OEICs. A priori there is still no reason to expect a
significant difference in average abnormal returns since both unit trusts/OEICs and
unit-linked personal pensions are collective investment schemes with professional
fund managers in the same investment sectors.
Since this thesis is concentrating on fund manager skill rather than the net return to
the investor no differential in abnormal performance between unit trusts/OEICs and
unit-linked personal pensions does not imply that an investor should be indifferent
between the two investment vehicles. From an investor’s perspective, even if there is
no differential between fund managers of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal
pensions, investors should in general still use personal pension funds for investing
2The databases are discussed in detail in Section 3.2 and Chapter 4 respectively.
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for retirement in comparison to unit trust/OEICs as personal pension funds offer
tax advantages and the possibility of employer contributions.
2.2.2 Performance Literature Review
The literature review on fund performance is the first of three literature reviews
with the other two examining performance persistence and fund flows respectively.
This separation of the literature review hopefully aids clarity and allows the focus
to be on one particular research area at a time. Numerous papers cover two or
more of the aforementioned research areas and they will be critiqued on each area
separately in the relevant literature review. Two recent publications closely related
to the research in this thesis have been a great source of information. A recent
survey paper by Cuthbertson et al. (2010c) provides an in depth comprehensive and
technical overview of fund performance, performance persistence and fund flows, the
exact same research areas as this thesis. Thus Cuthbertson et al. (2010c) is highly
relevant and has been an extremely useful and used resource. In addition, Luckoff
(2011) is a newly published book based on the author’s doctoral thesis covering
both fund performance and performance persistence with particular emphasis on
the impact fund flows and managerial change have on fund performance and per-
formance persistence. The concentration in Luckoff (2011) is on US mutual funds
but the methods used are of general relevance and the insight and findings from
this recent publication are highly relevant to this thesis. Whilst the aforementioned
resources have been invaluable the literature reviews that follow attempts to be a
concise, personal and unique critique of the literature with particular emphasis on
a comparative analysis between UK equity based unit trusts/OEICs and UK based
unit-linked personal pensions with the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual funds
flows in view.
The literature reviews concentrate primarily on US and UK studies only. The US
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and UK have two of the largest and most developed fund management industries
with long enough track records to allow meaningful sample periods to be analysed
which in part explains their prevalence in the academic literature. The literature
reviews concentrate primarily on the past 20 years which is where the vast majority
of the relevant research on this area has been conducted. For a very informative and
concise summary in tabular form of the literature on performance and performance
persistence in the US and UK see Giles et al. (2002) and Cuthbertson et al. (2010c).
US Studies
Although the literature review primarily concentrates on the past twenty years the
seminal work of Jensen (1968) is one of the first major studies on US mutual fund
performance. Jensen (1968) incorporates a risk-adjusted measure of performance
known as Jensen’s alpha on which to evaluate fund managers. Jensen (1968) finds
that tests of abnormal performance using the single index model (CAPM)on 115 US
mutual funds over the sample period 1945 to 1964 results in no significant abnormal
performance. Even before expenses fund managers do not appear to have superior
information on which to generate abnormal returns.
Malkiel (1995) analyses US equity mutual funds over the 21 year sample period,
1971 to 1991. Importantly Malkiel (1995) uses a survivor-bias-free dataset of quar-
terly total returns obtained from Lipper. The inclusion of both non-surviving and
surviving funds allows Malkiel (1995) to quantify the impact of survivor-bias on fund
returns and question the validity of the conclusions from previous research based
on survivor-biased datasets. Malkiel (1995) finds that surviving funds consistently
have higher mean returns than non-surviving funds and the difference is statisti-
cally significant. Survivor-biased datasets therefore generally overstate the returns
to mutual fund investors and emphasises the importance of creating a survivor-bias-
free dataset in this thesis. Funds only seem to outperform the market in Malkiel
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(1995) on a total return basis when gross of expenses and conditional on surviving
funds only. On a risk-adjusted basis using the single index model (CAPM) and only
surviving funds Malkiel (1995) finds an average alpha statistically insignificant from
zero. Malkiel (1995) also highlights the impact the proxy for the market return can
have particularly if an index of large capitalisation stocks is used in a period when
smaller stocks perform significantly different to the large stocks.
Ferson and Schadt (1996) extend the fund performance literature by using condi-
tional factor models. Ferson and Schadt (1996) advocate conditional performance
evaluation where lagged information variables that are publicly available are incor-
porated in to the factor model. Ferson and Schadt (1996) argue that a strategy that
simply uses publicly available information should not imply superior performance.
Using monthly data for 67 mutual funds over the sample period January 1968 to
December 1990 Ferson and Schadt (1996) find that their conditional models give
improved performance for the stock selection skills and market timing abilities of
fund managers in comparison to unconditional models.
The influential paper of Carhart (1997) incorporates the momentum factor of Je-
gadeesh and Titman (1993) into the Fama and French three factor model. Although
the motivation of Carhart (1997) is performance persistence using a survivor-bias-
free dataset of 1892 equity funds over the sample period January 1962 to December
1993 Carhart (1997) finds that fund performance is negatively related to the fees
charged by the fund and the turnover of the fund.
Almost all of the aforementioned research on performance has been conducted using
standard conventional statistical techniques, especially in regards to the calcula-
tion of the standard errors. In recent papers Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and
French (2010) use bootstrap methods to calculate alpha and the t statistic for al-
pha. The main idea behind the bootstrap is to separate skill from luck as standard
statistical techniques do not account for luck persisting or the non normality in
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alpha. Kosowski et al. (2006) find that after applying the bootstrap to their 1975
to 2002 equity sample of 2,118 US mutual funds net of returns a sizable minority
of fund managers exhibit adequate stock picking skills to cover their costs. In ad-
dition Kosowski et al. (2006) find that the significant abnormal performance and
persistence in performance is in growth oriented funds.
Scaillet et al. (2010) reexamine performance of US mutual funds over the sample
period 1975 to 2006 using a FDR (False Discovery Rate) approach. Applying this
new method to performance data Scaillet et al. (2010) they find that approximately
75% of funds exhibit zero alpha based on returns net of expenses with very few
funds providing evidence of genuine skill particularly in the most recent part of
their sample. The results of Scaillet et al. (2010) are broadly similar to Cuthbertson
et al. (2010a) who also apply the FDR approach to evaluate the performance of UK
equity unit trusts/OEICs.
In terms of the performance of pension funds in the US the literature is much sparer
than for mutual funds. Most of the US literature examining pensions focus on
US occupational schemes. Ippolito and Turner (1987) examine 1,526 US pension
funds and find and find evidence of under performance by US pension funds relative
to their S&P 500 benchmark. Coggin et al. (1993) examine the performance of
occupational pension funds from a random sample of 71 US equity funds over the
sample period 1983 to 1990 and find some evidence of positive stock selection skills
but negative market timing abilities.
UK Studies
The research on performance in the UK over the past 20 years has been sparser in
comparison to similar research based in a US setting. A potential reason for this
is survivorship bias issues in UK data. In the US academics have access to the
CRSP database where mutual fund data is held on both dead and live funds. In
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the UK however a complete sample of live and dead funds is difficult to obtain since
most database providers are commercial and are biased towards the active investor
who only requires data on their current opportunity set of investments. As a result
dead funds are generally dropped from such databases at the time of their death
causing survivorship bias issues when assessing the cross-sectional performance of
funds over time. Due to the difficulty in obtaining survivor-bias-free data few studies
on performance have been conducted on UK unit trusts/OEICs in comparison to
the US3.
Fletcher (1995) examines the selectivity and market timing skills of UK unit trust
managers in equity sectors. Fletcher (1995) analyses a random selection of 101 unit
trusts, under the restriction that each unit trust is required to have at least two
years of continuous returns data, over the sample period January 1980 to December
1989. Fletcher (1995) examines fund performance using the methods advocated
by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Chen and Stockum (1986) to decompose
fund performance into the stock selection ability and market timing skill of the
fund manager. Fletcher (1995) uses the single index (CAPM) model but uses a
variety of benchmarks to proxy for the market portfolio to evaluate whether results
are conditional on the benchmark used in the single index model. Fletcher (1995)
finds that on average UK equity unit trust managers exhibit positive performance
in stock selection and negative timing ability but the statistical significance of the
results depends on the portfolio benchmark used in the factor model, the selectivity
and market timing test used and the investment objectives of the unit trusts. Using
the same UK equity unit trust dataset Fletcher (1997) examines the relationship
between unit trust performance and their characteristics including their investment
objective, size and expenses. Using the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of Ross
(1976), Fletcher (1997) finds no significant evidence that unit trusts outperform
3Exceptions to this are Blake and Timmermann (1998), Quigley and Sinquefield (2000), Fletcher
and Forbes (2002) and Cuthbertson et al. (2008) whose research are all based on essentially
survivor-bias-free samples.
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their benchmark and their is little relationship between unit trust performance and
investment objective, size and expenses with the results robust to various APT
benchmarks.
Leger (1997) extends the literature on timing and selectivity in a UK setting but
unlike the vast majority of the literature Leger (1997) analyses UK investment trusts
instead of open end investment vehicles. Using a sample of 72 UK investment trusts
over the sample period 1973 to December 1993 Leger (1997) finds some evidence of
significant positive selectivity and significant negative timing ability using various
methods including the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) method based on a single index
model.
Blake et al. (1999) analyse UK unit trusts/OEICs performance across all investment
objectives with a survivor-bias-free dataset. The unique dataset Blake et al. (1999)
use allows them to assess the significance of survivorship bias on fund performance,
the performance of non-surviving funds in the period prior to their death, the per-
formance of funds in their first year of existence. The unique database Blake and
Timmermann (1998) use consists of monthly returns, provided by Micropal, over a
23 year period from February 1972 to June 1995. The data set is survivor-bias-free
and provides returns data on approximately 2300 funds of which 973 had been in
existence over the sample period but were not in existence at the end of the sample
either through being merged with another fund or through liquidation. The remain-
ing 1402 funds were still in existence at the end of the sample and had either been
in existence over the whole sample or in most cases had come into existence at some
point during the sample period. Unlike the standard equity focused mutual fund
research found in the literature the dataset Blake and Timmermann (1998) analyse
is subdivided into 20 unit trust sectors as defined by the Association of Unit Trusts
and Investment Funds (AUTIF). Thus, Blake and Timmermann (1998) not only
analyse unit trusts with a UK equity focus but also analyse unit trusts where fixed
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income, property, commodities and international investing are the primary objec-
tives of the fund. Blake and Timmermann (1998) use their dataset to analyse both
the survivor premium and survivor bias inherent in UK unit trusts. They find that
across all funds over the sample period the mean survivor premium is 2.4% per year.
Blake and Timmermann (1998) also analyse the various sectors within the dataset
and find that 16 out of the 20 sectors over the sample period have positive survivor
premiums. The 4 sectors where this is not the case only contain a limited num-
ber of non-surviving funds. Using an equally weighted portfolio approach based on
an unconditional multi factor model Blake and Timmermann (1998) find evidence
of under performance by equity and balanced fund managers of around -.15% per
month on a risk-adjusted basis although the majority of sectors are not statistically
significant at the 5% level.
Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) test whether UK equity unit trust/OEIC managers
can outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis with a strong emphasis on
whether this is particularly true for fund managers of small stocks. Whilst Blake
and Timmermann (1998) analyse all UK unit trusts Quigley and Sinquefield (2000)
concentrate on only UK equity unit trusts. Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) look at
monthly returns on 752 UK equity based funds, where 279 of those funds die at
some point within their 20 year sample period of January 1978 to December 1997.
Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) also obtain their data from Micropal and since it
includes non-surviving funds it is survivor-bias-free. Using both the CAPM (single
index model) and Fama-French three factor model they find that fund managers net
of expenses are unable to outperform the market, a conclusion in line with most US
mutual fund studies. Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) also find that funds in the UK
small stocks sector, contrary to popular belief, do not consistently beat the market
and on a risk-adjusted basis are the worst performers in their sample.
Whilst the majority of the UK literature concentrates on equity funds Gregory
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and Whittaker (2007) analyse the performance of UK ethical funds4. Funds with
objectives of socially responsible investing are relatively new and therefore contain
a small set of funds in comparison to the universe of equity funds. Gregory and
Whittaker (2007) analyse 32 ethical funds available in the UK over the sample
period January 1989 to December 2002. Whilst the SRI funds have a lower raw
average return than non SRI funds Gregory and Whittaker (2007) find no significant
under performance on a risk adjusted basis using three and four factor models.
Interestingly, Gregory and Whittaker (2007) find varying results for the significance
of abnormal performance based on whether a static or time-varying model is used.
The majority of the previous studies on performance use standard conventional sta-
tistical measures, particularly in regards the measurement of the standard errors,
which may be invalid if regressions are run individually for each fund and average
alphas calculated. In contrast, Cuthbertson et al. (2008) employ the methodology
of Kosowski et al. (2006) where they use a residual bootstrapping technique to ac-
count for the non normality in the individual fund alpha distributions to distinguish
between skill and luck for fund performance. On a survivor-bias-free sample of 842
non tracker UK equity unit trusts/OEICs over the time period April 1975 to De-
cember 2002 Cuthbertson et al. (2008) find that the average alpha of UK equity
unit trusts/OEICs is negative but statistically insignificant generally supporting
the findings of Blake and Timmermann (1998). These results are relatively robust
across three and four factor models including both unconditional and conditional
alpha and alpha and beta models. In addition to analyzing cross-sectional averages
Cuthbertson et al. (2008) also investigate the extreme tails of the alpha distribution.
Cuthbertson et al. (2008) find a relatively small number (between 5 and 10%) of
UK funds that have managers with genuine stock picking skills after controlling for
luck. They also find that the majority of poorly performing funds is due to bad
skill from the fund manager rather that the fund manager simply being unlucky.
4Ethical funds are also known as SRI (Socially responsible investing) funds.
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Using the same dataset Cuthbertson et al. (2010a) assesses UK equity trust/OEIC
performance using the false discovery rate (FDR). This builds on the authors pre-
vious work and analyses funds individually rather than focusing on cross-sectional
averages and tries to identify how many UK equity unit trusts/OEICs truly have
significant abnormal return after adjusting for the FDR. The FDR aims to identify
the proportion of funds with significant alphas that would be expected due to luck
alone. Cuthbertson et al. (2008) find that approximately 75% of UK equity unit
trusts/OEICs do not under or outperform their benchmarks using an unconditional
three factor model. Traditional methods find 3% of funds have a significantly posi-
tive alpha at a 2.5% significant level but the FDR for these funds is high at 30.4%
which suggests only 2% of these significantly positive alpha funds are truly skillful
and are not just lucky. Cuthbertson et al. (2008) find a much smaller FDR of 5%
at the 2.5% significant level for funds with significantly negative alpha. After ac-
counting for the FDR the evidence at the 2.5% significance level Cuthbertson et al.
(2010a) suggest that 17% of UK equity unit trust/OEICs are unskilled. Evidence in
both Cuthbertson et al. (2008) and Cuthbertson et al. (2010a) suggests the number
of funds with truly negative abnormal performance is much greater than the num-
ber of funds with truly positive abnormal performance. Cuthbertson et al. (2010b)
also extend the literature on UK equity unit trust performance by focusing on the
timing ability of UK unit trusts/OEICs. Instead of using the traditional market
timing methods of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981),
Cuthbertson et al. (2010b) employ the nonparametric technique of Jiang (2003). Al-
though Cuthbertson et al. (2010b) use a different method to the previous literature
to analyse the market timing skills of unit trusts/OEICs they find little evidence of
market timing skills amongst UK unit trusts/OEICs with only a few funds exhibit-
ing positive market timing skills with the which supports the previous findings of
Fletcher (1995) and the work of Leger (1997) based on investment trusts.
In comparison to UK unit trusts/OEICs the literature on the performance of UK
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pension funds is more limited. Gregory and Tonks (2004) analyse the performance
of 506 UK equity based unit-linked personal pensions over the sample period June
1980 to December 2000 using both conditional and unconditional models based
on single, three and four factor models. Gregory and Tonks (2004) find that in
general average performance of personal pension funds is not significantly different
from zero. Gregory and Tonks (2004) use the market timing test of Treynor and
Mazuy (1966) and find a negative market timing effect. In general they find that
unit-linked personal pensions do not earn significant abnormal returns, a finding
relatively consistent with previous fund research.
Clare et al. (2010) analyse the performance of UK pension managers of occupational
schemes with a strong emphasis on the market timing ability of the managers. Using
a sample of quarterly returns over the period March 1980 to December 2004, con-
sisting of 734 pooled funds including both dead and live funds, Clare et al. (2010)
find little evidence of significant positive abnormal performance or any significant
market timing.
Blake et al. (2010) analyse the performance of UK occupational defined-benefit
funds across a range of investment objectives including equities and bonds, with
both domestic and international objectives. Whilst the main motivation of Blake
et al. (2010) is to investigate the decentralisation of the investment management
industry using pension fund data, they do find some evidence of significant security
selection skills for specialist managers.
The general consensus in the literature is that markets are generally informationally
efficient and on average fund managers do not consistently earn abnormal returns.
Whilst there is some evidence of stock selection ability there is very little evidence
that fund managers can time the market.
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2.3 Performance Persistence
Whilst the first part of this thesis addresses fund performance I now extend the dis-
cussion to address the time dynamics of performance and whether fund performance
persists. Carpenter and Lynch (1999) analyse fund persistence tests, particularly in
relation to survivorship bias, and classify the methodologies into two types, contin-
gency tables and performance ranked portfolio tests. Both of these type of tests are
used extensively in the fund performance literature and I use both in this thesis. The
performance persistence tests are in essence a test of the EMH where ex ante data
is being used to test whether it provides information to achieve abnormal returns ex
post. Whilst the performance persistence results in this thesis also provide evidence
on the informational efficiency of the UK equity market the main motivation is an
empirical test of the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows.
2.3.1 Berk and Green (2004) Model of Mutual Fund Flows
Berk and Green (2004) produce an equilibrium model of fund performance where
fund flows are the equilibrating mechanism that results in no persistence in per-
formance. The performance flow relationship is non linear where extremely good
fund performance subsequently results in large fund inflows whereas for funds with
poor performance there are relatively smaller outflows. The Berk and Green (2004)
model of mutual fund flows predicts that we will never observe persistence in mu-
tual fund performance because money flows into funds that have performed well
and out of funds that have performed badly. Thus Berk and Green (2004) argue
that this flow of money into successful funds will lead to difficulties in managing
the money successfully due to decreasing returns to scale. These decreasing returns
to scale could be due to higher transaction costs and larger price impact on trades
associated with larger inflows or due to spreading information gathering activities
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too thinly. Conversely they argue that for funds that have had poor performance,
an outflow of money will allow the fund to be managed more efficiently and the poor
performance will not persist. Berk and Green (2004) argue that performance is not
persistent because investors chase good performance and punish bad performance.
The performance flow relationship is convex in the model and is consistent with
the general findings in the empirical fund flow literature. Personal pensions can be
switched but since they have high switching costs and are a long term contractual
savings vehicle inaccessible until retirement the flow of funds in personal pensions
should not be as responsive to past performance as that of unit trusts, and hence,
if the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows is correct we should find
more performance persistence in personal pensions.
The idea that fund flows are subject to diminishing returns to scale is at the heart
of the Berk and Green (2004) model. It would be tempting to just compare the
funds of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions but this is implicitly
assuming that the diseconomies of scale due to fund flows occur at the fund level
and are independent from one another. If each fund has its own separate underlying
portfolio and fund manager then a direct comparison between the unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pension funds with a view to test Berk and Green (2004)
would be valid. However, diseconomies of scale from fund flows must occur at the
underlying portfolio level and it is generally not the case that underlying portfolios
of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions are independent from one
another. It is still insightful to compare the performance persistence between unit
trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions to directly compare two different
investment vehicles but it cannot be viewed as a rigorous empirical test of the
Berk and Green (2004) model. The fund manager of an underlying portfolio may
receive fund flows into the underlying portfolio from numerous funds across various
investment vehicles. I assess the structure of the underlying portfolios for UK equity
open ended investments in Section 3.2 in order to justify the conditions needed for
54 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE SURVEY AND HYPOTHESES
a valid empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) based on a comparative analysis
between unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds.
2.3.2 Performance Persistence Methodologies and
Hypotheses
Contingency Tables
Contingency tables have been used throughout the relevant literature to assess per-
formance persistence in funds5. Funds are classified as winners (W) or losers (L)
based on the median abnormal return over the relevant ranking period. Over two
consecutive time periods a two by two table is formed such that a fund can have
one of four outcomes, (WW ), (WL), (LW ) or (WW ) where W represents being
above the median abnormal return and a winner and L means being below the me-
dian abnormal return and a loser. The following four statistical procedures are the
most common found in the literature to be used with contingency tables to test for
performance persistence:
1. Cross-product ratio (CP) or Odds Ratio
CP =
(WW × LL)
(WL× LW ) (2.11)
The statistical significance of the CP ratio can be tested as log(CP)/σlogCP
has a standard normal distribution where
σlogCP =
[(
1
WW
)
+
(
1
WL
)
+
(
1
LW
)
+
(
1
LL
)] 1
2
(2.12)
5See Brown et al. (1992), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995),
Malkiel (1995) and Fletcher and Forbes (2002) for the application of contingency tables to test for
fund performance persistence.
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and allows the significance of the deviations of CP ratio from unity to be
tested. If the test statistic is significantly positive then it provides evidence
of persistence in performance. A significantly negative test statistic provides
evidence of reversals in performance.
2. Percentage of repeat winners (PRW), where
PRW =
WW(
N
2
) (2.13)
The percentage of repeat winners is generally employed in the literate to test
the “hot hands” phenomenon found in Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Goetz-
mann and Ibbotson (1994) and Hendricks et al. (1993). Funds identified as
winners in the ranking period would expect on average to be winners in the
evaluation period 50% of the time if there is no persistence in performance
and funds are independent.
3. Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f, where
CHI =
(
WW − N
4
)2
+
(
WL− N
4
)2
+
(
LW − N
4
)2
+
(
LL− N
4
)2(
N
4
) (2.14)
4. Following Grinblatt and Titman (1992) a regression of evaluation period ab-
normal returns on ranking period abnormal returns with a t-stat assessing the
statistical significance of the slope coefficient. A positive slope coefficient with
a statistically significant t-statistic supports the hypothesis that abnormal past
performance can be used to predict future abnormal performance.
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Performance Ranked Portfolio Strategies
Funds are sorted into portfolios, normally decile or quintile depending on the num-
ber of funds in the sample, based on abnormal performance from a factor model
over a specified ranking period. The abnormal performance of the top and bottom
portfolios is then calculated over a specified evaluation period. These procedures are
carried out over the sample period based on overlapping observations. Statistical
tests are applied on the difference between the average abnormal returns between
the top and bottom portfolios over the evaluation period adjusting for autocorrela-
tion. Carpenter and Lynch (1999) advocate the use of performance ranked portfolio
tests where the test statistic based on the difference in the abnormal return between
the top and bottom portfolios over the evaluation periods is best specified under a
null hypothesis of no performance persistence.
Performance Persistence Hypotheses
• Hypothesis 3
– There is more performance persistence in UK equity unit-linked personal
pension funds in comparison to UK equity unit trusts/OEICs.
The Berk and Green (2004) model implies that fund flows are the equilibrating
mechanism that results in no persistence in performance. Money invested in unit-
linked personal pension funds is only accessible when the pension holder retires or
reaches the minimum age at which the pension can be taken, which in the UK is 55
years of age as at April 2010. Investors can transfer capital across personal pension
funds but the level of switching is minimal, Alfon (2002). In comparison, money
invested in unit trusts/OEICs can be withdrawn and accessed for other purposes
at any time. The performance fund flow relationship should therefore be stronger
for unit trust/OEICs due to the highly illiquid nature of personal pension funds. In
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the US Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find evidence of a more attenuated fund flow
relationship for pensions in comparison to mutual funds. If the Berk and Green
(2004) equilibrating mechanism of fund flows is restricted in unit-linked personal
pensions then we should expect more evidence of performance persistence in unit-
linked personal pensions. However, as previously mentioned diseconomies of scale
from fund flows must be at the underlying portfolio level. Since many unit-linked
personal pension funds share an underlying portfolio with a unit trust/OEIC these
personal pensions do not have a more attenuated performance fund flow relationship
at the underlying portfolio level. Therefore, the direct comparison between unit
trust/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions is insightful but cannot be viewed
as a strict empirical test of Berk and Green (2004). However, not all unit linked
personal pension share an underlying portfolio with a unit trust/OEIC so potentially
we should still expect more performance persistence in unit-linked personal pensions.
To conduct a more rigorous empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) I use FundID
as a proxy for the underlying portfolio and use the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal
Pension FundID Database to test Hypothesis 4.
• Hypothesis 4
– There is more performance persistence in UK equity unit-linked personal
pension funds that have FundIDs that do not include a unit trust/OEIC
in comparison to unit-linked personal pension funds that do have Fun-
dIDs that include a unit trust/OEIC, where FundID proxies for the un-
derlying portfolio.
Hypothesis 4 concentrates on unit-linked personal pension funds rather than both
unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions as the unit trust/OEIC sample
contains a large proportion of dead funds. Since I do not have FundID information
for dead funds it is not possible to analyse their underlying portfolios, where Fun-
dID proxies for the underlying portfolio. It is also not as important to analyse the
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underlying portfolios of unit trusts/OEICs as regardless of what other investment
vehicles are part of their underlying portfolios the fund flows to the underlying port-
folio still contain flows from a unit trust/OEIC. I therefore concentrate Hypothesis
4 on the unit-linked personal pension funds where survivor bias is less of an issue.
Hypothesis 4 is tested using the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID
Database. The database includes all UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds
that have a FundID that only includes unit-linked personal pensions and all UK
equity unit-linked personal pension funds that have a FundID that also includes
at least a unit trust/OEIC. Due to the illiquid nature of unit-linked personal pen-
sion funds that have a FundID that only includes unit-linked personal pensions the
performance fund flow relationship should be more attenuated and we should ob-
serve more performance persistence since the equilibrating mechanism of fund flows
in the Berk and Green (2004) is restricted. For the unit-linked personal pension
funds that have FundIDs that include at least a unit trust/OEIC their underlying
portfolios also includes fund flows from a unit trust/OEIC and hence the fund flows
to the underlying portfolio are not restricted and we should see less persistence in
performance.
2.3.3 Performance Persistence Literature Review
US Studies
Grinblatt and Titman (1992) use a survivor-biased dataset of 279 US mutual funds
to test for performance persistence over the sample period 1974 to 1984. Grin-
blatt and Titman (1992) believe survivor bias to be small in their dataset and since
non-surviving funds are excluded it should make finding positive persistence more
difficult since non-surviving funds are typically funds who are poor performers in se-
quential periods. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) find statistically significant evidence
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of performance persistence by regressing 5 year evaluation period alphas on 5 year
ranking period alphas. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) use an eight-portfolio bench-
mark on which to calculate alpha where the factors in the eight-portfolio benchmark
account for size, dividend yields and past returns.
Malkiel (1995) finds significant persistence in US equity mutual fund performance
during the 1970s using 2-way contingency tables based on a Z-stat6 for the percentage
of repeat winners with the results robust to the length of the ranking and evaluation
periods and the whether performance is measured by total returns or a risk-adjusted
alpha. However, during the 1980’s the same contingency table tests produce much
weaker support of the hot hand phenomenon in Hendricks et al. (1993) with the
empirical evidence failing to reject the null hypothesis that performance persists.
In fact during the 1980s Malkiel (1995) finds significant evidence of reversals in
performance (WL or LW) rather than positive performance persistence.
Brown and Goetzmann (1995) like Malkiel (1995) analyses performance persistence
on an essentially survivor-bias-free dataset of equity mutual funds over the sample
period 1976 to 1988. Unlike Malkiel (1995) whose dataset is from Lipper Brown
and Goetzmann (1995) obtain their data from Weisenberger Investment Companies
Service’s Mutual Fund Panorama. Brown and Goetzmann (1995) find persistence
in poor performers but through their year by year analysis find it is sensitive to the
time period under analysis.
An influential study by Carhart (1997) finds that after using his four factor model
performance persistence is not present. Using a survivor-bias free sample of 1,892
US equity mutual funds the one anomaly in Carhart (1997) is the relative continual
under performance by the worst performing funds. The recent fund flow literature
tries to explain the one anomaly in Carhart (1997) by examining the performance
6Z = (Y −np)/(√np(1− p)) where n is the number of pairs, p equals 0.5 and Y is the number
of persistently winning funds. When n is large Z is approximately normally distributed with mean
0 and standard deviation 1.
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fund flow relationship in relation to the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual
fund flows.
UK Studies
Whilst the main motivation of Blake and Timmermann (1998) is to analyse fund
performance they also assess the level of performance persistence in their 1972 to
1995 sample of 814 UK funds. Blake and Timmermann (1998) apply the recursive
portfolio approach based on abnormal returns using a 24 month ranking period
with a one month evaluation period and find some evidence of positive performance
persistence.
Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) analyse performance persistence on their survivor-
bias-free UK equity unit trust sample using both raw and abnormal returns based
on the CAPM and Fama and French three factor model. Quigley and Sinquefield
(2000) use the recursive portfolio approach and find persistence in performance
in raw returns but they emphasise that to exploit this opportunity would require
80% turnover a year eliminating any profits in practice. On a risk-adjusted basis
Quigley-Sinquefield-2000 find little evidence of persistence in performance in the top
performing funds but some evidence of persistence in the worst performers in line
with numerous US based studies.
Fletcher and Forbes (2002) assess performance persistence in UK equity unit trusts
using both contingency tables, as previously used by Allen and Tan (1999) for UK
investment trusts, and the recursive portfolio approach. Fletcher and Forbes (2002)
find significant persistence using contingency tables based on prior year excess re-
turns and no significant evidence of reversals with their results robust to the per-
formance measure used. The performance persistence in the contingency table tests
is mainly due to repeat losers. Using the recursive portfolio approach Fletcher and
Forbes (2002) find evidence of performance persistence when ranking funds into
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quartiles based on prior year excess returns from a single index model. However,
using the Carhart (1997) four factor model Fletcher and Forbes (2002) find more
reversals in performance and no significant evidence of performance persistence.
Cuthbertson et al. (2008) assess the performance persistence of 675 UK equity funds
over the sample period 1975 to 2002. Whilst the main motivation of Cuthbertson
et al. (2008) is to assess the performance of UK equity funds using a bootstrap
method to distinguish between lucky and skillful fund managers they also briefly
analyse performance persistence using a recursive portfolio approach. Funds are
ranked into quintiles based on the t statistic of alpha using the previous 60 months
of data. Cuthbertson et al. (2008) find no evidence of performance persistence for
winners but some evidence of performance persistence for losers with the results
robust to rebalancing over 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. The average alpha of the
bottom quintile is approximately -2% per year.
For UK pensions the performance persistence literature is much sparer and covers a
range of pension products. Brown et al. (1997) and Blake et al. (1999) find no strong
evidence of performance persistence. Tonks (2005) examines performance persis-
tence in UK occupational schemes over the sample period March 1983 to December
1997 using both contingency tables and performance ranked portfolio strategies.
Tonks (2005) finds stronger evidence of persistence than previous studies at one
year horizons and weaker evidence in the long run with the results being generally
robust when using both the Fama and French three factor model and the Carhart
4 factor model. Gregory and Tonks (2004) examine the performance and perfor-
mance persistence in UK personal pensions and find negative persistence at short
horizons, but over six months to a year significant positive performance persistence,
even when using the Carhart (1997) four factor model.
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2.4 Fund Flows
The fund flow literature can be broadly split into two areas based on whether the
motivation is to
• Examine the relationship between ex ante performance and ex post fund flows.
• Examine the relationship between the ex ante fund flows and the ex post
performance.
The vast majority of the previous literature on fund flows examines the relationship
between ex ante performance and ex post fund flows to examine how investors react
to past performance through their subsequent investments. The second and more
recent motivation examines the relationship between the ex ante fund flows and the
ex post performance and has been a focus of interest due to the Berk and Green
(2004) model of mutual fund flows. In this thesis I will examine both motivations.
I will examine the performance fund flow relationship for both UK equity unit
trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds. There is very
little previous evidence on the performance fund flow relationship for UK collective
investment schemes due to the lack of data availability. I will also perform another
empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) using performance ranked portfolio tests
conditional on fund flows. It is also important to stress that the empirical test of
Berk and Green (2004) is based on fund flows at the underlying portfolio level which
is a unique element of this test.
2.4.1 Fund Flow Methodologies and Hypotheses
Fund flows can be calculated on relative or absolute terms. The relative fund flow
measure is shown in Equation (7.1). Since it adjusts for the size of the fund it is
generally the preferred measure used in the literature, see Sirri and Tufano (1998)
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and Chevalier and Ellison (1997). In Equation (2.15) the NAVit is the total NAV
(net asset value) i.e. fund size for fund i at time t, NAVit−1 is the total NAV at
t − 1 and (1 + rit) is the realised return on the fund between t and t − 1 assuming
all distributions are reinvested.
Flowit ≡ NAVit − NAVit−1 (1 + rit)
NAVit−1
(2.15)
In this thesis I use a slightly modified version of Equation 2.15 as Berk and Tonks
(2007) highlight a potential problem with this measure. If a poorly performing fund
in the sample enters liquidation the relative flow of funds measure would expected
to be -100%. However, Equation (2.15) will not produce a relative flow of funds
measure of -100% in liquidation7. To overcome this potential problem, Berk and
Tonks (2007) modify the denominator of Equation (2.15) and use Equation (2.16),
where now in liquidation a fund’s flow in its last period will be equal to -100%.
In this research I use Equation (2.16) for the calculation of the relative fund flows
although the impact of using either measure should be minimal.
Flowit ≡ NAVit − NAVit−1 (1 + rit)
NAVit−1 (1 + rit)
(2.16)
The absolute fund flow measure is given in Equation (2.17).
Flowit ≡ NAVit − NAVit−1 (1 + rit) (2.17)
Fund Flow Hypotheses
• Hypothesis 5
7Unless, the return over the period is 0 i.e. rit is equal to zero.
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– There is a stronger performance fund flow relationship for UK equity
unit trusts/OEICs than for UK unit-linked personal pensions.
Due to the illiquid nature of personal pensions investors in unit-linked personal
pension funds should be less responsive to past performance in comparison to unit
trust/OEIC investors. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) provide evidence to support a
more convex performance fund flow relationship for US mutual funds in comparison
to US pension funds and this thesis will extend the literature to the UK market where
there is a lack of empirical evidence. I will also examine whether any differences
in the performance fund flow relationship are located in the extreme tails of the
performance distribution.
• Hypothesis 6
– Past winners who have the highest net flows should on average have ex
post worse abnormal performance than the past winners who have the
lowest net flows.
• Hypothesis 7
– Past losers who have the lowest net flows should on average have ex post
better abnormal performance than the past losers who have the highest
net flows.
According to Berk and Green (2004) decreasing returns to scale from fund flows
should result in no persistence in fund performance. Using performance ranked
portfolio tests conditional on fund flows at the underlying portfolio level we should
find more performance persistence in the evaluation period for the worst perform-
ing funds with the highest net fund flows in the ranking period in comparison to
the worst performing funds with the lowest net fund flows in the ranking period.
The best performing funds with the highest net fund flows in the ranking period
should provide less evidence of performance persistence in comparison to the best
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performing funds with the lowest net fund flows in the ranking period. These general
predictions should apply to both unit-trusts/OEICs but it probably depends on the
level of convexity in the performance fund flow relationships.
2.4.2 Fund Flows Literature Review
US Studies
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) estimate the performance fund flow relationship for US
mutual funds using using growth and income funds over the sample period 1982 to
1992. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that the performance fund flow relationship
creates incentives for fund managers to risk shift and find empirical evidence that
fund managers to risk shift towards the end of the year. Sirri and Tufano (1998)
find a convex performance fund flow relationship for 690 US mutual funds over the
period 1971 to 1990. In addition to performance Sirri and Tufano (1998) also find
that marketing, fees and fund size are important factors in determining fund flows.
The convex nature of the performance fund flow relationship for US mutual funds is
also found in Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). Evidence in Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)
also provides evidence on US mutual funds and generally find a strong relationship
between past performance and subsequent fund flows. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)
also examine US pension funds and find that investors in pension funds punish the
worst performing funds by withdrawing their capital from the fund. They also have
less inclination to switch to winner funds in comparison to mutual fund investors.
Berk and Tonks (2007) empirically test the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual
fund flows. Using a sample of 9,830 US mutual funds over the period 1962 to 2004
they find that the anomaly in Carhart (1997) of performance persistence in the worst
funds can potentially be explained by investors being reluctant to withdraw their
capital from these poorly performing funds. Bessler et al. (2010) perform similar
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tests for performance persistence but conditional on both fund flows and managerial
change. Bessler et al. (2010) find that managerial change is at least as important as
fund flows in explaining performance persistence in US mutual funds.
UK Studies
There is very little literature on the performance fund flow relationship for UK
funds. The main reason is fund size data not being available. The only exception to
this is Keswani and Stolin (2008) and their related work. Keswani and Stolin (2008)
examine how new cash inflows and outflows impact on future performance. Their
sample includes approximately 500 funds and covers the period 1992 to 2000. Their
rich dataset find that the performance fund flow relationship is convex for both
buying and selling decisions. They are also able to investigate the performance fund
flow relationship for retail and institutional investors and find marked differences.
Chapter 3
Institutional Features of Unit
Trusts/OEICs, Unit-Linked
Personal Pensions and Fund Flows
3.1 Unit Trusts/OEICs and Unit-Linked Personal
Pensions
Unit trusts are a collective investment vehicle which allow both individual and in-
stitutional investors to invest in a pooled investment fund. The primary benefit
of such a collective investment scheme, particularly for individual investors, is a
widely diversified portfolio obtainable at relatively low cost. Thus, collective invest-
ment schemes with the benefit of economies of scale serve an important function
for investors in the financial markets. In addition the average individual investor
generally does not have the knowledge, expertise and the required time to conduct
investment research and analysis to make well informed investment decisions and
manage those decisions over time. By investing in a collective investment vehicle
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investors are able to obtain the investment services of professional portfolio man-
agers. The benefit of this professional investment however comes with a price which
the investor pays for through various fees1. In recent years OEICs, a new collec-
tive investment scheme, have seen an emergence into the market place in the UK.
OEICs are very similar in nature to unit trusts with the primary difference being
that OEICs are legally created as a company whereas unit trusts are created as a
trust. Another important difference, particularly for the investor, is that unit trusts
are priced on a bid-ask2 basis whereas OEICs offer single pricing which seems more
transparent to the investor. Thus OEICs have a simpler structure and have more
transparent pricing than unit trusts which seems more appealing to investors and
in part explains OEICs increase in popularity. OEICs, which originated in Europe,
comply with EU law and are thus more marketable to european investors as they can
be sold across the EU. This is the other main reason for the rise in the popularity
and growth of OEICs in the UK over recent years and the trend for unit trusts to
convert their funds into an OEIC structure. By converting to an OEIC structure
the larger set of potential investors means there are more opportunities for the fund
to grow in size through new fund inflows increasing fund manager compensation.
To illustrate the size and importance of the industry the Investment Management
Association (IMA) estimate that UK authorised unit trusts and OEICs have £569
billion of assets under management as at 2010.
Both unit trusts and OEICs are open-ended investment vehicles where their unit/share
price is determined as a function of the underlying asset value and the number of
units/shares in existence. New money invested in a unit trust/OEIC creates new
units/shares and investors withdrawing money from the unit trust/OEIC results in
units/shares being redeemed/canceled directly with the fund manager. Thus the
value of unit trusts and OEICs shares are not a function of supply and demand
1Fund charges and fess are discussed in detail Section 3.1.1.
2Also refereed to as bid-offer.
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pressure as in closed end funds e.g. UK investment trusts. In comparison to the US
market unit trusts/OEICs can be seen as the UK equivalent to the US mutual fund.
Although the terminology is different the fact that unit trusts and OEICs are the
equivalent to mutual funds is beneficial as it allows direct comparisons to be made
between fund performance in the US and the UK.
In summary, unit trusts and OEICs are similar open ended investment vehicles in
that they both allow investors to invest a diversified portfolio at low cost. Unit trusts
and OEICs take advantage of economies of scale and offer investors a diversified
investment with the additional benefit of having a professional portfolio manager
in charge of their capital. The downside for the investor is that managers of unit
trusts/OEICs charge investors for their services which reduces the net return to the
investor.
The personal pensions I analyse in this research are unit-linked personal pensions
and therefore have many similarities with unit trusts/OEICs. Unit-linked personal
pensions are a funded pension scheme that pays a pension at retirement on a de-
fined contribution basis3. For the pension holder this implies that the value of the
pension at retirement is a function of the frequency and amount of the contribu-
tions into their pension fund over the accumulation phase as well as the investment
performance and fees of the fund manager. To illustrate the size and importance
of the personal pension industry the Association of British Insurers (ABI) estimate
that insurer-administered individual pensions hold £475 billion in assets as at 2010.
The main difference between unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions
is that money invested in unit-linked personal pensions is inaccessible until the pen-
sion holder retires or reaches the minimum age at which the pension can be taken,
which in the UK is 55 years of age as at April 2010. Thus, unit-linked personal
pensions are highly illiquid forms of investment from the investor’s perspective in
3For more information on pensions in the UK see Blake (2003) and Blake (2006).
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comparison to unit trusts/OEICs where units/shares can be liquidated with the
fund manager at any time. It is precisely this illiquidity in unit-linked personal
pensions that should restrict the fund flow performance relationship and result in
more performance persistence in unit-linked personal pensions.
3.1.1 Fund Characteristics
The following sections detail specific characteristics of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-
linked personal pensions allowing comparisons to be drawn. Tables 3.1 and 3.2
summarise the key features of unit trusts and OEICs in tabular form and supple-
ments the discussion below. The table is taken from the document “Aberdeen Unit
Trust Managers Limited Proposed Scheme of Arrangement for the Conversion of
Aberdeen UK Growth Unit Trust a UK Authorised Unit Trust into Aberdeen UK
Growth Fund a sub-fund of Aberdeen Investment Funds ICVC.” Whilst the infor-
mation is specific to the aforementioned fund it provides a useful general comparison
between units trusts and OEICs. Fund characteristics can differ in terms of fund
structure, fund sector, fund valuation, fund pricing, fund charges and fund taxation
which are all important factors when assessing fund performance from an investors
perspective. These sections draw heavily on the work of St Giles et al. (2003) which
is one of the few publications that covers these areas in depth and is an indispensable
resource on the operations of collective investment schemes. The fund character-
istics discussion below is succinct in nature as although informative this research
is motivated and focused on assessing fund manager performance through security
selection and market timing and not the return to the investor which depends on the
fees/charges set by the fund manager and the investor’s individual circumstances
e.g. tax status.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Unit Trusts and OEICs
Feature Authorised Unit Trust OEIC
Legal Structure Trust Open-ended investment company
Fund Structure Single unit trust or umbrella Open-ended investment company
unit trust with single fund or umbrella
company with several sub-funds
Unit/Share Classes Can have income or Can have more than one class
accumulation units only and type of share
Fund managed by Manager Authorised Corporate Director
(ACD)
Investments held by Trustee Depositar
Meetings No annual general meeting Annual general meeting currently
required required. It is possible to
dispense with the requirement
for holding annual general
meetings on giving shareholders
60 days notice.
Pricing Dual or single pricing Single pricing
Switching Facility Unitholders in a single unit Shares can be switched between
trust are generally permitted classes within a sub-fund
to switch all or part of and between sub-funds of an
their units in a trust for umbrella company.
units in any other trust
managed by the same
manager. Similarly,
switching may take place
between the sub-funds of
an umbrella unit trust.
Taxation of Fund Not liable to UK corporation As for authorised unit
tax on capital gains arising trust
from disposal of investments.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Unit Trusts and OEICs Continued
Feature Authorised Unit Trust OEIC
Taxation of Fund Liable to corporation tax As for authorised unit trust
at the lower rate of tax
(currently 20%) on income
arising from investments after
relief for expenses
Dividends and distributions As for authorised unit trust
received from UK resident
companies are received with
a notional tax credit and
no further tax is payable
Dividends and distributions As for authorised unit trust
received from UK unit trusts
are split between franked
investment income and
unfranked investment income,
the latter is included as
taxable income.
The Trust is treated as if it For corporation tax purposes,
was a company resident in the each separate sub-fund of an
UK, and unitholders are OEIC is treated as a company.
treated as if they were The OEIC itself is not
shareholders in the company. treated as a UK company.
Ongoing taxation Income distributed by or accumulated in an OEIC is taxed on
of shareholders shareholders in the same way as income distributed by or
accumulated in a unit trust. Gains arising on disposal of
shares in the OEIC are also taxed on shareholders in the same
way as gains arising on disposal of units in an authorised
unit trust. Where a shareholder switches between different
classes of shares within the same sub-fund, this will not
normally constitute a disposal for capital gains tax purposes.
The new holding will be treated as if it had been acquired for
the same cost and at the same time as the old holding. However,
a shareholder switching between different sub-funds of the OEIC
will be treated as making a disposal of the old shareholding
for capital gains tax purposes.
The table above has been directly taken from the document “Aberdeen Unit Trust
Managers Limited Proposed Scheme of Arrangement for the Conversion of
Aberdeen UK Growth Unit Trust a UK Authorised Unit Trust into Aberdeen UK
Growth Fund a sub-fund of Aberdeen Investment Funds ICVC.”
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Fund Structure
Differences between fund structures is generally one of a legal nature and hence can
vary across countries due to differing legal systems. In this section the focus is on
the structure of the fund from a UK legal perspective with particular emphasis on
unit trusts, OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions.
In comparison to unit trusts, OEICs are created and structured as companies rather
than as a trust. Unit trusts created under a trust deed are governed by trust law
whereas OEICs are governed by company law. OEICs issue shares to investors
rather than units and the OEIC can issue different share classes that fulfill the
needs of a diverse group of potential investors. Generally, the share classes offered
by OEICs can be classified into retail and institutional where the substantial size of
the investments made by institutional investors allows OEICs to offer them reduced
charges/fees as an incentive for substantial investment. In comparison unit trusts
issue units rather than shares that are generally either accumulation units or income
units. For income units with an equity focus any dividends paid by the equity shares
in the underlying fund are paid out as income to the holders of the unit trust. In
comparison the accumulation units reinvest the dividends from the underlying equity
shares back into the underlying fund.
As a result of the legal differences between unit trusts and OEICs the unit trust
is managed by the fund manager and the investments are held by the trustee. In
comparison the OEIC is managed by an authorised corporate director (ACD) and
the investments are held by the depositar. Although both fund structures have
differences they are mainly from a legal perspective. From an investor’s perspec-
tive they are both open ended investment vehicles where the sale and redemption
of shares/units is directly with the fund manager and their NAV depends on the
underlying assets and the investment performance of the fund.
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Unit-linked personal pensions are very similar to unit trusts/OEICs. The main
difference is the illiquid nature of unit-linked personal pensions from the investor’s
perspective. Money invested into a personal pensions is inaccessible until retirement.
Also since unit-linked personal pensions are a contractual savings device for an indi-
vidual’s provision for retirement they are marketed and sold to individual investors
only although employers can contribute to an employee’s personal pension.
Scheme Sectors
Funds are classified into sectors based on their investment objectives. This research
concentrates on UK equity based funds only which is in line with the vast majority
of the existing literature on fund performance and performance persistence. The
UK equity focused unit trusts and OEICs are classified into sectors based on their
specific equity objectives and for the purpose of this research I use the Investment
Management Association’s (IMA) classification. Appendix A.1 defines the current
definitions as at 2008 for the three IMA UK equity based sectors of UK All Compa-
nies, UK Equity Income and UK Smaller Companies. The key criteria across all the
UK equity based sectors is that at least 80% of the fund must be held in UK equities.
The exact nature of sector classification is not universal and can differ across data
providers and through time. For instance Lipper’s equivalent classifications for UK
All Companies (IMA), UK Equity income (IMA) and UK Smaller Companies (IMA)
are Equity UK, Equity UK Income and UK Smaller Companies respectively. The
implication of this is that a database of funds in UK equity sectors may have slight
variations depending on which sector classifications are used although the variation
is not substantial and hence should have a negligible impact on the results.
The unit-linked personal pensions are also classified into sectors based on their spe-
cific equity objectives. The UK equity unit-linked personal pensions are divided into
UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Smaller Companies but whereas for
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unit trusts/OEICs the IMA define the sector definitions for unit-linked personal pen-
sions the Association of British Insurers (ABI) set the sector definitions as shown
in Appendix A.2. Comparing the ABI and IMA UK equity sector definitions em-
phasises that both bodies define the sectors in virtually the same manner. This
enables a clear comparison in the analysis of performance, performance persistence
and fund flows between UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked
personal pensions both at the sector level and for the entire sample.
Although Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2 define the IMA and ABI UK equity
based sector definitions these are the current definitions only as at the beginning of
2008 and it is important to emphasise that this has not always been the classification
used. For unit trusts/OEICs the IMA is the trade association for the investment
management industry but it only came into existence in its current form in 2002
with the merger of the Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds (AUTIF)
and the Fund Managers Association (FMA). Prior to 2002 unit trusts and OEICs
were classified into sectors by the AUTIF and prior to 1999 the equivalent equity
fund sectors were UK Equity Growth, UK Growth and Income, UK Equity Income
and UK Smaller Companies. In 1999 the AUTIF merged the two sectors of UK
Equity Growth and UK Growth and Income into one sector, UK All Companies,
due to there being no significant difference between the two sectors. I classify funds
that were in UK Equity Growth and UK Growth and Income prior to 1999 as being
in UK All Companies.
Charges
Investors use collective investment schemes to achieve diversification at lower cost
due to their economies of scale and to obtain professional portfolio management.
However, these services come at a cost to the investor. An investor in a collective
investment scheme is subject to charges that can be broadly classified into two
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categories as defined in St Giles et al. (2003).
• Charges levied on investors entering or leaving the fund.
• Charges or expenses levied directly on the fund.
Table 3.3 is an edited version from St Giles et al. (2003) describing the various fees
and charges incurred by investors and the fund in accordance with the aforemen-
tioned classification. The fees that apply to any given fund and investor depend
on the fund’s legal structure and the management company and should be clearly
stated in the fund’s prospectus and legal documentation.
Unit trusts use a dual pricing system where investors can buy a unit from the fund
manager at a higher price (offer or ask price) than they can sell back a unit to
the manager (bid price). The spread incorporates the initial charge/front end load
and notional dealing charges depending on whether there is net buying/selling of
units. The spread is also used by the fund to cover fund marketing expenses and pay
commissions to brokers and financial advisors to compensate them for their business.
Not all fund managers have the same charging structure particularly in regards front
and back end loads. The majority of funds only have a front end load which is part
of the spread initially paid by investors at the point of purchase. However, some
funds do not apply a front end load to encourage investors to invest in their unit
trust due to the reduce fees. These funds tend therefore to have back end loads
which is a fee the investor will occur at the point of sale of the unit trust and is
generally on a sliding scale over time. Back end fees encourage long term investment
by the investor which is particularly suited to fund managers as they generally are
compensated by a percentage of funds under management. The charges imposed by
OEICs are similar in nature to unit trusts but since OEICs employ a single pricing
methodology the charges are seen as more transparent. Although buyers and sellers
transact at the same price with the fund manager investors in OEICs may still have
to pay an initial charge but instead of being part of the spread it is an explicit cost
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rather than being incorporated into the price. If the OEIC does not apply a front
end load it may also use back end loads as with unit trusts.
The annual management fee is generally set as a percentage of total NAV rather
than a fixed fee to align the interests of the investors and fund manager. Good fund
performance is desired by the investor and since it increases total NAV it increases
the fund manager’s compensation. In well developed financial markets a typical
annual management fee can be anything up to approximately 1.5% but this varies
fund to fund as ultimately it is a decision made by fund management.
The annual management fee covers the general costs incurred by the fund manager
from running the fund and is generally charged pro rata on a daily basis. The
charges of the fund in Table 3.3 can either by paid by the fund manager using the
annual management fee or they can be paid directly by the fund. Fund managers
and investors will have conflicting views here as paying the expenses from the annual
management fee is beneficial to the investor but detrimental to the fund manager
whilst paying the charges directly from the fund is beneficial to the fund manager
but detrimental from the investors perspective. Since the annual management fee
may therefore not adequately reflect the expenses borne by investors regulators
are keen on fund managers reporting the total expense ratio. The total expense
ratio represents the total costs charged to the fund in a given year expressed as
a percentage of the average total NAV over the year. It is therefore a much more
informative figure than just the annual management fee for investors as their realised
return depends on all fund charges and how they are paid. For OEICs any charges
caused by investors entering or leaving the fund can be covered by a dilution levy.
This is similar to the notional dealing costs in unit trusts but in OEICs instead
of being incorporated into the price the dilution levy is an explicit cost that aids
transparency.
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Table 3.3: Fund Charges and Expenses
Types of Charges and Expenses Definition
Charges levied upon investors entering or leaving the fund
Initial charge Fee paid to the management company upon
subscription to an open-ended fund,
based on a percentage of NAV per share/unit.
Redemption charge (Also know as back Fee paid to management company upon
end load and deferred sales charge. redemption from an open-ended based on
a percentage of NAV per share/unit.
Rounding Rounding up of a share or unit price to a
convenient value for dealing.
Dilution levy Levy made on either entering or
redeeming investors to compensate ongoing
investors for dilution that would otherwise
be caused, based on NAV per share/unit.
Charges or expenses levied on the fund
Annual management fee Fee paid annually to management company
for investment management and admin of the
fund, based on percentage of average annual
total NAV of the fund.
Performance fee Fee payable to the management company
based on out performance of a specified
benchmark.
Custodian, depositary or trustee Fees payable to custodian, depositary
or trustee of a fund
Share or unit holder servicing Costs of registration, admin, payment
of dividends, issuance of reports
and accounts etc.
Audit Fees and expenses of the fund audit
Valuer
Regulatory fees Authorisation fees payable to the regulator.
Borrowing Charges and fess payable of fund borrowing.
Taxes and duties Taxes and duties payable by the fund.
Legal fees Generally associated with the fund
founding documents and their amendment.
Brokerage Cost of transactions in fund assets.
The above table is an edited version taken from St Giles et al. (2003).
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Unit-linked personal pensions have very similar charges to unit trusts. The initial
charge is generally up to 5% and the investor in the personal pensions pays an
annual management charge of similar magnitude to that of a standard unit trust
which covers the administration and management of the pension plan. Since most
personal pensions involve the investor making regular payments into the fund over
a long period of time generally no charges are levied if the contributions vary over
the pensions accumulation phase. Also since personal pensions are a long term
investment vehicle inaccessible until retirement investors may want to switch pension
providers and fund managers at some point if fund performance is not satisfactory.
Investors generally will occur a switching cost in this situation but the level of
switching is estimated to be low, see Alfon (2002).
Pricing
Unit trusts and OEICs are open ended investment vehicles and therefore their prices
are not determined by demand and supply forces. In addition, an investor liquidates
their position by selling the shares/units back to the fund manager rather than in
an open market. The price of a unit/share is based on the market value of the net
assets of the underlying portfolio divided by the number of units/shares outstanding.
However the pricing methods vary and depend on the legal structure of the fund.
For unit trusts dual pricing is employed whereas single pricing is used for OEICs.
Potential investors who want to purchase a unit pay the offer price and current
investors who want to sell a unit back to the fund manager receive the bid price
where the offer price is higher than the bid price. Thus a price differential exists
between buying and selling units from and to the fund manager at any given point
in time. This differential in price is termed the spread and exists to cover the front
end load, notional dealing costs when there is net buying/selling and commission
to brokers as described in detail in Section 3.1.1 under the heading Charges. The
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methodology to determine the maximum ask price, the minimum bid price and
hence the maximum bid-ask spread is set by the FSA in the UK. Since the personal
pensions I analyse in this thesis are unit-linked they are priced in line with the
method for the standard unit trust.
The pricing of OEICs is based on a single price and is seen as more transparent
for the investor in comparison to the dual pricing system of the unit trust. The
single price is still calculated based on NAV per share as with unit trusts. However,
investors do not trade at this single price as ultimately investors of OEICs still incur
possible front end loads, exit charges and a dilution levy. A dilution levy is paid
by buyers/sellers of the fund when there is significant sales or redemptions and is
paid directly into the fund rather than profit for the fund manager. Its purpose is
to protect existing investors in the fund from dilution in value due to excessive net
sales or net redemptions from new and exiting investors. Since OEICs are single
priced based on the middle market price current investors could be worse off if
exiting investors receive a higher price that which the fund assets can be sold at in
the market. In addition the price does not take into consideration the cost incurred
from selling assets. The dilution levy therefore acts to protect current investors from
dilution due to excessive net sales or net redemptions. In summary whereas for unit
trusts the charges are incorporated into the pricing for OEICs they are explicitly
stated to add transparency for the investor.
Taxation
Equity based funds achieve their return through dividends and capital appreciation
on their underlying equity investments. Taxation rates are time varying and for the
investor is a very important consideration that needs constant monitoring over time.
Unit trusts/OEICs receive dividends from their underlying stock net of corporation
tax. Investors receive the dividend if paid out by the fund net of corporation tax
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with a 10% tax credit. The tax credit cannot be reclaimed and the individual
circumstances of the investor determine whether any more income tax is liable on the
dividends received. Prior to 1997 pension funds could have reclaimed the associated
tax credit with the dividend. Whilst unit trusts and OEICs themselves are not liable
for capital gains tax investors are liable when they sell their units/shares. Since the
the emphasis of this thesis is the performance and performance persistence of the
fund due to the fund managers investment decisions rather than the return to the
investor after taxation an in depth analysis of taxation of funds and its evolution
over time is not detailed here. The returns I use in this thesis are gross of taxation
and hence meet the objective of concentrating on returns due to the investment
decisions of fund managers.
3.2 Structure of the Unit Trust/OEIC and Unit-
Linked Personal Pension Industries
The structure of the unit trust/OEIC and unit-linked personal pension industries
has important implications for an empirical test of the Berk and Green (2004) model
of mutual fund flows. In Berk and Green (2004) fund flows are the equilibrating
mechanism that means going forward performance should not persist. In the model
the fund manager faces diseconomies of scale as the fund’s assets under management
increase. Since fund flows are the equilibrating mechanism it is important to clarify
what I define as the “fund” and how fund flows should be measured to test Berk
and Green (2004). I use the term fund throughout this thesis as a generic term that
relates to the unit trust/OEIC and unit-linked personal pension products/funds
marketed to and bought by investors. I use the term “underlying portfolio” to
represent the total assets under management that the fund manager4 has to invest
4The fund manager (also known as the portfolio manager) manages the underlying portfolio.
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Figure 3.1: Example of Underlying Portfolio Structure
and manage. The underlying portfolio’s total assets under management are derived
from fund flows from its associated investment funds/products. It is important to
recognize that an underlying portfolio may include assets that have been accrued
through various investment products (or “wrappers”) such as unit trusts, personal
pensions or life funds. The importance and relevance of these definitions especially
in terms of fund flows is best illustrated through an example.
Figure 3.1 represents a potential underlying portfolio structure in the UK where the
fund manager invests the underlying portfolio’s assets under management. In this
example the underlying portfolio collects fund flows from its associated investment
vehicles/funds that are marketed and sold to investors, here a unit trust/OEIC, a
life product and a personal pension product. For the OEIC as well as the life and
pension funds in this example investors have a choice of two products to invest in,
share class 1 or share class 25. Investors of share class 1 or 2 in the OEIC both
have the same underlying investment, the underlying investment portfolio managed
5Share class is the term used for OEICs, unit trusts generally offer investors a choice of income
units or accumulation units. The number of share classes offered does not have to be limited to
two.
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by the fund manager. Typically for OEICs the different share classes just represent
different fees applied to the investor due to the different amounts invested i.e. higher
fees for retail investors if investing smaller amounts of money in comparison to lower
fees for institutional investors investing larger sums of money. Reduced fees for
investors who invest larger amounts is rational from the fund manager’s perspective
as they generally earn compensation through assets under management and want to
maximise their compensation by enticing large investors to invest. Offering various
share classes/products based on the same fund but with different fee structures is
also common for life and pension products.
Since fund flows to the underlying portfolio in Figure 3.1 are a combination of the
flows from the personal pension fund, life fund and unit trust/OEIC empirically test-
ing Berk and Green (2004) by comparing the performance, performance persistence
and fund flows of unit trusts/OEICs with personal pensions at the fund level in this
example could be misleading. The unit trust/OEIC and the personal pension fund
both have the same underlying portfolio and their return series would be virtually
identical, the main difference only being due to the charges/fees applied. However,
the fund flows at the investment product/fund level for the unit trust/OEIC and
the personal pension may be very different. To illustrate the point let’s assume
that the personal pension fund has much smaller fund flows in comparison to the
unit trust/OEIC. Using fund flow data at the investment product/fund level we
would expect to see greater performance persistence in the personal pension fund in
comparison to the unit trust/OEIC. However we know this will not be the case as
both the personal pension and the unit trust/OEIC have the same underlying assets
as they have the same underlying portfolio and fund manager. Any diseconomies
of scale the fund manager experiences will impact the return series of the under-
lying portfolio and hence the returns on both the personal pension fund and unit
trust/OEIC. For unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions who have a
structure similar to Figure 3.1 using fund flow data at the investment product level
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rather than the underlying portfolio level to test Berk and Green (2004) could lead
to erroneous conclusions. Diseconomies of scale fundamentally apply to the fund
manager at the underlying portfolio level. In this example the fund manager of the
personal pension fund does not have restricted fund flows since the fund manager
of the personal pension also has fund flows from a unit trust/OEIC. It is there-
fore not valid to expect more performance persistence in the personal pension fund
in this scenario. We can only expect more performance persistence in those unit-
linked personal pensions that do not have a shared underlying portfolio with a unit
trust/OEIC.
Unfortunately I do not have access to a data variable that identifies underlying port-
folios. Potentially the underlying portfolio could be estimated by examining fund
manager names, histories and portfolio holdings but I also do not have a compre-
hensive dataset of this information. I therefore propose a second best alternative to
identify underlying portfolios by using the Morningstar FundID variable as a proxy
for the underlying portfolio. FundID is a Morningstar Direct data variable that
identifies individual sub funds in the Morningstar Direct Database. Morningstar
assigns a FundID to all funds in its database and therefore FundID provides a com-
prehensive dataset for funds at any given point in time. Figure 3.2 is an example of
the FundID variable and shows all funds that belong to the FundID FSGR050C3.
All funds in Figure 3.2 have the same manager, Mark Lyttleton, and underlying
portfolio. The funds in this example that belong to FundID FSGR050C3 include
an OEIC, personal pension funds and life funds. The fund manager would have to
deal with fund flows and face diseconomies of scale from fund flows from all of the
investment products in Figure 3.2. I would not therefore expect more performance
persistence in the personal pension fund in this example in comparison to an average
unit trust/OEIC as the fund manager also has to deal with the fund flows from the
OEIC.
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Figure 3.2: FundID Example
Whilst Figure 3.1 is just an example and Figure 3.2 only represents one FundID,
unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds sharing the same under-
lying portfolio and fund manager is not unusual. Figure 3.3 shows the cross section
of FundIDs in the UK focusing on UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pensions as at June 2010. Unfortunately whilst the FundID variable is
comprehensive, Morningstar treat the FundID variable as a static data point and
hence it is not possible to identify how and if underlying portfolio structures change
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Figure 3.3: Composition of FundIDs for Unit-Linked Personal Pension Funds and Unit Trusts/OEICs as at June 2010
IPP = Individual personal pension (unit-linked personal pension); OEIC = Open-ended investment company or unit trust; LF =
Life fund; GP = Group pension
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over time. Figure 3.3 is also survivor biased as it only reports the underlying port-
folio structures of live funds in existence as at June 2010. Despite these limitations
Figure 3.3 clearly shows unit-linked personal pensions and unit trust/OEICs sharing
the same underlying portfolio and fund manager. Of the 668 FundIDs that include
a unit trust/OEIC, 194 also include a unit-linked personal pension fund. This rep-
resents approximately 29% of all FundIDs, a proxy for underlying portfolios, for
unit trusts/OEICs and 40% of all all underlying portfolios for unit-linked personal
pensions within the equity sectors of UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and
UK Smaller Companies as at June 2010. For FundIDs that include both a unit
trust/OEIC and a unit-linked personal pension the most common underlying struc-
ture is where the underlying portfolio also includes a life product. This type of
underlying structure was previously shown via the example in Figure 3.1.
In general underlying portfolios for open-ended investment vehicles can consist of
a combination of unit-linked personal pensions, unit trusts/OEICs, life funds and
group pensions. Using Morningstar Direct’s FundID variable as a proxy for the
underlying portfolio, the underlying portfolio structure can have one of 15 possible
combinations as shown in Table 3.4, although in practice only 13 underlying portfolio
structures are found in operation at June 2010. The most common underlying
fund structures are the most straightforward. For example, for unit trusts/OEICs
the underlying portfolio generates fund flows only from unit trusts/OEICs and for
personal pension’s the underlying portfolio only generates fund flows from personal
pension funds. For underlying portfolios that only contain a unit trust/OEIC there
are on average 2.3 classes per underlying portfolio. This supports the notion that
unit trusts generally offer income and accumulation units to investors and OEICs
offer share classes normally marketed with a retail or institutional emphasis.
For more complex underlying structures where the underlying portfolio contains
at least three out of the four different investment vehicles the average number of
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classes per underlying portfolio increases dramatically. For example the average
number of classes for underlying portfolios that include a unit trust/OEIC, life fund
and a unit-linked personal pension fund is 17.3. This large number of classes in
part reflects numerous different pension providers marketing their own products to
investors but using the same underlying portfolio and fund manager as the other
pension providers.
Although complex underlying portfolios for unit trusts/OEICs and personal pensions
are common, the most popular structure is the most straightforward where the
FundID, a proxy for the underlying portfolio, has fund flows exclusively from a unit
trust/OEIC or a unit-linked personal pension fund. In Figure 3.3 approximately 69%
of unit trusts/OEICs have a FundID where the assets under management are solely
derived from the unit trust/OEIC. Therefore the total fund flows across units/classes
for the unit trust/OEIC are also the total fund flows for the fund manager and
underlying portfolio. For unit-linked personal pensions approximately 50% have a
FundID consisting of only a unit-linked personal pension product/s. For these unit-
linked personal pensions the fund flows are restricted to only a personal pension
product and are central to testing the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund
flows.
To test Berk and Green (2004) I address the problem of unit trusts/OEICs and
unit-linked personal pensions sharing the same FundID, a proxy for the underly-
ing portfolio, by creating datasets based on FundID. In addition, whilst testing
Berk and Green (2004) is a primary objective of this thesis a general comparative
analysis between the performance, performance persistence and fund flows of unit
trusts/OEICs is also important. I create seven proprietary datasets in order to meet
these objectives throughout the thesis.
• UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free Database
• UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension Database
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Table 3.4: Underlying Fund Structure based on Morningstar’s FundID for UK Equity OEICs/UT’s, Individual Personal Pensions
(IPP), Life Funds (LF) and Group Pensions (GP) as at June 2010
Fund Structure No. of FundIDs FundIDs % No. of classes Classes % Average classes per fund structure
IPP 244 20.2% 582 10.2% 2.4
LF 229 19% 379 6.6% 1.7
GP 16 1.3% 31 0.5% 1.9
OEIC 463 38.3% 1046 18.3% 2.3
OEIC & IPP 15 1.2% 67 1.2% 4.5
OEIC & LF 10 0.8% 37 0.6% 3.7
OEIC & GP
IPP & LF 28 2.3% 186 3.3% 6.6
IPP & GP 20 1.7% 128 2.2% 6.4
LF & GP
OEIC & IPP & LF 168 13.9% 2900 50.7% 17.3
OEIC & IPP & GP 2 0.2% 16 0.3% 8
OEIC & LF & GP 1 0.1% 5 0.1% 5
IPP & LF & GP 3 0.2% 107 1.9% 35.7
OEIC & IPP & LF & GP 9 0.7% 238 4.2% 26.4
Total 1208 100% 5722 100%
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• UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database
• UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database
• UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Fund Size Database
• UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database
• UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database
The UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Surviour-Bias-Free and UK Equity Unit-linked
Personal Pension datasets restricts each fund in their respective samples to one
primary share class/unit and one FundID only. The datasets therefore proxy the
underlying portfolios for unit trust/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions where
only one return series per underlying fund is permitted. Details of the construction
of these datasets is given in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.
Although the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension dataset restricts each fund
to only one primary share class/unit and one FundID some of the personal pen-
sion funds have a shared underlying portfolio with a unit trust/OEIC as previously
discussed and emphasised in Figure 3.3. For the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal
Pension FundID Database I identify those unit-linked personal pensions that also
have a unit trust with the same FundID, a proxy for the underlying portfolio, and
those that just have a personal pension in their FundID. In the former the fund flows
for those pension funds are not restricted as the underlying portfolio fund manager
also has fund flows from a unit trust/OEIC whereas in the latter fund flows should
be more restricted as fund flows are only from a personal pension fund. This de-
composition of personal pension funds based on FundID, where FundID is a proxy
for the underlying portfolio structure, should allow a more rigorous test of Berk and
Green (2004). Details for the construction of this dataset is given in Section 4.5.
Whilst the empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) using performance persistence
tests is based on assumption that there are restricted fund flows in personal pensions
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in comparison to unit trusts/OEICs Chapter 7 directly analyses the performance
fund flow relationship for both UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-
linked personal pensions. The UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database
essentially consists of those funds from the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-
Bias-Free Database which have fund size data available. Likewise, the UK Equity
Unit-Linked Personal Pension Fund Size Database consists of those funds from the
UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension Database which have fund size data avail-
able. These datasets allow the performance flow relationship for unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pensions to be examined.
In addition to the performance persistence tests Chapter 7 proposes another empiri-
cal test of Berk and Green (2004) using actual fund flows from the FundID fund size
databases. The UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database consists
of those unit trusts/OEICs where fund size data is available and the FundIDs only
contain a unit trust/OEIC with only one unit/share class. In effect the fund size
therefore proxies for underlying portfolio size. Likewise, the UK Equity Unit-Linked
Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database consists of those unit-linked personal
pension funds where fund size data is available and the FundIDs only contain a
unit-linked personal pension with only one unit/share class. More details for the
construction and rational of the fund size datasets are given in Section 4.7.
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Chapter 4
Data and Database Construction
4.1 Returns Data
I obtain returns data for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked
personal pensions primarily from S&P Micropal1. Throughout this thesis the main
focus is on the performance of the fund manager through their stock selection and
market timing skills and not the actual return to the investor after taxes and fund
fees/charges have been deducted. For this reason the returns for unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pensions are calculated on a monthly basis over the sample
period January 1980 to December 2007 based on bid-bid2 prices gross of tax. The
returns therefore proxy the actual return due to the fund manager’s investment
decisions rather than the net return to an investor which depends on their specific tax
situation, fund management fees/charges and bid-ask spreads. The only exception
to this is for the dead unit trusts/OEICs where only net returns are available. Whilst
this needs to be taken into consideration when directly comparing performance of
unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions Keswani and Stolin (2008)
highlight the impact using net or gross returns has on performance. Keswani and
1For UK equity unit trusts/OEICs I also use other sources as discussed in detail in Section 4.2.
2For OEICs where single pricing is employed return calculations are based on mid-mid prices.
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Stolin (2008) run their performance tests using both net and gross returns and find
that on average the difference in performance from using net returns is only about 5
basis points lower per month than gross returns. Further details for the calculation
of returns in S/P Micropal can be found in Quigley and Sinquefield (2000).
4.1.1 Survivorship Bias
Unit Trusts/OEICs
Survivorship bias is a particularly important issue in fund performance studies due
to the large number of funds that cease to exist over time either through liquidations
or mergers. In the US an important milestone in mutual fund research was the cre-
ation of the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database which was originally
developed by Mark Carhart in 1995 for his doctoral dissertation at the University
of Chicago. The database has been developed and maintained by CRSP and offers
researchers data on the universe of both live and dead US mutual funds. Thus
the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database allows researchers to under-
take analysis of fund performance without the problem of survivorship bias and
its existence and availability in part explains the prominence of performance and
performance persistence studies centered on US mutual funds. In the UK a compa-
rable dataset to the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database for UK unit
trusts/OEICs is not available. Over the past 30 years only a handful of academic
studies3 have been based on UK unit trusts/OEICs due to the problem of accessing
a survivor-bias-free dataset. Commercial databases that provide information on UK
unit trusts/OEICs generally only provide returns data on funds that are currently in
existence, presumably based on the assumption that the primary user will be an ac-
tive investor who generally only needs information on potential current investments
3For example see Quigley and Sinquefield (2000), Blake and Timmermann (1998), Fletcher and
Forbes (2002) and Cuthbertson et al. (2008).
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for their portfolio. Funds that were once in existence but have died are generally not
included in commercial databases as they are not part of the investment opportunity
set and this creates a survivorship bias when cross sectionally analysing funds over
time.
Unit trusts/OEICs are generally part of a fund family/complex and consistently
poorly performing funds are generally merged into a successful fund in the fund
complex. This allows the fund family to keep the assets under management from
the poorly performing fund whilst at the same time burying its poor performance
record. At the extreme, as highlighted by Malkiel (1995), fund families may start a
number of new funds at the same time under different fund managers with the view
to identify the most successful funds and merge the worst performing funds. This
allows the fund complex to aggressively market their funds which have a strong past
performance record and bury the past performance record of the worst performing
funds that were subsequently merged. If fund families do this on a regular basis
datasets based on surviving funds only will tend to have higher performance figures
as the excluded non-surviving funds are often the worst performers.
Brown and Goetzmann (1995) estimate the difference in raw returns between an
equally weighted sample of all funds and non-surviving funds to be 0.8% a year.
Similar estimates are found in Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and Malkiel (1995).
When value weighted the difference is much smaller indicating that the main cause
of survivor-bias are small funds that perform poorly and cease to exist through a
merger or liquidation. I address the important issue of survivor-bias in this thesis by
creating a dataset of fund returns for UK equity unit trust/OEICs that is essentially
survivor-bias-free. Details of the construction of the dataset are given in Section 4.2.
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Unit-Linked Personal Pensions
Whilst the level and importance of survivor-bias in mutual funds is well documented
for unit-linked personal pension funds survivor-bias is less of an issue. Due to the
long term nature of personal pensions any personal pension funds closed to new
investors are in effect still in existence and are still reported in S&P Micropal.
Liquidations for unit-linked personal pensions are also negligible as the funds held
by unit-linked personal pensions are actually held under trust by a trustee for the
benefit and security of the unit holders until retirement. Thus the money invested
in the fund is not available to the creditors of the personal pension provider and is
not at risk by the provider going into liquidation. Exceptions to this could only be
due to illegal financial activities by the pension provider/fund manager. These cases
are rare and if they do occur are highly publicised in the media. Since S/P Micropal
includes data on personal pensions closed to new investors and liquidations are very
rare a large proportion of the survivor-bias in mutual funds is accounted for in the
personal pension dataset. However, I have no data on the frequency of mergers
between unit-linked personal pension funds across my 28 year sample period. The
UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension dataset that I create in this thesis can
therefore be viewed as approximately survivor-bias-free with an unmeasurable but
estimated small survivor-bias due to potential mergers between personal pension
funds.
4.1.2 Investment Objectives
Typically unit trusts/OIECs and unit-linked personal pensions are categorised by
their investment objectives, also known as investment sectors. The returns data
in this thesis for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal
pensions are based on the investment objectives of UK All Companies, UK Equity
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Income and UK Smaller Companies4. Since I use fund returns data from a com-
mercial database it is biased towards active investors concerned primarily with the
current investment opportunity set available to them. This bias towards active in-
vestors can be problematic for research requiring historical data as some of the data
variables are considered as fixed even when they are time varying. For example
fund sector data in S&P Micropal only gives the current fund sector without con-
sideration of whether funds change sectors over time. A current equity fund could
have potentially been in another sector such as fixed income but over time changed
focus and moved into an equity sector. Using only the current sector information,
which would indicate an equity focus, would be misleading since part of the return
time series is under a fixed income rather than an equity objective. As S&P Mi-
cropal does not record a time series for fund sector history I do not know precisely
the extent to which funds change sectors over time. This highlights the need for a
comprehensive database available to researchers where all data variables are treated
as time varying. From the information I do have available funds changing sector is
not viewed as a frequent occurrence although it does happen for a small number of
funds. When fund sector changes do occur it is more likely to be within the same
asset class rather than changing focus entirely e.g. UK Equity Income (equity sec-
tor) to UK All Companies (equity sector). For the analysis I conduct at the entire
equity sample level fund sector changes within equity classes are irrelevant. Where
fund sector changes are known the time series of returns for the fund are included
only in the relevant equity sector/s.
In addition to the issue of funds changing sectors, fund sectors themselves have not
been constant over time. Prior to 1999 the UK All Companies sector did not exist.
Funds with a similar objective as UK All Companies would have been in either UK
Growth or UK Growth and Income before the AUTIF merged these two sectors to
form UK All Companies in 1999. I include funds that are classified as UK Growth
4See Section 3.1.1 for more information on investment objectives.
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and UK Growth and Income prior to 1999 as part of the UK All Companies sector.
4.1.3 Tracker Funds
The UK All Companies sector for both unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal
pensions includes index/tracker funds. I exclude passively managed index/tracker
funds, where managers simply track and mirror the market’s performance, as I am
primarily interested in fund manager performance via stock selection ability and
market timing skills. Excluding index/tracker funds is standard in the literature for
research motivated by analysing active fund management, see Cuthbertson et al.
(2008).
I identify index/tracker funds for both unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal
pensions using two methods. Initially I use Morningstar Direct to filter the funds as
it contains a data variable that indicates whether or not a fund has an index/tracker
objective. This method is sufficient to identify most of the index/tracker funds
with the main exception being the dead funds not included in the Morningstar
Direct database. For the dead funds a second method is employed where I identify
index/tracker funds by inspection of the fund name. If the fund name contains
the terms ‘index’ or ‘tracker’ or any abbreviation used by the database provider
of the aforementioned terms such as ‘Tracking’, ‘Trk’ or ‘Indx’ then I drop them
from the sample. I test this method for robustness by examining the names of the
tracker funds identified by Morningstar Direct, where virtually all funds identified
contain within the fund name a term or abbreviated term that indicates that it is
an index/tracker fund. Thus, the sample I use for both unit trusts/OEICs and unit-
linked personal pensions consists of actively managed funds only. The only potential
exceptions are index/tracker funds that died during the sample period, are not part
of the Morningstar Direct database and have fund names that do not indicate that
it is an index/tracker fund. However, in consideration of the aforementioned process
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I use to identify index/tracker funds the probability and significance of a dead fund
actually being an index/tracker fund without indicating this in its name is seen
as negligible. In addition any fund that changes from being passively to actively
managed during the sample would not be identifiable as the index/tracker variable
is a static data point in Morningstar Direct. This again highlights the need for a
comprehensive database that treats all variables as time varying.
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 detail the construction of the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC
Survivor-Bias-Free and the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension databases in-
cluding the identification of tracker funds. In summary, 72 unit trusts/OEICs and 51
unit-linked personal pensions are identified as index/tracker funds and are excluded
from the analysis. There are relatively few index/tracker funds in comparison to
the number of non index/tracker funds in the final samples for both UK equity unit
trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pensions.
4.2 UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-
Free Database
The initial S&P Micropal list of unit trusts/OEICs restricts each fund to only one
unit/share class. Since units/share classes of the same fund have the same underlying
portfolio, returns across units/share classes generally only differ marginally due to
the different charges/fees applied to the fund and not due to the performance of
the underlying portfolio. Allowing all units/share classes to be included would
potentially bias the results in favour of those funds with numerous units/share classes
and would not represent the underlying performance of the fund managers. US
studies generally use a value weighted average of returns across share classes but
since I do not have comprehensive fund size data at share class level this preferred
option is not feasible. For unit trusts/OEICs the restriction of one share class/unit
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per fund also results in each unit trust/OEIC in the list having a unique FundID
where I use the FundID variable as a proxy for the underlying portfolio. That is
to say once the restriction of one unit/share class is enforced no unit trust/OEIC
shares the same FundID with another unit trust/OEIC.
4.2.1 Methodology for Database Construction
The UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free Database covers the period,
January 1980 to December 2007. I obtain returns data for live and dead unit
trust/OEIC funds from four sources. The returns data for funds that die prior
to December 2007 are from three sources. Returns for funds that die before January
1998 are from Quigley and Sinquefield (2000), here after QS1; returns for funds that
die between January 1998 and December 2003 are from Lei, Keswani and Stolin,
from now on to be known as QS2; and funds that die after December 2003 are from
the FSA Customer Outcomes Retailer Investments database. The returns of a dead
fund therefore maybe made up of a combination of QS1, QS2 and the FSA Customer
Outcomes Retailer Investments database depending on when the fund is created and
subsequently dies. The returns data for live funds, as at the end of December 2007,
are from S&P Micropal.
The funds that die during the period January 1980 to December 1997 are from QS1.
The original QS1 sample from 1978 to 1997 contains 279 dead funds. Of these 279
dead funds, I exclude 4 funds that die before January 1980 as they are not alive
at any point during my sample period, January 1980 to December 2007. I also
drop 5 index/tracker funds. Thus, I include 270 dead funds from QS1 in the final
dataset with all 279 dead funds from QS1 accounted for. The returns for funds
that die in the QS2 sample, January 1998 to December 2003, are from one of three
possible scenarios. Firstly, 43 funds are born but also die within the QS2 six year
sample period. I take their returns directly from QS2. Of the 43 funds, I drop
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10 index/tracker funds. Secondly, 13 funds are in existence prior to January 1998
in non equity sectors, hence are not on the QS1 list, but subsequently change into
equity sectors during QS2 and then die before the end of the QS2 sample period,
December 2003. For these 13 funds I only include the return series when the funds
are in equity sectors. Finally, 197 funds are born prior to or in the QS1 sample
period and die in the QS2 sample period, January 1998 to December 2003. For
these funds the returns cover time periods in both QS1 and QS2 and so are joined
together at the December 2003/January 2004 merging point of the QS1 and QS2
datasets. Of these 197 funds, I drop 15 index/tracker funds and one additional fund
due to data inconsistencies. In summary, 279 funds die in QS1 and 253 funds die
in QS2 of which I include 270 funds from QS1 and 227 funds from QS2 in the final
database.
The main issue in the construction of the survivor-bias-free database is matching
the live funds as at December 2003 from the QS2 study with the list of live funds as
at December 2007 from S&P Micorpal, which I will refer to within this section as
QS3 for consistency and simplicity. There are 451 live funds as at December 2003
from the QS2 list and 460 live funds as at December 2007 from the S&P Micropal
QS3 list. I use the following procedures to match the aforementioned datasets:
1. I match the funds across the QS2 list as at December 2003 and the QS3 list as
at December 2007 through sedol number and then cross check the fund name.
(a) 150 funds have the same name and the same sedol number. I drop 17
index/tracker funds.
(b) 156 funds have the same sedol number but a different fund name5. In all
cases, for robustness I cross check the returns for each of these funds from
the QS2 data against the returns from the S&P Micropal December 2007
5In some instances the name changes are insignificant, for example the fund name being abbre-
viated differently over time by S&P Micropal whilst in other cases a fund could have a completely
different fund name.
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data over the common overlapping time period i.e. prior to January 2004.
I drop 7 funds due to the QS1 and QS2 return series being sufficiently
different to cause concern. In addition I drop 15 index/tracker funds.
2. I check the remaining funds from the QS3 2007 list for start/inception dates
on or after January 2004 as these are new funds that are not in existence as
at December 2003 and would not be on the 2003 list.
(a) 101 funds are created on or after January 2004 and are still alive at
December 2007. I drop 2 index/tracker funds and one fund is dropped
due to data inconsistencies.
3. I cross check by sedol number the remaining funds on the QS2 2003 list with the
FSA Customer Outcomes Retailer Investments database to identify whether
any of the funds die during the period January 2004 to December 2007.
(a) 65 funds die due to a merger. Of these funds I drop 4 index/tracker funds
and 1 fund due to inconsistencies between the return series from the FSA
Customer Outcomes Retailer Investments database and QS2/QS1 over
the overlapping time period i.e. prior to January 2004.
(b) 23 funds die due to a liquidation. Of these funds I drop 3 index/tracker
funds and 1 fund due to inconsistencies between the return series from the
FSA Customer Outcomes Retailer Investments database and QS1/QS2
over the overlapping time period.
4. The reasons for the remaining funds on the QS2 2003 list and the QS3 2007
list are more complicated.
(a) 7 funds on the QS2 2003 list are actually on the QS3 2007 list but change
from a unit trust to a OEIC during the period January 2004 to December
2007. This change in legal structure results in a change of sedol number
and explains why the two funds could not be initially matched based on
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sedol number.
(b) 13 funds on the QS2 2003 list are matched to the QS3 list but the
class/unit of fund advertised in the download list by S&P Micropal,
which restricts each fund to one advertised class/unit only, changes dur-
ing the period January 2004 to December 2007. For example, on the QS2
2003 list the income unit may be advertised but in the QS3 2007 list it
may change to the accumulation unit. Since different units/classes of the
same fund have different sedol numbers matching across sedol numbers
is not possible. In these cases I use the returns for the funds on the QS3
list.
(c) 2 funds have both a change in legal structure (unit trust to OEIC) and
also a change in class advertised.
(d) 5 funds on the QS2 2003 list are still be in existence at December 2007 but
change out of equity sectors during the period January 2004 to December
2007 and hence are not on the QS3 2007 list. I include the returns for
these funds up to and including the last full month they are in an equity
sector.
(e) 2 funds change sedol numbers over the period January 2004 to December
2007. The reasons for their sedol changes are unknown but I match their
returns from QS2 to two funds on QS3 over the overlapping time period
i.e. prior to January 2004. I drop 1 index/tracker fund.
5. 4 funds are created after January 2004 and subsequently die before December
2007. Therefore these funds do not show up on either of the QS2 or QS3 lists.
I identify these funds from the FSA Customer Outcomes Retailer Investments
database.
There are 28 unresolved funds on the QS2 list and 29 funds unresolved on the QS3
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list. Although the number of unresolved funds on QS2 and QS3 are very similar
I cross check returns and no fund is identified as being the same fund across the
remaining QS2 and QS3 lists. The 29 funds from QS3 have start dates prior to
January 2004 and therefore if in equity sectors prior to January 2004 should be on
the QS2 list. One possible scenario is that these funds are in non equity sectors at
the end of the QS2 sample and subsequently transferred into equity sectors during
QS2. Since I have no information to confirm this and if true to identify the exact
month of sector change I drop these 29 funds from the final database. The 28
unresolved funds from QS2 are assumed to either change sedol and then die in QS3
or change out of equity sectors in QS3 with a resultant change of sedol. This would
potentially explain the reason for not being able to track these funds as at December
2007. Therefore I also drop these 28 funds from the final database. Although ideally
the final database would contain all funds identified as in existence and in equity
sectors during the 28 year sample period, dropping these 57 funds only represents
about 5% of the total funds identified. Thus the final unit trust/OEIC database
is essentially survivor-bias-free and represents a close approximation to the entire
universe of unit trusts/OEICs in existence during the sample period January 1980
to December 20076.
To the clarify the outcome of the above process Table 4.1 summarises the final UK
Equity Survivor-Bias-Free Unit Trust/OEICs Database. Appendix A.3 summarises
the funds from the QS2 2003 list and their relation to the funds on the QS3 2007
list and Appendix A.4 summarises the funds from the QS3 2007 list.
6Under the restriction of one unit/share class per fund.
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Table 4.1: UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free Database
Live Funds
Initial Number of funds Explanation for fund Number of dropped funds Final Number of funds
150 Same sedol and same fund name 17 133
156 Same sedol but different fund name 22 134
101 Funds born after 31 Dec 2003 3 98
13 Change of fund class advertised 13
7 Change of fund structure: UT to OEIC 7
2 Both change of structure and class advertised 2
2 Unknown reason for change of sedol 1 1
5 Moved out of equity sectors 5
393
Dead Funds
Initial Number of funds Explanation for fund Number of dropped funds Final Number of funds
279 Dead funds from QS1 9 270
253 Dead funds from QS2 26 227
92 Dead funds from QS3 9 83
580
Total Total Total
1060 87 973
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4.3 UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Database
Unlike the unit trusts/OEICs the restriction of one unit/share class per fund for
unit-linked personal pensions does not result in each fund having a unique FundID.
It is not uncommon for numerous personal pension providers, who market and sell
their funds separately, to use the same external fund manager to invest and manage
the underlying portfolio. For these funds the performance of the fund manager and
underlying portfolio are the same. Figure 4.1 illustrates a theoretical though realistic
example where even with the restriction of one unit/share class per personal pension
fund there still are numerous return series which are from the same underlying
portfolio.
In Figure 4.1 three separate personal pension providers/insurance companies market
and sell their unit-linked personal pensions separately to the general public but all
have the same underlying portfolio and fund manager. This outsourcing of underly-
ing portfolio management seems to have grown in popularity over the past decade.
To further illustrate the point consider the name of the following pension,“Stan
Life/Baillie Gifford UK Eq 5 Pen”. Standard Life is the insurance company that
markets the fund and is the pension provider to the investor but it is Baillie Gifford
who invest and manage the underlying portfolio. In general it is not uncommon for
there to be more insurance companies other than Standard Life who market their
own funds but at the same time have the same underlying portfolio managed by
Baillie Gifford. Since I am interested in the performance of the underlying portfolio
it is rationale to restrict each unit-linked personal pension to 1 FundID only where
I use the FundID as a proxy for the underlying portfolio. By ensuring no FundIDs
are replicated in the personal pension dataset there should only be one return time
series per underlying portfolio. Where various personal pensions have the same
FundID I keep the fund with the earliest inception date to maximise the number of
observations in the return time series.
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Figure 4.1: Personal Pension Fund Management Outsourcing Example
4.3.1 Methodology for Database Construction
1. Under the restriction of 1 unit/share class per fund there are 766 UK eq-
uity unit-linked personal pensions from S&P Micropal over the sample period
January 1980 to December 2007.
(a) I drop 51 index/tracker funds from the sample.
(b) I drop 109 inet funds. Inet stands for indicative net value and relates to a
pricing methodology imposed by the ABI since 2005/06 for comparative
purposes. Therefore inet funds are used for comparative pricing purposes
and are not actually funds that an investor can invest in.
(c) I drop 4 funds which have duplicated sedol numbers. The sedol number
should be unique and hence I drop these funds to err on the side of
caution.
(d) I drop 2 funds with missing sedol numbers.
(e) I drop 6 funds which have no returns data in S&P Micropal.
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I follow the above procedures chronologically so the numbers applying to each
category are not definitive e.g. more funds have missing sedol numbers in the
data but have already been excluded due to being a tracker fund for example.
2. Using sedol numbers I merge the remaining 594 funds from S&P Micropal with
Morningstar Direct FundID data.
(a) 573 funds merge successfully and have an associated FundID that I use
as a proxy to identify the underlying portfolios.
(b) 21 funds do not merge successfully and without a FundID to identify
their underlying portfolio I drop them from the sample.
3. I cross check the 573 funds that contain a FundID to identify any pension
funds using the same underlying portfolio. Where more than one personal
pension fund uses the same underlying portfolio the fund with the earliest
inception date is chosen to maximise the number of observations in the return
time series.
(a) 280 funds are in the final UK equity unit-linked personal pension dataset
after I restrict each pension to 1 FundID only.
Table 4.2 summarises the above process and shows the final UK Equity Unit-Linked
Personal Database under the restriction of 1 unit/share class and 1 FundID per
personal pension fund. Table 4.2 therefore represents a proxy for the underlying
portfolios for UK equity unit-linked personal pensions where only one return series
per underlying fund is permitted.
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Table 4.2: Database of UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Funds
Unit-Linked Personal Pension Funds
Initial Number of Funds Number of Funds Dropped Explanation for Dropping Funds Number of Funds Remaining
766 51 Index/tracker fund 715
715 109 Inet fund 606
606 4 Duplicated Sedol 602
602 2 Missing Sedol 600
600 6 No returns data 594
594 21 No FundID 573
573 293 Only 1 FundID allowed 280
Total Final Number
486 280
110
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
4.
D
A
T
A
A
N
D
D
A
T
A
B
A
S
E
C
O
N
S
T
R
U
C
T
IO
N
Figure 4.2: Number of Live UK Equity Unit Trusts/OEICs 1980 to 2007
The number of live unit trusts/OEICs is calculated in December each year over the 28 year sample. Figure 4.2 restricts each unit
trust/OEIC fund to one unit/share class and one FundID only. This implies that each fund represents a unique FundID and hence
the number of funds is a proxy for the number of underlying portfolios for unit trusts/OEICs. Index/tracker funds are excluded.
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4.4 Comparison of the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC
Survivor-Bias-Free and UK Equity Unit-linked
Personal Pension Databases
Figure 4.2 shows the number of live unit trusts/OEICs by equity sector in December
of each year under the restrictions of one unit/share class and one FundID per fund
only over the sample period January 1980 to December 2007. Figure 4.2 therefore
represents a proxy to the underlying portfolios for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs
rather than the number of all units/share classes in existence in December of each
year. Figure 4.2 only shows the number of live funds in December of each year and
hence the year on year changes reflect the combined effects of newly created UK
equity funds entering the marketplace, funds ceasing to exist due to mergers and
liquidations and funds changing sectors. Since dead funds are not explicitly shown
in Figure 4.2 the number of funds does not have to increase monotonically over
time. The number of unit trusts/OEICs in existence increases substantially over
the 1980’s. From 1980 to the end of 1989 the number of unit trusts/OEICs more
than doubles from just over 200 funds in 1980. From 1990 onwards the variation in
the number of unit trusts/OEICs is relatively low with an overall slight downward
trend in the number of unit trusts/OEICs from 1990 to 2007. In every year during
the sample UK All Companies7 contains the most funds and always represents more
than half of the total number of unit trusts/OEICs. UK Equity Income always has
the second most number of funds with UK Smaller Companies always containing
the least. The general pattern of unit trusts/OEICs increasing substantially over
the 1980’s and being relatively stable thereafter is also seen at the sector level.
The relative proportions of UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Smaller
Companies is fairly consistent over the 28 year sample period.
7Prior to 1999 in Figure 4.2 UK Companies proxies for UK Growth and UK Growth and Income,
the sectors in place before the AUTIF merged them together to create UK All Companies.
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Figure 4.3 shows the number of UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds in
December of each year over the 28 year sample period with the restriction of one
unit/share class and one FundID per fund only. Figure 4.3 therefore proxies the
number of unique underlying portfolios for unit-linked personal pensions. Since
S&P Micropal still reports returns for closed unit-linked personal pension schemes,
liquidations in personal pension funds are negligible and I have no information on
merged funds Figure 4.3 by construction increases monotonically over time as newly
created equity funds come into existence during the sample period. The total number
of personal pensions in Figure 4.3 at the start of the sample period in 1980 is
extremely small indicating the limited role personal pensions held in society at
that time. There is a large relative increase in the number of personal pension
funds during the 1980’s particularly towards the latter part of the decade, although
the absolute number of personal pension funds is still relatively small especially in
comparison to the number of unit trusts/OEICs during the same period. The large
relative increase in personal pension funds since the late 1980’s can be linked to the
1986 Social Security Act which on the 1st July 1988 made personal pensions schemes
widely available to all members of society. The introduction of personal pensions
in 1988 to all members of society replaced the more restrictive retirement annuity
plans which were also personal pensions but were only available to the self-employed
and individuals who did not have access to an occupational pension scheme. The
increase in availability of personal pensions since 1988 explains the relative increase
in personal pension funds since the end of the 1980’s. Since the turn of millennium
the growth of personal pension funds has been large in relative and absolute terms
rising from about 150 funds in 2000 to over 250 funds as at December 20078. At
the sector level personal pension funds exhibit very similar characteristics to unit
trusts/OEICs. In every year during the sample UK All Companies is the dominant
8These figures are an underestimate of the true number of funds (underlying portfolios) available
to investors since index/tracker funds, funds with duplicated sedol numbers, funds with missing
sedol numbers and funds with no returns data in S/P Micropal are excluded.
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Figure 4.3: Number of Live UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Funds 1980 to 2007
The figure restricts each unit-linked personal pension to one unit/share class. Each personal pension included must also have a
unique FundID. The figure therefore proxies the number of unique underlying portfolios for unit-linked personal pensions.
Index/tracker funds are excluded.
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sector in terms of the number of funds in existence always representing more than
half of the total number of personal pension funds, UK Equity Income always has
the second most number of funds with UK Smaller Companies always containing
the least. However unlike unit trusts/OEICs all of the personal pensions funds at
the start of the sample are in the UK All Companies sector. From the early to mid
1980’s funds start to appear in the UK Equity Income and UK Smaller sectors as
the general population of personal pension funds grows.
Whilst Figure 4.3 emphasises the increase in the number of personal pension funds
over the sample period it fails to highlight the fairly recent trend for different per-
sonal pension providers to use the same external fund manager and underlying
portfolio. To emphasise this point Figure 4.3 is reproduced in Figure 4.4 but with-
out the restriction that each fund has to have a unique FundID and hence a unique
underlying portfolio. In Figure 4.4 there are just under 600 personal pension funds
at the end of the sample in 2007 whereas in Figure 4.3 there are only around 280
funds. The huge difference between the number of funds in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 at
the end of the sample is due to Figure 4.3 restricting each fund to having a unique
FundID. It seems a common occurrence from around 2000 onwards for different
pension providers, who are generally insurance and life companies, to offer investors
personal pension products that use the same underlying portfolio and fund manager
as other pension providers. Thus whilst the universe of potential personal pension
products since around 2000 has grown rapidly the actual universe of underlying
portfolios that investors can invest in through personal pensions has not grown at
the same rate. Prior to 2000 the differences between the number of funds in Figures
4.3 and 4.4 are minimal indicating that different personal pension providers using
the same external fund manager and underlying portfolio is a fairly recent trend in
the industry. For unit trusts/OEICs this is not an issue as each unit trust/OEIC
once restricted to one unit/share class per fund has its own underlying portfolio.
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Figure 4.4: Number of Live UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pensions 1980 to 2007
The figure restricts each unit-linked personal pension to one unit/share class only. Due to the nature/structure of the unit-linked
personal pension industry the FundID for each personal pension may not be unique even with the restriction of one unit/share
class only per fund. This implies that there are more personal pension funds in the diagram than unique underlying portfolios i.e.
some funds, although from different pension providers, have the same underlying portfolio. Figure 4.4 excludes index/tracker
funds, inet funds, funds with duplicated sedol numbers, funds with missing sedol numbers and funds with no returns data in S/P
Micropal.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for UK Equity Unit Trusts/OEICs and UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pensions 1980 to 2007.
Entire Sample UT Entire Sample PP UT ≥ 20 months PP ≥ 20 months UT 336 months PP 336 months
Mean 1.05% 0.84% 1.05% 0.85% 1.21% 1.07%
Std. Dev. 4.86% 4.33% 4.86% 4.35% 4.51% 4.44%
Distribution
of returns:
10% -4.83% -4.77% -4.83% -4.80% -4.42% -4.48%
25% -1.32% -1.24% -1.32% -1.26% -1.01% -1.00%
50% 1.41% 1.37% 1.42% 1.40% 1.59% 1.56%
75% 3.79% 3.31% 3.80% 3.33% 3.82% 3.72%
90% 6.41% 5.40% 6.42% 5.42% 6.31% 5.79%
Obs. 123,915 36,705 122,854 36,156 5,040 1,344
No. of 973 280 882 252 15 4
schemes
The descriptive statistics are based on the restriction of one unit/share class and one FundID only in each of the respective
samples for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions. The funds therefore represent a proxy for the underlying
portfolios. Index/tracker funds are excluded. UT is used in the table to imply both unit trusts and OEICs. UT ≥ 20 months and
PP ≥ 20 months implies that each fund has greater or equal to 20 monthly returns in the dataset.
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Table 4.3 shows the raw returns for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pensions over the entire sample period January 1980 to December 2007.
The average raw monthly return for unit trusts/OEICs is 1.05% compared to 0.84%
for unit-linked personal pension funds. The variation in the returns distribution is
also higher for unit trusts/OEICs in comparison to unit-linked personal pensions
when comparing the monthly standard deviation of returns and the range in the
distribution of returns. Whilst unit trusts/OEICs have on average a higher raw
monthly return than unit-linked personal pensions it does not necessarily imply
greater skill by unit trust/OEIC managers. It could be that unit trust/OEIC man-
agers on average hold riskier portfolios, where risk is defined by an asset pricing
model, and are rewarded with higher average returns for bearing more risk. It is
for this exact reason that all tests in this thesis for fund manager performance and
performance persistence are based on risk adjusted returns. For an excellent critique
of the problems arising from using raw returns rather than risk adjusted returns in
fund performance and performance persistence tests see Blake and Timmermann
(2002). In addition a larger proportion of the returns for personal pension funds are
concentrated in the latter part of the sample period in comparison to unit trusts
due to the relatively small number of personal pension funds in existence at the
beginning of the sample and the vast number of non-surviving unit trusts/OEICs
from the 1980’s and 1990’s. Since the average raw returns during the 1980’s and
1990’s is in general higher than the latter part of the sample period the differences in
raw returns between unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions is in part
due to unit trusts/OEICs having more observations in the more prosperous parts of
the sample period.
The average raw monthly return of 1.05% for unit trusts/OEICs is similar but lower
than the average raw returns reported by Blake and Timmermann (1998) for the UK
equity unit trusts in their 1972 to 1995 sample. Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) also
have comparable figures for UK equity unit trusts but like Blake and Timmermann
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(1998) the raw returns in their 1978 to 1997 sample are slightly higher than 1.05%.
The average raw monthly return of 0.84% for unit-linked personal pension funds is
comparable to Gregory and Tonks (2004) who find an average monthly raw return
for UK equity unit-linked personal pensions of 1.1% over their sample period 1980
to 2000. For both UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions
the previous literature generally finds higher average raw returns than found in this
research. This again suggests that the relatively poor performance of UK equities
in the later part of the 1980 to 2007 sample causes the sample average to decrease
in comparison to earlier studies.
For the performance and performance persistence tests I require that each fund
consists of a minimum of 20 monthly returns to aid statistically meaningful analy-
sis. The descriptive statistics with and without the restriction of a minimum of 20
monthly returns do not deviate significantly from each other as can be seen from
Table 4.3. Whilst enforcing a restriction on the minimum number of observations
may reduce estimation error it also potentially creates a survivorship bias. However,
Kosowski et al. (2006) estimate that the survivor-bias induced by dropping funds
with less than 60 observations is only 20 basis points per year. Wermers (1999) also
examines the survivor-bias caused by setting a minimum threshold on the number of
observations required to be part of the analysis and find similar results to Kosowski
et al. (2006). Therefore requiring each fund to have greater than or equal to 20
monthly returns should not have any significant economic consequences.
Both the unit trusts/OEICs and personal pension funds that are in existence through-
out the entire 28 year sample have higher average raw monthly returns than for funds
who have not been in existence for the entire sample period. Unit trusts/OEICs that
have been in existence for all 336 months in the sample have an average raw monthly
return of 1.21% and unit-linked personal pensions have an average raw monthly re-
turn of 1.07%. As the data used to calculate these raw monthly averages is cotermi-
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nous they are directly comparable. Since consistently poorly performing funds face
the threat of liquidation or a merger it is not that surprising that funds that have
been in existence and survived the entire sample period have higher average raw
returns. The unit trusts/OEICs in existence for the entire sample period by defini-
tion contains only surviving funds and their superior raw performance is consistent
with Blake and Timmermann (1998) who find that surviving funds have an average
survivor premium of 20 basis points per points in comparison with non-surviving
funds when using coterminous data.
Table 4.4 shows the average raw monthly returns over the entire sample period at the
sector level. For both unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds the
UK Equity Income sector has the highest average raw return, UK Smaller Compa-
nies has the next highest level of average raw performance with UK All Companies
having the smallest average raw monthly return. In all three equity sectors unit
trusts/OEICs consistently have higher average raw returns when compared with
unit-linked personal pensions. In comparison Blake and Timmermann (1998) find
that the UK Smaller Companies sector has the highest average mean monthly re-
turn although the difference between the average raw return on the UK Smaller
Companies and UK Equity Income is small.
As previously mentioned, when comparing Tables 4.3 and 4.4 we need to be cautious
in our conclusions since the returns are raw and not risk adjusted and the returns
are not coterminous and may reflect a higher weighting of observations in more
economically prosperous times in the UK equities market. In addition comparisons
between raw returns in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 need to acknowledge that the underlying
portfolio for some of the unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions are
the same and hence the performance of the fund manager is the same.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics by Investment Objective for UK Equity Unit Trusts/OEICs and UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal
Pensions, 1980 to 2007.
UT UK All PP UK All UT UK Equity PP UK Equity UT UK Smaller PP UK Smaller
Companies Companies Income Income Companies Companies
Mean 1.02% 0.84% 1.12% 0.88% 1.04% 0.85%
Std. Dev. 4.76% 4.32% 4.57% 4.02% 5.64% 5.22%
Distribution
of returns:
10% -4.81% -4.80% -4.53% -4.55% -5.32% -5.55%
25% -1.30% -1.28% -1.12% -0.91% -1.78% -1.91%
50% 1.41% 1.41% 1.46% 1.38% 1.36% 1.40%
75% 3.73% 3.33% 3.75% 3.13% 4.18% 4.01%
90% 6.28% 5.37% 6.26% 5.05% 7.28% 6.51%
Obs. 74,567 25,874 29,585 7,125 18,629 3,157
No. of 570 176 193 50 121 26
schemes
The descriptive statistics are based on the restriction of one unit/share class and one FundID only in each of the respective
samples for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions. Each fund has ≥ 20 monthly returns. Index/tracker funds are
excluded. UT is used here to imply both unit trusts and OEICs. UT’s add up to 884 across investment objectives, two more than
the 882 for the entire sample, due to funds changing between equity sectors.
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4.5 Underlying Portfolio Structure
My empirical test of the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows is based
on the assumption that the flow of funds in unit-linked personal pension funds is
restricted. For unit-linked personal pension funds that have an underlying portfolio
which also includes a unit trust/OEIC the flow of funds is not restricted. I therefore
construct a secondary dataset of personal pensions based on FundID which I use
as a proxy for the composition of the underlying portfolios. Unit-linked personal
pensions that have an underlying portfolio composed only of personal pension funds
are assumed to have restricted underlying portfolio flows where as personal pensions
that have an underlying portfolio that also includes a unit trust/OEIC should have
less restricted underlying portfolio flows. Unit trusts/OEICs are assumed to have
unrestricted flows as they do not have the long term inaccessible characteristics of
personal pensions and so as long as the underlying portfolio has flows from a unit
trust/OEIC then the rest of the underlying portfolio’s structure is not of concern.
4.5.1 Methodology for Database Construction
I use Morningstar Direct to analyse the composition of the FundIDs, a proxy for the
underlying portfolios, for the personal pension funds in order to construct two sec-
ondary datasets which combined create the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension
FundID Database. The first dataset consists of underlying portfolios that consist of a
personal pension/s only. The FundID data variable is a static data variable in Morn-
ingstar so I assume that underlying portfolios consisting of personal pensions only,
have this underlying portfolio structure throughout their existence. The secondary
dataset consists of underlying portfolio that contain a personal pension fund and
at least a unit trust/OEIC. The concentration on the personal pension data rather
than the unit trust/OEIC data is primarily due to survivorship issues. The UK
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Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free Database consists of a large number of
dead funds and Morningstar provides no FundID data for dead unit trusts/OEICs.
If the Berk and Green (2004) model is correct I would expect more performance per-
sistence in the underlying portfolios consisting of only personal pension funds where
fund flows are assumed restricted in comparison to the underlying personal pension
portfolios that also include a unit trust/OEIC. Matching the FundID variable with
the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension Database I identify:
1. 100 unit-linked personal pension funds that have a FundID, proxy for the
underlying portfolio, that consists of personal pension funds only.
2. 129 unit-linked personal pension funds that also have at least a unit trust/OEIC
as part of the underlying portfolio9.
Table 4.5 summarises the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database.
Table 4.6 shows the average raw monthly returns for the UK Equity Unit-linked Per-
sonal Pension FundID Database. Unit-linked personal pension funds who share their
underlying portfolio with at least a unit trust/OEIC have an average monthly raw
return of 0.80%. In comparison, unit-linked personal pension funds that do not
share their underlying portfolio with any other type of collective investment vehicle
apart from personal pension funds have an average raw monthly return of 0.87%.
Table 4.6 also again shows little deviation between the raw return figures when a
restriction of greater than or equal to 20 monthly observations is enforced.
9These underlying portfolio structures include (PP and UT), (PP, UT and GP), (PP, UT and
LF) and (PP, UT, GP and LF), where LF is a life fund, PP is a unit-linked personal pension, UT
is a unit trust/OEIC and GP is a group pension.
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Table 4.5: UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database
Unit-Linked Personal Pension Funds Categorised by Underlying Portfolio Structure - 1 FundID only
Underlying Portfolio Structure Number of funds
PP underlying only 100
PP & at least UT/OEIC underlying 129
Total
229
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics for UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database 1980 to 2007
PP Underlying Only PP Underlying Only PP & at least PP & at least UT Underlying
≥ 20 months UT Underlying ≥ 20 months
Mean 0.87% 0.87% 0.80% 0.80%
Std. Dev. 4.28% 4.28% 4.40% 4.41%
Distribution
of returns:
10% -4.67% -4.67% -5.00% -5.02%
25% -1.25% -1.25% -1.29% -1.30%
50% 1.38% 1.38% 1.44% 1.45%
75% 3.32% 3.32% 3.32% 3.33%
90% 5.44% 5.44% 5.35% 5.37%
Obs. 17,806 17,802 11,703 11,467
No. of 100 99 129 109
schemes
The descriptive statistics are based on the restriction of one unit/share class and one FundID only per fund and the composition
of the FundID. PP underlying only implies that the FundID is composed of unit-linked personal pensions only. PP & at least UT
Underlying implies that the FundID is composed of a unit-linked personal pension and at least a unit trust/OEIC (See Figure 3.4
for relevant underlying portfolio combinations). Index/tracker funds are excluded.
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4.6 Factor Data
Factor data for the one, three and four factor models is readily available for US
data through Ken French’s website10. This enables researchers to have easy access
to reliable data provided by prominent academic scholars and hence has resulted in
numerous research papers using factor models with a US tilt. The factors consist
of a market factor, a size factor, a value factor and a momentum factor. In the
UK there has been limited research based on UK factor data in comparison to the
US due to the lack of a comparable source for UK factor data using the Fama and
French methodology. However, a recent working paper by Gregory et al. (2009) has
addressed the lack of availability of UK factor data as the authors have constructed
a dataset of UK factor data based on the Carhart (1997) four factor model . The
factor data for the four factors is freely available for download11 and I use this factor
data for the one, three and four factor models I use throughout this thesis.
4.7 Fund Size Data
Comprehensive fund size data, especially in time series, is notoriously difficult to
obtain for UK collective investment schemes. This explains the lack of academic
research on fund flows in a UK setting. The exception to this is Keswani and Stolin
(2008) and the author’s related work on fund flows. This thesis extends the limited
research in the UK on fund flows not only for unit trusts/OEICs but also for unit-
linked personal pensions.
I obtain fund size data for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs from Morningstar and
Defaqto. The fund size data is on a monthly basis from January 2000 to December
2007 but it is only for surviving funds. If the fund size is missing in any given month
10http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
11http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/index.php
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Morningstar and Defaqto either report a missing data point or report the previous
month’s fund size. I therefore drop any repeated fund sizes in both the Morningstar
and Defaqto datasets. The problem of repeated fund sizes due to missing data points
is much more of a problem in the Defaqto dataset. There are also significantly more
missing data points in Defaqto. For these reasons I use the Morningstar fund size
data as the primary data series for fund size for unit trusts/OEICs. If fund size is
missing in Morningstar but present in Defaqto I merge these data points into the
Morningstar fund size time series.
For UK equity unit-linked personal pensions I obtain monthly fund size data from
Morningstar, Defaqto and Money Management. As with the unit trust/OEIC fund
size data all three data sources report the previous month’s fund size if fund size
is missing or a missing data point. I therefore delete any repeated fund sizes. The
Morningstar fund size data is the most comprehensive but is only from January 2004
to June 2007. The Defaqto fund size data is from January 2000 to December 2007 but
is less comprehensive in coverage in comparison to the Morningstar data. I generally
only use Money Management as a source to cross reference fund size when needed
since Money Management also obtain their fund size data from S&P Micropal and
then Morningstar after the purchase of S&P Micropal by Morningstar. Hence, the
Money Management data is essentially the same as the Morningstar Data although
I do have Money Management data from 2000. Unfortunately Money Management
rounds fund size to the nearest million so if there is a repeated fund size it is therefore
impossible to distinguish between whether the fund size is missing or is in fact the
same as last month’s fund size when rounded to the nearest million. Rounding fund
size to the nearest million, especially for smaller funds, is problematic as potentially
any variation in fund size is unobservable if when rounded it gives the same fund size
as the previous month. In addition the Money Management fund size data is only
in hard copy and identified by fund name rather than sedol code or an equivalent
identifier. For these reasons I use the Morningstar fund size data as the primary
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series and merge the Defaqto data with the Morningstar series where Defaqto data
is available and Morninstar data is missing. The final fund size time series for unit-
linked personal pensions covers the time period January 2000 to December 2007 but
the observations are predominantly located in the latter part of the sample period
due to the more comprehensive Morningstar data only beginning in 2004.
Using the final fund size data for unit trust/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions
I create four new datasets.
• UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database
• UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Fund Size Database
• UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database
• UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database
I use the first two datasets to examine the performance fund flow relationship for
UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pensions. I use
the last two datasets to perform another empirical test of the Berk and Green (2004)
model of mutual fund flows. The aforementioned databases are the basis for Chapter
7 which analyses fund flows for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions
and their relation to Berk and Green (2004).
4.7.1 UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database
To create the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database I merge the final
unit trust/OEIC fund size time series data with the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC
Survivor-Bias-Free Database. The final database consists of 291 unit trusts/OEICs.
This is considerably less than the number of funds in the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC
Survivor-Bias-Free Database due to fund size data not being available for dead funds,
which is a large proportion of the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free
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Database, and fund size data not covering every fund. In addition both databases
cover different time periods with the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-
Free Database covering 1980 to 2007 and the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund
Size Database only covering 2000 to 2007. Hence the dead funds pre 2000 in the
UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free Database are not relevant for the
UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database.
Table 4.7 shows the summary statistics for fund size and flows by year for the UK
Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database. The fund flow calculations are based
on absolute and relative measures. The absolute fund flow calculation is given in
Equation 4.1
Flowit ≡ NAVit − NAVit−1 (1 + rit) (4.1)
where NAVit is the total NAV (net asset value) i.e. fund size, at the time t, NAVit−1
is the total NAV at time t−1 and (1 + rit) is the realised return on the fund between
t and t−1 assuming all distributions are reinvested. The relative fund flow equation
is given in Equation 4.2.
Flowit ≡ NAVit − NAVit−1 (1 + rit)
NAVit−1 (1 + rit)
(4.2)
Table 4.7 shows that the mean monthly fund size across the entire sample for unit
trusts/OEICs is £305.65 million. In general the trend for average monthly fund
size increases from 2000 to 2007 although the standard deviation is much greater in
the 2006 and 2007 periods, presumably due to the build up of the financial crisis.
The number of funds in Table 4.7 increases monotonically over time by construction
due to the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database only reporting fund
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Table 4.7: Fund Size and Flow Summary Statistics for UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000 to 2007
Number of funds 200 216 235 247 264 278 291 291 291
Mean monthly fund size 260.90 249.81 223.78 232.88 271.01 326.38 377.68 420.29 305.65
S.D monthly fund size 346.26 341.75 331.89 379.71 467.16 593.03 719.92 864.21 575.82
10th percentile monthly fund size 17.64 19.40 9.85 9.32 15.55 18.94 18.38 18.13 16.17
Median monthly fund size 124.45 114.47 94.69 90.03 106.67 131.60 139.58 142.21 118.39
90th percentile monthly fund size 677.20 684.90 628.02 605.34 657.87 743.40 833.25 1002.33 740.20
Mean monthly absolute net flow 1.55 1.09 1.47 .76 -.17 2.36 .14 -.56 .74
S.D monthly absolute net flow 29.94 32.69 15.92 13.86 42.62 55.22 59.14 45.95 42.47
10th percentile monthly absolute net flow -4.41 -7.09 -3.74 -3.42 -4.75 -6.21 -7.46 -10.41 -6.03
Median monthly monthly absolute net flow .28 .04 .01 -.02 -.10 -.16 -.22 -.42 -.08
90th percentile monthly absolute net flow 9.26 10.00 6.79 5.42 6.14 7.62 8.91 7.52 7.53
Mean monthly relative net flow 1.92% 4.04% 6.14% 4.01% 5.42% 4.27% 1.09% 7.48% 4.37%
S.D monthly relative net flow 25.24% 55.77% 118.76% 82.32% 170.51% 84.31% 25.76% 306.07% 42.47%
10th percentile monthly relative net flow -2.62% -4.45% -2.22% -2.20% -2.50% -2.58% -2.75% -3.28% -6.03%
Median monthly monthly relative net flow .29% .06% .03% -.03% -.12% -.19% -.29% -.51% -.08%
90th percentile monthly relative net flow 6.03% 7.85% 6.00% 5.69% 4.72% 4.71% 3.82% 2.48% 7.53%
Fund sizes and absolute fund flows are in millions of GBP.
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size for live funds. The mean monthly absolute fund flow across the entire sample
is £.74 million. Over the entire sample some years have a mean monthly outflow
whilst others have a mean monthly inflow. The mean monthly relative fund flow
over the 8 year sample period is 4.37% and the mean monthly relative fund flow
every year during the sample is always positive. Consistently positive mean monthly
relative fund flows in conjunction with both positive and negative mean monthly
absolute fund flows can be explained by very large funds dominating the absolute
flow calculations but not the relative fund flows once absolute fund flow is measured
relative to the fund size.
4.7.2 UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Fund Size
Database
To create the UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Fund Size Database I merge
the final unit-linked personal pension fund size data with the UK Equity Unit-
linked Personal Pension Database. The UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension
Fund Size Database contains 211 funds which is slightly less than the number of
funds in the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension Database. This is mainly due
to the fund size data not covering every fund. Table 4.8 displays the summary fund
size and fund flow statistics by year for the UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension
Fund Size Database over the sample period 2000 to 2007.
The mean monthly fund size over the entire sample period is £159.86 million.
Over the entire sample period the mean monthly fund size has actually decreased
slightly from £204.04 million in 2000 to £179.62 million. In comparison to the unit
trusts/OEICs in the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database the aver-
age monthly fund size for unit-linked personal pensions is slightly smaller and this
deviation increases over the sample period due to the increase in the average unit
trust/OEIC fund size and the decrease in the average unit-linked personal pension
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Table 4.8: Fund Size and Fund Flow Summary Statistics for UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Fund Size Database
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000 to 2007
Number of funds 132 172 189 199 208 211 211 211 211
Mean monthly fund size 204.04 185.18 175.07 174.15 127.95 140.48 162.47 179.62 159.86
S.D monthly fund size 575.57 520.81 463.42 457.35 404.89 454.72 539.94 580.30 498.16
10th percentile monthly fund size 2.20 2.10 1.65 1.66 .53 .92 1.51 1.41 1.11
Median monthly fund size 23.50 17.82 13.71 17.84 7.13 7.81 9.70 13.52 10.34
90th percentile monthly fund size 523.52 451.70 491.80 501.00 276.22 305.00 370.81 420.40 346.00
Mean monthly absolute net flow 2.17 -.20 2.29 1.49 .02 1.39 -.18 .42 .67
S.D monthly absolute net flow 24.41 56.55 18.61 16.89 100.83 45.73 34.78 35.29 53.33
10th percentile monthly absolute net flow -.66 -.86 -.33 -.47 -.38 -.39 -1.20 -1.68 -.67
Median monthly monthly absolute net flow .07 .06 .05 .05 .01 .01 .00 -.01 .01
90th percentile monthly absolute net flow 5.20 3.93 4.31 2.63 1.25 1.13 .85 1.57 1.54
Mean monthly relative net flow 1.13% 4.49% 2.66% 41.44% 148.34% 53.40% 14.52% 16.12% 44.61%
S.D monthly relative net flow 8.64% 56.45% 44.43% 596.00% 3781.33% 2056.96% 315.91% 360.99% 1823.74%
10th percentile monthly relative net flow -2.39% -2.99% -2.00% -1.74% -2.02% -1.82% -2.33% -2.60% -2.19%
Median monthly monthly relative net flow .42% .33% .24% .40% .19% .11% -.05% -.14% .09%
90th percentile monthly relative net flow 5.88% 5.38% 5.06% 6.10% 6.44% 5.37% 4.35% 3.74% 5.18%
Fund sizes and absolute fund flows are in millions of GBP.
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fund size. The median fund size for unit-linked personal pension is much smaller
than the mean fund size indicating that the unit-linked personal pension sample in-
cludes many small personal pension funds but also some exceptionally large funds.
The mean monthly absolute fund flow over the entire sample for unit-linked personal
pensions is £.67 with both positive and negative mean absolute flows across the 8
year sample which is broadly similar to the unit trust/OEIC sample. The mean
monthly relative fund flow across the entire sample is 44.61% which is much bigger
than the unit trust/OEIC sample. However, by examining the relative fund flow
figures year by year it potentially seems that some outliers with extremely large rel-
ative fund flows located in the extreme tails of the distribution dominate the mean
results.
4.7.3 UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Pension FundID Fund
Size Database
If diseconomies of scale in the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows are
at the underlying portfolio level then any empirical test of Berk and Green (2004)
needs to use underlying portfolio fund flows or as close a proxy as possible. Fund
size data is generally reported at the fund level and not the underlying portfolio
level which is problematic for an empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) based on
underlying portfolio flows. Using the FundID as a proxy for the underlying portfolio,
if a unit trust/OEIC has a FundID that also includes other investment vehicles such
as unit-linked personal pensions or life funds then any underlying portfolio fund flow
calculation would need to have fund size data for all funds related to the FundID.
Since I do not have comprehensive fund size data across all investment vehicles re-
lated to each FundID this is not possible. Also, even for FundIDs that only include
a unit trust/OEIC fund size would have to be reported in a consistent manner by
all fund management companies i.e. all fund sizes reported at the unit/share class
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level or all fund sizes reported at the fund size level (the summation of unit/share
class sizes across all units/share classes). Figure 4.5 is an example from Morningstar
Direct of a FundID and its associated funds and whilst it is a relatively complex Fun-
dID in relation to the set of all FundIDs it illustrates well the problem of calculating
underlying portfolio size based on FundID.
The FundID in Figure 4.5 includes various different investment vehicles including
unit trusts/OEICs, unit-linked personal pension funds and life funds and their re-
lated units/share classes. For example the top funds in Figure 4.5 are just different
share classes of the same OEIC. For this OEIC the fund sizes across all share classes
are reported at the fund size level rather than the share class level i.e. all fund sizes
are the same across share classes. The unit-linked personal pension funds in this
example show that numerous different insurance companies market and sell their
unit-linked personal pension products but use the same fund manager, in this case
Mark Lyttleton. For example Aviva have a unit-linked personal pension with various
units/share classes but they report each fund size individually i.e. at the unit/share
class level. In comparison Scottish Widows report the fund size across their three
units/share classes for their pension products as the same figure i.e. the fund size
figure (summation of fund sizes across units/classes) rather that the unit/share class
figure. In addition, in Figure 4.5 there are lots of missing fund sizes12. All of these
problems make the calculation of the underlying portfolio size, using FundID as a
proxy for the underlying portfolio, impossible. Given the problems with the fund size
data on which to calculate underlying portfolio size and fund flows, using FundID
as a proxy for the underlying portfolio, I propose a second best alternative to test
fund flows at the underlying portfolio level for both UK equity unit trusts/OEICs
and UK equity unit-linked personal pensions.
12Inet relates to a pricing methodology imposed by the ABI since 2005/06 for comparative
purposes. Therefore inet funds are used for comparative pricing purposes and are not actually
funds that an investor can invest in and therefore these inet funds in Figure 4.5 should have
missing fund size data.
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Figure 4.5: FundID and Fund Size Example
For unit trusts/OEICs I create the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size
Database where FundID proxies for the underlying portfolio. The UK Equity Unit
Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database includes unit trusts/OEICs that only have
FundIDs that relate to a unit trust/OEIC and also only have one unit/share class.
This restriction implies that fund size data is not only the fund size at the share
class level but also the fund size at the fund level since each fund only has one
unit/share class. Since each fund is also restricted to only containing a FundID with
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a unit trust/OEIC it ensures that the fund size is also the underlying portfolio size,
where FundID proxies for the underlying portfolio. Whilst this drastically limits
the number of unit trusts/OEICs in the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund
Size Database it ensures any fund size data on which I test Berk and Green (2004)
is based on underlying portfolio size where the FundID proxies for the underlying
portfolio.
Table 4.9 shows the summary statistics for the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID
Fund Size Database. There are 39 funds in the dataset with a mean monthly fund
size across the entire sample of £118.55 million. In contrast to the UK Equity Unit
Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database there has actually been a decline in the mean fund
size across the sample. The mean fund size in 2000 is £198.32 million whereas it
is £120.33 million in 2007. The mean monthly absolute fund flow across the entire
sample is £.26 million with a large variation with both positive and negative mean
absolute fund flows across the years in the sample which is broadly similar to the
UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database. The mean monthly
relative fund flow across the entire sample is 3.26% with a large standard deviation
and unlike the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database the mean
relative fund flows over the years in the sample have been both positive and negative.
4.7.4 UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund
Size Database
For unit-linked personal pensions I create the UK Equity Unit-Linked FundID Fund
Size Database where FundID proxies for the underlying portfolio. As with the
unit trusts/OEICs the UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund Size
Database only includes unit-linked personal pension funds that have FundIDs that
relate to personal pensions and also only have one unit/share class. This ensures
that the fund size proxies for the the underlying portfolio size. Table 4.10 displays
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Table 4.9: Fund Size and Flow Summary Statistics for UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000 to 2007
Number of funds 28 30 33 34 36 38 39 39 39
Mean monthly fund size 198.32 139.00 95.42 79.47 85.30 115.74 142.55 120.33 118.55
S.D monthly fund size 181.62 136.28 99.82 91.03 113.07 221.78 378.99 324.31 233.32
10th percentile monthly fund size 59.67 35.96 3.97 4.88 9.08 13.43 10.58 9.19 11.58
Median monthly fund size 109.10 85.30 58.71 48.66 47.69 53.24 57.62 55.91 62.09
90th percentile monthly fund size 371.40 280.33 229.64 203.42 202.85 277.28 299.65 249.93 270.44
Mean monthly absolute net flow -.37 -.92 -.70 -.50 .86 4.55 -.29 -1.43 .26
S.D monthly absolute net flow 35.83 16.13 7.12 2.92 20.98 97.36 9.00 15.61 39.88
10th percentile monthly absolute net flow -5.23 -5.14 -3.27 -1.51 -1.82 -3.02 -2.94 -2.55 -2.95
Median monthly monthly absolute net flow .03 -.09 -.17 -.15 -.24 -.23 -.27 -.22 -.19
90th percentile monthly absolute net flow 6.76 3.00 1.22 .73 .82 .99 .60 .32 1.16
Mean monthly relative net flow .69% -.20% .50% .17% 23.78% 1.13% -.92% -.84% 3.26%
S.D monthly relative net flow 9.56% 7.54% 12.00% 6.87% 436.28% 28.04% 7.46% 11.57% 161.93%
10th percentile monthly relative net flow -2.45% -5.87% -3.70% -2.87% -3.03% -3.27% -4.18% -3.13% -3.34%
Median monthly monthly relative net flow .02% -.10% -.30% -.34% -.42% -.36% -.51% -.56% -.39%
90th percentile monthly relative net flow 5.28% 4.11% 2.51% 1.74% 2.57% 2.24% 1.19% 1.31% 2.24%
Fund sizes and absolute fund flows are in millions of GBP.
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the summery statistics for fund size and fund flows for the UK Equity Unit-Linked
Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database over the sample period January 2000
to December 2007. The dataset includes 34 funds with a mean monthly fund size
across the entire sample of £289.10 million. The mean monthly fund size generally
increases each year over the sample which contrasts to the UK Equity Unit-Linked
Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database where mean fund size decreases over
the sample. The mean monthly absolute fund flow across the entire sample is £.88
million and the mean monthly relative fund flow is .96%.
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Table 4.10: Fund Size and Fund Flow Summary Statistics for UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000 to 2007
Number of funds 31 31 31 32 34 34 34 34 34
Mean monthly fund size 222.12 218.48 244.94 208.07 252.73 340.11 371.44 366.12 289.10
S.D monthly fund size 388.70 373.93 414.74 398.10 512.70 664.60 744.61 752.95 580.98
10th percentile monthly fund size 3.50 3.65 3.80 3.30 3.90 5.56 5.74 5.96 4.10
Median monthly fund size 89.25 90.25 75.89 66.70 30.03 30.89 28.34 30.59 55.40
90th percentile monthly fund size 736.00 863.45 1060.20 1060.10 1126.28 1654.35 1940.96 2030.11 1164.38
Mean monthly absolute net flow 1.48 3.82 3.21 1.64 -.97 3.39 -1.21 -2.42 .88
S.D monthly absolute net flow 8.45 92.20 9.61 8.25 136.94 101.52 8.81 9.34 74.85
10th percentile monthly absolute net flow -1.17 -.84 -.62 -.91 -1.26 -2.90 -2.21 -6.02 -1.64
Median monthly monthly absolute net flow .04 .09 .06 .03 .00 -.02 -.05 -.09 .00
90th percentile monthly absolute net flow 7.54 18.81 9.67 4.16 1.65 1.05 .45 .53 2.63
Mean monthly relative net flow .58% 3.51% .73% .25% .83% 1.06% .98% -.11% .96%
S.D monthly relative net flow 2.57% 35.77% 2.43% 3.71% 22.06% 20.58% 21.64% 1.94% 18.96%
10th percentile monthly relative net flow -1.09% -1.12% -1.09% -1.54% -1.42% -1.67% -1.37% -1.54% -1.39%
Median monthly monthly relative net flow .19% .29% .13% .08% .02% -.07% -.14% -.32% .00%
90th percentile monthly relative net flow 3.12% 5.74% 2.93% 2.71% 1.93% 2.48% 1.64% 1.88% 2.47%
Fund sizes and absolute fund flows are in millions of GBP.
Chapter 5
Fund Performance
Collective investment schemes are an important investment vehicle for investors as
they provide well diversified portfolios at low cost. For actively managed funds
they also provide investors with the investment skill of a professional fund manager.
However, actively managed funds are compensated by higher fees and therefore a
key research theme of the finance literature is whether active fund managers can
produce abnormal returns and if so whether the abnormal returns are passed onto
the investors. Whilst the latter question is of no less importance, in this chapter I
concentrate on whether fund managers of actively managed funds produce abnormal
returns from their investment decisions. To empirically investigate whether fund
managers produce abnormal returns from their investment decisions I concentrate on
actively managed UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal
pension funds using the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free and UK
Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension databases. I also assess whether there is any
significant difference between the performance of UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and
UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds.
Since many of the fund managers of the unit-linked personal pension funds will
also manage a unit trust/OEIC as part of their underlying portfolio I also anal-
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yse the performance of unit-linked personal pension fund managers conditional on
the structure of their underlying portfolio using the UK Equity Unit-linked Per-
sonal Pension FundID Database. I analyse whether there is any evidence that the
performance of unit-linked personal pension fund managers who also manage an un-
derlying portfolio that contains at least a unit trust/OEIC is significantly different
from a fund manager who just manages an underlying portfolio that only contains
unit-linked personal pensions. The concentration on unit-linked personal pension
funds is due to FundID, a proxy for the underlying portfolio, not being available for
non-surviving funds which is a large component of the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC
Survivor-Bias-Free Database. If there is evidence of significantly superior perfor-
mance by unit trust/OEIC managers then it is important to understand why. Since
the returns data are based on bid-bid prices gross of tax they represent the return
due to the investment decisions of the fund manager and therefore any difference in
performance should be due to a differential skill rather than differences in fees and
taxation. Due to the long term nature of personal pensions any small consistent
differential in performance could cause large deviations in future pension values. If
unit trusts/OEICs do have significantly better performance then the pension in-
dustry and regulators need to assess why the better fund managers are attracted to
unit trusts/OEICs and/or whether there are any barriers restricting the performance
of unit-linked personal pension fund managers. Comparing the different in perfor-
mance between unit-linked personal pension funds with a FundID that includes only
personal pensions with unit-linked personal pension funds that have a FundID that
includes at least a unit trust/OEIC will also provide evidence on whether the struc-
ture of the underlying portfolio potentially impacts on performance and whether
more skillful managers are attracted to more complex fund structures due to the
potential of larger fund flows and fund size increasing fund manager compensation.
In a UK setting Blake and Timmermann (2002) and Quigley and Sinquefield (2000)
find that abnormal performance of unit trusts is not statistically different from zero.
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For the equity and balanced funds in the Blake and Timmermann (2002) sample
they find an average monthly alpha of -.15% on a risk adjusted basis which is not
significant. Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) find little evidence of equity unit trusts
outperforming the market using both a single index model and a UK based Fama and
French three factor model. Cuthbertson et al. (2008) also find an average negative
alpha for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs but it is not significantly different from
zero. In addition to analysing the average performance Cuthbertson et al. (2008)
also examine the tails of the performance distribution using a bootstrap and find few
funds with positive abnormal performance but much more with negative abnormal
performance after accounting for luck. Similar results are also found in Cuthbertson
et al. (2010a) using the false discovery rate. Fletcher (1995) finds little evidence of
positive market timing skill by unit trust managers which supports the findings of
Cuthbertson et al. (2010b)1. This chapter will extend the literature on UK fund
performance and provide empirical evidence not only the performance of UK equity
unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pensions but also whether
underlying portfolio structure is significant and whether there exists a differential
in performance between unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds.
5.1 Measuring Fund Performance
I measure the performance of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension
funds against the single index/CAPM model, the Fama and French three factor
model and the Carhart four factor model. The Carhart four factor model is shown
in Equation 5.1.
Rpt − rft = αp + βp (Rmt − rft) + γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + εpt (5.1)
1For a comprehensive performance literature review see Section 2.2.2
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When λp = 0 in Equation (5.1) the Fama and French three factor model is obtained.
The CAPM model is obtained from Equation (5.1) when γp = 0, δp = 0 and λp = 0.
I test for fund performance as in Blake and Timmermann (1998) where an equally
weighted portfolio of excess returns in each time period is regressed against the
one, three and four factor models as in Equation 5.1. With the equally weighted
portfolio method no assumptions are made about the cross-sectional relationship
between fund returns. In Equation 5.1 Rpt−rft, is regressed against the four factors
in Equation (5.1), where Rpt is the monthly equally weighted return at time t and rft
is the monthly return on the risk free asset at time t. The Jensen’s alpha, αp, assesses
the equally weighted portfolio’s level of abnormal performance. The (Rmt − rft)
variable is the excess return on the market; SMB is the size factor, which is the
difference between the returns on a portfolio of small companies and the returns
on a portfolio of large companies; HML is the book to market factor which is the
difference in returns between a portfolio of high book to market companies and low
book to market companies and MOM is the one year momentum factor portfolio
originally cited in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The factor data I use in this
research is obtained from Gregory et al. (2009) and is available to freely download
at the Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment’s website2. The four factors are used
as a strategy that is practically implementable as a zero investment portfolio and
one that an investor would expect their fund manager to outperform particularly in
consideration of the compensation of managers in the fund management industry.
Here the four factor model will not be used to infer or critique how appropriate the
model is to measure risk factors but I will simply use it as a stringent benchmark
against which to assess fund manager performance.
2http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/index.php
5.1. MEASURING FUND PERFORMANCE 143
5.1.1 Market Timing
The factor models in the form of (5.1) primarily test the stock picking skill of the
fund manager. Another important aspect of fund manager skill that needs to be
considered is their market timing ability. In these tests the emphasis is on whether
the fund manager can time the market rather than whether the fund manager can
factor tilt their portfolios for the other factors. Although the funds under analysis
in this research are confined to UK equity severely restricting the asset allocation
decision the manager can still time the market by investing in high beta stocks in
bull markets and switching to low beta stocks in bear markets. I test for market
timing using the method of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) where a quadratic term is
added to the original factor models, to capture the curvature of market timing, as
shown in Equation 5.2.
Rpt−rft = αp+βp (Rmt − rft)+γpSMBt+δpHMLt+λpMOMt+ηp (Rmt − rft)2+εpt
(5.2)
A positive and significant γ indicates evidence of market timing by the fund manager.
As with the previous tests I use an equally weighted portfolio approach to test for
stock selection skills and market timing abilities of the fund managers.
5.1.2 Conditional Beta
Ferson and Schadt (1996) extend the general factor models to assess the ability
of fund managers to add value through private market timing skill. Ferson and
Schadt (1996) develop a conditional beta model where a fund’s factor betas depend
on lagged publicly available information. I use conditional beta models across the
single, three and four factor models to distinguish between the private market timing
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skills of fund managers and timing skills derived from predictable market or factor
movements. The conditional beta model based on the single index (CAPM) model
is as follows
Rpt − rft = αp + β0p (Rmt − rft) + β′1p [Zt−1 (Rmt − rft)] + εpt (5.3)
where Zt−1 is a vector of lagged information available at time t. For the vector of
lagged macroeconomic variables widely available to investors at time (t−1) I use the
lagged three month UK treasury bill yield from Datastream, the FTSE All Share
dividend yield from LSPD, the lagged term structure (ten year UK gilt yield minus
the three month UK treasury bill yield) and a dummy variable for January. In
addition to the conditional version of the single index model I also assess fund per-
formance using conditional models for the Fama and French three factor model and
the Carhart four factor model. I also test for market timing in the conditional beta
model by adding the quadratic term from Treynor and Mazuy (1966) to Equation
5.3 which allows a separation between the public and private information used by a
fund manager in market timing. I also test market timing for the conditional three
and four factor models. Using the equally weighted portfolio method for conditional
factor models with and without a market timing component I test for significant
abnormal performance by fund managers of both unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pension funds.
5.2 Data
The returns data for the performance tests are from the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC
Survivor-Bias-Free Database, the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension Database
and the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database. Details of the
construction of these datasets are given in Chapter 4. The returns for the funds in
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the databases are calculated on a monthly basis over the sample period January 1980
to December 2007 based on bid-to-bid prices gross of tax and therefore represent
the return to due to the investment decisions of the fund manager rather than the
return of the investors after all fees and expenses have been deducted.
The UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free Database consists of 973 funds,
including 393 live and 580 dead funds, and the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal
Pension Database consists of 280 funds. Both of these datasets are based on the
restriction that only one unit/share class and one FundID per fund is permitted.
When the number of observations in the return time series is restricted to greater
than or equal to 20 monthly returns to aid statistically meaningful analysis there
are 882 unit trust/OEICs and 252 unit-linked personal pension funds in each sample
respectively. Index/tracker funds are excluded as I am primarily interested in fund
manager performance via stock selection ability and market timing. The datasets
are both based on the equity investment sectors of UK All Companies, UK Equity
Income and UK Smaller Companies. The datasets represent the underlying portfo-
lios for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pension
funds.
Table 5.1 displays the descriptive statistics based on raw monthly returns for UK
equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pensions over the
sample period January 1980 to December 2007. Index/tracker funds are excluded
and each fund must have at least 20 monthly return observations. The average raw
monthly return for unit trusts/OEICs is 1.05% compared to 0.85% for unit-linked
personal pension funds. The variation in the returns distribution is also higher for
unit trusts/OEICs in comparison to unit-linked personal pensions when comparing
the monthly standard deviation of returns and the range in the distribution of
returns. Although the number of observations are lower for unit-linked personal
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for UK Equity Unit Trusts/OEICs and UK Equity
Unit-Linked Personal Pensions 1980 to 2007.
Entire Sample Entire Sample
Unit Trusts/OEICs Unit-linked Personal Pensions
Mean 1.05% 0.85%
Std. Dev. 4.86% 4.35%
Distribution
of returns:
10% -4.83% -4.80%
25% -1.32% -1.26%
50% 1.42% 1.40%
75% 3.80% 3.33%
90% 6.42% 5.42%
Obs. 122,854 36,156
No. of 882 252
schemes
pensions a larger proportion of the observations for unit-linked personal pension are
located towards the end of the sample where raw returns on average are lower than
the 1980’s and 1990’s. This is a potential reason why the average raw return for
unit trusts/OEICs is higher than the unit-linked personal pensions. It could also be
due to unit trusts/OEICs holding on average riskier assets than unit-linked personal
pension funds.
Table 5.2 displays the summary statistics based on raw returns for the UK Equity
Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database. In term of raw returns there is
little difference between the average raw monthly return and the distribution of re-
turns between unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs only associated with
personal pensions and those unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs associ-
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pensions 1980
to 2007 based on the Composition of FundID
FundID - unit-linked Fund ID - Unit-Linked
Personal Pension Only Personal Pension and at
Least a Unit Trust/OEIC
Mean 0.87% 0.80%
Std. Dev. 4.28% 4.41%
Distribution
of returns:
10% -4.67% -5.02%
25% -1.25% -1.30%
50% 1.38% 1.45%
75% 3.32% 3.33%
90% 5.44% 5.37%
Obs. 17,802 11,467
No. of 99 109
schemes
ated with at least a unit trust/OEIC. There is also very little difference between the
average raw monthly returns for the entire sample of unit-linked personal pension
funds in Table 5.1 and the personal pension funds categorised by the composition
of their FundID in Table 5.2.
5.3 Results
Table 5.3 displays the alphas for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-
linked personal pension funds based on unconditional factor models using an equally
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weighted portfolio approach as in Blake and Timmermann (1998) over the sample
period January 1980 to December 2007. In general, across both unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pension funds there is very little evidence of significant
abnormal performance. Unit trusts/OEICs show evidence of negative average ab-
normal performance which is robust to the factor model used but in almost all cases
it is not statistically significant. The only exception is the significant negative per-
formance at the 5% level by unit trusts/OEICs in the UK All Companies sector.
Unit-linked personal pension funds show evidence of both positive and negative ab-
normal performance but the evidence is not statistically significant. Only the entire
sample for unit-linked personal pension funds and the UK Equity Income sector
show consistently positive abnormal returns across all factor models although again
the evidence is not statistically significant. It is also interesting to highlight that
although the average raw return over the entire sample period for unit trusts/OEICs
is higher than for unit-linked personal pension funds the reverse is generally true
on a risk adjusted basis with unit-linked personal pensions generally having higher
alphas. This highlights the importance of adjusting for risk exposure and the need
for coterminous data if a comparative analysis is based on raw returns.
Table 5.4 displays the alphas for the unit-linked personal pensions based on the
composition of their FundID, where FundID proxies for the underlying portfolio. It
also includes the alphas for the entire samples of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pension funds from Table 5.3 to aid the comparative analysis. Table 5.4
provides similar evidence to Table 5.3. There is no evidence of abnormal performance
when analysing unit-linked personal pension funds based on the composition of their
FundID, a proxy for the underlying portfolio. Unit-linked personal pensions that
have a FundID that only contains personal pension funds generate a higher alpha
and this finding is robust across factor models. However, in general the alpha
for unit-linked personal pensions with FundIDs that only contain personal pension
funds is negative. Since the alpha for the entire UK equity unit-linked personal
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Table 5.3: Equally Weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation Using Jensen-alphas
Factor Model Investment Vehicle Sample No. Funds No. Obs α α t-stat R2
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.039% -.58 .92
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.080% -1.47 .95
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 264 -.027% -.37 .92
Single Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .177% .19 .61
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .018% .25 .92
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 -.006% -.09 .93
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .105% 1.16 .86
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 -.036% -.17 .52
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.043% -1.07 .97
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.075% -1.96? .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 264 -.091% -1.61 .95
Three Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .116% 1.31 .91
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .022% .42 .96
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .007% .13 .96
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .016% .19 .90
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 .058% .45 .84
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.065% -1.53 .97
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 366 -.093% -2.27? .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 264 -.076% -1.27 .95
Four Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .034% .38 .91
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .010% .18 .96
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 -.005% -.08 .96
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .044% .47 .90
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 -.039% -.27 .85
The four factor model is regressed as follows over the sample period, January 1980 to December 2007, where the dependent variable is the equally-weighted monthly excess return
on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t.: Rpt − rft = αp + βp
(
Rmt − rft
)
+ γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + εpt. Regressions are also made for the three and
single factor models where for the three factor model the same equation applies but λp = 0, and for the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0. The Jensen-alpha for each sample is
calculated and recorded in the α column with the t stat in the α t-stat column. The R2 value for the regression in the respective sample is recorded in the final column.
Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 5.4: Equally Weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation Using Jensen-alphas based on the Composition of the Underlying
Portfolio’s FundID
Factor Model Investment Vehicle Sample No. Funds No. Obs α α t-stat R2
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.039% -.58 .92
Single Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .018% .25 .92
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 -.007% -.12 .93
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 -.046% -.38 .81
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.043% -1.07 .97
Three Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .022% .42 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 0.00% .00 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 -.043% -.46 .89
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.065% -1.53 .97
Four Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .010% .18 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 -.016% -.30 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 -.090% -.85 .89
The four factor model is regressed as follows over the sample period, January 1980 to December 2007, where the dependent variable is the equally-weighted monthly excess return
on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t.: Rpt − rft = αp + βp
(
Rmt − rft
)
+ γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + εpt. Regressions are also made for the three and
single factor models where for the three factor model the same equation applies but λp = 0, and for the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0. The Jensen-alpha for each sample is
calculated and recorded in the α column with the t stat in the α t-stat column. The R2 value for the regression in the respective sample is recorded in the final column.
Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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pension sample is positive across factor models it suggests other compositions of the
underlying portfolios, proxied by the FundID, have positive alphas i.e. FundIDs that
contain a unit-linked personal pension, no unit trusts/OEICs but another investment
vehicle e.g. a life fund.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide evidence that the UK equity market is informationally
efficient. However, I only analyse the alpha on the entire sample of funds in question
rather than analysing the tails of the performance distribution so we can not say that
certain funds do no consistently produce abnormal returns. The evidence in Tables
5.3 and 5.4 is consistent with the findings of Quigley and Sinquefield (2000), Blake
and Timmermann (1998), Cuthbertson et al. (2008) for UK unit trusts/OEICs and
Gregory and Tonks (2004) for UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds.
Table 5.11 analyses the difference between the performance of unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pension funds as well as the difference between the perfor-
mance of unit-linked personal pension funds that have FundIDs associated with only
personal pensions and unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs associated
with at least a unit trust/OEIC. There is no evidence of differential performance
that is statistically significant at the 5% level based on unconditional factor models.
Table 5.5 analyses the market timing component of fund performance using un-
conditional factor models. Unit trusts/OEICs show significant evidence of negative
market timing which is robust across sectors and factor models. The only exception
is the UK Equity Income sector where there is no significant evidence of market
timing although the market timing coefficient is still negative. Unit-linked personal
pension funds also show strong evidence of a negative market timing effect and the
results are consistent across all factor models and equity sectors. As shown in Ta-
ble 5.6 there is again statistically significant evidence of a negative market timing
effect for both unit-linked personal pensions that have a FundID that only includes
personal pension funds and unit-linked personal pension funds that have a FundID
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Table 5.5: Equally Weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation Using Jensen-alphas with Market Timing
Factor Model Investment Vehicle Sample No. Funds No. Obs α α t-stat η η t-stat R2
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 .047% .66 -.37 -2.86?? .92
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.002% -.04 -.33 -3.80?? .95
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 264 -.005% -.06 -.09 -.66 .92
Single Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .278% 1.49 -1.05 -2.78?? .61
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .145% 2.11? -.55 -5.35?? .92
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .103% 1.63 -.47 -5.05?? .93
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .220% 2.47? -.52 -3.76?? .87
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 .354% 1.60 -1.77 -4.12?? .54
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 .008% .20 -.23 -2.81?? .97
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.024% -.60 -.23 -2.97?? .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 264 -.056% -.92 -.14 -1.38 .95
Three Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .244% 2.75?? -.57 -4.26?? .91
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .117% 2.29? -.42 -4.19?? .96
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .086% 1.71 -.35 -3.96?? .96
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .129% 1.56 -.53 -3.07?? .90
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 .349% 2.88?? -1.36 -5.00?? .86
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.013% -.29 -.21 -2.62?? .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.040% -.94 -.22 -2.80?? .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 264 -.031% -.48 -.16 -1.55 .95
Four Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .159% 1.81 -.51 -3.83?? .92
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .113% 2.06? -.42 -4.14?? .96
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .082% 1.53 -.35 -3.90?? .96
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .173% 1.91 -.56 -3.12?? .90
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 .265% 2.13? -1.31 -4.91?? .86
The four factor model including the Treynor-Mazuy test for market timing is regressed as follows over the sample period, January 1980 to December 2007, where the dependent
variable is the equally-weighted monthly excess return on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t.:
Rpt − rft = αp + βp
(
Rmt − rft
)
+ γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + ηp
(
Rmt − rf
)2
+ εpt. Regressions are also made for the three and single factor models where for the three
factor model the same equation applies but λ = 0p, and for the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0. The Jensen-alpha for each sample is calculated and recorded in the α column
with the appropriate t stat in the α t-stat column. The market timing parameter is reported in the η column with its relevant t-statistic in the η t-stat column. The R2 value for
the regression in the respective sample is recorded in the final column. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 5.6: Equally Weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation using Jensen-Alphas with Market Timing based on the Composition
of the Underlying Portfolio’s FundID
Factor Model Investment Vehicle Sample No. Funds No. Obs α α t-stat η η t-stat R2
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 .047% .66 -.37 -2.86?? .92
Single Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .145% 2.11? -.55 -5.35?? .92
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .112% 1.79 -.51 -4.95?? .94
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 .173% 1.55 -.99 -5.68?? .82
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 .008% .20 -.23 -2.81?? .97
Three Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .117% 2.29? -.42 -4.19?? .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .092% 1.86 -.41 -5.13?? .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 .137% 1.49 -.85 -3.20?? .90
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.013% -.29 -.21 -2.62?? .98
Four Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .113% 2.06? -.42 -4.14?? .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .083% 1.58 -.40 -5.05?? .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 .100% 1.03 -.82 -3.15?? .90
The four factor model including the Treynor-Mazuy test for market timing is regressed as follows over the sample period, January 1980 to December 2007, where the dependent
variable is the equally-weighted monthly excess return on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t.:
Rpt − rft = αp + βp
(
Rmt − rft
)
+ γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + ηp
(
Rmt − rf
)2
+ εpt. Regressions are also made for the three and single factor models where for the three
factor model the same equation applies but λ = 0p, and for the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0. The Jensen-alpha for each sample is calculated and recorded in the α column
with the appropriate t stat in the α t-stat column. The market timing parameter is reported in the η column with its relevant t-statistic in the η t-stat column. The R2 value for
the regression in the respective sample is recorded in the final column. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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that also contain at least a unit trust/OEIC.
The evidence of significant negative market timing for UK equity unit-trusts/OEICs
is consistent with Cuthbertson et al. (2010b) and seems to be robust to the method
used to evaluate market timing. For unit-linked personal pensions the evidence in
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 is similar to Clare et al. (2010) who find little evidence that pro-
fessional fund managers add value through market timing strategies. Tables 5.5 and
5.6 provide strong evidence that fund managers for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs
and UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds cannot time the market. It sug-
gests that investors should be cautious of funds employing market timing strategies
although the evidence in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 are based on all funds in their relevant
samples rather than the tails of the performance distribution and do not specifically
analyse funds that claim to use market timing strategies. However, Cuthbertson
et al. (2010b) address the distribution of market timing ability of UK equity unit
trusts/OEICs and find that very few funds provide evidence of market timing. If
an investor is to invest in an active fund the evidence suggests that they should
place the emphasis on the stock picking skills of the fund manager rather than their
market timing ability.
Table 5.7 displays the alphas for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pen-
sions based on conditional factor models as advocated by Ferson and Schadt (1996).
There is very little evidence of significant abnormal performance by unit trusts/OEICs
using conditional models based on the single index (CAPM) model, three factor
model and four factor model. The UK Smaller Companies sector using a three fac-
tor model provides the only evidence of abnormal performance for unit trusts/OEICs
with a monthly alpha of .181%. For the three and four factor models all alphas for
unit trusts/OEICs are negative apart from the UK Smaller Companies sector. For
unit-linked personal pension funds there is also no evidence of abnormal performance
but all of the alphas are positive across all sectors and factor models. However, the
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difference between the abnormal performance of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pension funds is not significantly significant as shown in Table 5.11.
Table 5.8 again finds no evidence of abnormal performance for unit-linked personal
pension funds based on the composition of their underlying FundIDs using condi-
tional factor models. Personal pension funds that have FundIDs that include only
personal pensions have positive alphas across all conditional factor models but there
is no evidence they are statistically significant. The unit-linked personal pensions
that have FundIDs that include at least a unit trust/OEIC have consistently lower
alphas that is both positive and negative across conditional factor models but there
is no evidence they are significantly different from zero. Table 5.11 also provides
evidence that the difference between the abnormal return for unit-linked personal
pensions that have FundIDs that include only pension funds and unit-linked per-
sonal pensions that have FundIDs that include at least a unit trust/OEIC is not
significantly different from zero.
Table 5.9 shows the abnormal returns for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked per-
sonal pensions based on conditional factor models that include a market timing
component. The coefficients for the market timing component are generally nega-
tive for unit trusts/OEICs but they are not statistically significant. This contrasts
with the unconditional factor models with market timing where there is strong sta-
tistically significant evidence of a negative market timing effect. There are in fact
positive timing coefficients for the entire sample of unit trusts/OEICs using three
and four factor models that seems to be driven by the UK Smaller Companies Sector
but the timing coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The results for
unit-linked personal pension funds based on conditional factor models that include
a market timing component are very similar to the unit trusts/OEICs. The market
timing coefficient is negative in general but there is no evidence it is significantly
different form zero. In Table 5.10 the results for unit-linked personal pension funds
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Table 5.7: Equally Weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation Using Jensen-alphas based on Conditional Models
Factor Model Investment Vehicle Sample No. Funds No. Obs α α t-stat R2
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 .003% .04 .92
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.039% -.73 .95
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 336 .017% .25 .91
Single Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .143% .81 .62
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .077% 1.15 .92
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .051% .84 .94
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .149% 1.70 .87
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 .120% .57 .55
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.011% -.29 .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.044% -1.19 .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 336 -.063% -1.18 .95
Three Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .181% 2.09? .92
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .068% 1.39 .96
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .051% 1.06 .96
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .063% .79 .90
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 336 .152% 1.25 .86
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.029% -.69 .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.059% -1.48 .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 336 -.047% -.76 .95
Four Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .117% 1.41 .92
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .065% 1.24 .96
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .044% .88 .96
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .108% 1.26 .90
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 336 .078% .61 .86
The four factor model is regressed as follows over the sample period, January 1980 to December 2007, where the dependent variable is the equally-weighted monthly excess return
on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t.: Rpt − rf = αp + β0p
(
Rmt − rf
)
+ γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + β′1p
[
Zt−1
(
Rmt − rft
)]
+ εpt where Zt−1 is a vector
of lagged information available at time t including the lagged 3-month Treasury bill rate, the lagged divided yield on the FTSE All Share Index, the lagged slope of the term
structure (difference between long and short run government yields) and a dummy variable for January. Regressions are also made for the three and single factor models where for
the three factor model the same equation applies but λ = 0p, and for the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0. The Jensen-alpha for each sample is calculated and recorded in the
α column with the appropriate t stat in the α t-stat column. The market timing parameter is reported in the η column with its relevant t-statistic in the eta t-stat column. The R2
value for the regression in the respective sample is recorded in the final column. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
5.3.
R
E
S
U
L
T
S
157
Table 5.8: Equally Weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation using Jensen-Alphas based on Conditional Models and the Compo-
sition of the Underlying Portfolio’s FundID
Factor Model Investment Vehicle Sample No. Funds No. Obs α α t-stat R2
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 .003% .04 .92
Single Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .077% 1.15 .92
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .050% .84 .94
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 .037% .32 .82
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.011% -.29 .98
Three Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .068% 1.39 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .046% .95 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 .013% .15 .90
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.029% -.69 .98
Four Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .065% 1.24 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .038% .76 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 -.014% -.14 .90
The four factor model is regressed as follows over the sample period, January 1980 to December 2007, where the dependent variable is the equally-weighted monthly excess return
on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t.: Rpt − rf = αp + β0p
(
Rmt − rf
)
+ γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + β′1p
[
Zt−1
(
Rmt − rft
)]
+ εpt where Zt−1 is a vector
of lagged information available at time t including the lagged 3-month Treasury bill rate, the lagged divided yield on the FTSE All Share Index, the lagged slope of the term
structure (difference between long and short run government yields) and a dummy variable for January. Regressions are also made for the three and single factor models where for
the three factor model the same equation applies but λ = 0p, and for the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0. The Jensen-alpha for each sample is calculated and recorded in the
α column with the appropriate t stat in the α t-stat column. The market timing parameter is reported in the η column with its relevant t-statistic in the eta t-stat column. The R2
value for the regression in the respective sample is recorded in the final column. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 5.9: Equally Weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation Using Jensen-alphas with Market Timing based on Conditional
Models
Factor Model Investment Vehicle Sample No. Funds No. Obs α α t-stat η η t-stat R2
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 .051% .71 -.28 -1.46 .92
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.002% -.04 -.21 -1.40 .95
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 336 .055% .74 -.22 -1.21 .91
Single Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .267% 1.42 -.71 -1.34 .62
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .144% 2.10? -.39 -2.09? .92
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .098% 1.55 -.27 -1.52 .94
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 336 .249% 2.69?? -.61 -2.52? .87
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 .332% 1.49 -1.25 -1.93? .56
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.014% -.33 .01 .14 .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.042% -1.01 -.01 -.11 .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 336 -.059% -1.04 -.02 -.12 .95
Three Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .172% 1.90 .05 .23 .92
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .094% 1.84 -.149 -1.19 .96
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .063% 1.25 -.07 -.57 .96
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .121% 1.42 -.34 -1.49 .90
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 .271% 2.12? -.68 -1.65 .86
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.031% -.70 .16 .15 .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK All Companies 570 336 -.057% -1.33 -.01 -.10 .98
Unit Trust/OEIC UK Equity Income 193 336 -.044% -.67 -.02 -.13 .95
Four Factor Model Unit Trust/OEIC UK Smaller Companies 121 336 .107% 1.16 .06 .26 .92
Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .091% 1.68 -.15 -1.19 .96
Personal Pension UK All Companies 176 336 .056% 1.08 -.07 -.56 .96
Personal Pension UK Equity Income 50 305 .170% 1.83 -.35 -1.55 .90
Personal Pension UK Smaller Companies 26 283 .196% 1.46 -.66 -1.60 .87
The four factor model including the Treynor-Mazuy test for market timing is regressed as follows over the sample period, January 1980 to December 2007, where the dependent
variable is the equally-weighted monthly excess return on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t.:
Rpt − rf = αp + β0p
(
Rmt − rf
)
+ γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + ηp
(
Rmt − rf
)2
+ β′1p
[
Zt−1
(
Rmt − rft
)]
+ εpt where Zt−1 is a vector of lagged information available at
time t including the lagged 3-month Treasury bill rate, the lagged divided yield on the FTSE All Share Index, the lagged slope of the term structure (difference between long and
short run government yields) and a dummy variable for January. Regressions are also made for the three and single factor models where for the three factor model the same
equation applies but λ = 0p, and for the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0. The Jensen-alpha for each sample is calculated and recorded in the α column with the appropriate t
stat in the α t-stat column. The market timing parameter is reported in the η column with its relevant t-statistic in the eta t-stat column. The R2 value for the regression in the
respective sample is recorded in the final column. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 5.10: Equally Weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation using Jensen-Alphas with Market Timing based on Conditional
Models and the Composition of the Underlying Portfolio’s FundID
Factor Model Investment Vehicle Sample No. Funds No. Obs α α t-stat η η t-stat R2
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 .051% .71 -.28 -1.46 .92
Single Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .144% 2.10? -.39 -2.09? .92
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .099% 1.56 -.28 -1.53 .94
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 .167% 1.45 -.78 -2.53? .82
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.014% -.33 .01 .14 .98
Three Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .094% 1.84 -.149 -1.19 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .060% 1.19 -.08 -.63 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 .092% 1.01 -.45 -1.81 .90
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 882 336 -.031% -.70 .16 .15 .98
Four Factor Model Personal Pension Entire Sample 252 336 .091% 1.68 -.15 -1.19 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP only 99 336 .053% 1.01 -.08 -.63 .96
Personal Pension FundID - Underlying PP & at least a UT/OEIC 109 299 .065% .68 -.44 -1.77 .90
The four factor model including the Treynor-Mazuy test for market timing is regressed as follows over the sample period, January 1980 to December 2007, where the dependent
variable is the equally-weighted monthly excess return on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t.:
Rpt − rf = αp + β0p
(
Rmt − rf
)
+ γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + ηp
(
Rmt − rf
)2
+ β′1p
[
Zt−1
(
Rmt − rft
)]
+ εpt where Zt−1 is a vector of lagged information available at
time t including the lagged 3-month Treasury bill rate, the lagged divided yield on the FTSE All Share Index, the lagged slope of the term structure (difference between long and
short run government yields) and a dummy variable for January. Regressions are also made for the three and single factor models where for the three factor model the same
equation applies but λ = 0p, and for the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0. The Jensen-alpha for each sample is calculated and recorded in the α column with the appropriate t
stat in the α t-stat column. The market timing parameter is reported in the η column with its relevant t-statistic in the η t-stat column. The R2 value for the regression in the
respective sample is recorded in the final column. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 5.11: Analysing the Difference Between Alphas
Factor Model Performance Test Difference in α α t-stat
Single Factor Unconditional α .057% .59
Single Factor Unconditional α with market timing .098% 1.18
Single Factor Conditional α .074% .78
Single Factor Conditional α with market timing .094% .94
Three Factor Unconditional α .065% .99
PP Entire Sample - UT/OEIC Entire Sample Three Factor Unconditional α with market timing .108% 1.65
Three Factor Conditional α .079% 1.26
Three Factor Conditional α with market timing .107% 1.63
Four Factor Unconditional α .075% 1.06
Four Factor Unconditional α with market timing .126% 1.79
Four Factor Conditional α .093% 1.40
Four Factor Conditional α with market timing .122% 1.75
Single Factor Unconditional α -.069% -.51
Single Factor Unconditional α with market timing .155% 1.21
Single Factor Conditional α .141% 1.10
Single Factor Conditional α with market timing .085% .65
Three Factor Unconditional α .043% .40
FundID PP Only - FundID PP & at least a UT/OEIC Three Factor Unconditional α with market timing -.045% -.43
Three Factor Conditional α .032% .31
Three Factor Conditional α with market timing -.032% -.30
Four Factor Unconditional α .074% .62
Four Factor Unconditional α with market timing -.017% -.15
Four Factor Conditional α .052% .48
Four Factor Conditional α with market timing -.012% -.11
The alphas are obtained from the previous performance tests based on the equally weighted portfolio approach. Statistical significance between alphas at the 5% and 1% levels are
denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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that have FundIDs associated with only personal pensions is very similar to the per-
sonal pension funds that have FundID’s associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC.
The timing coefficients are negative but generally not significant.
5.4 Conclusion
The empirical evidence presented in the performance chapter suggests that the
UK equity market is informationally efficient as fund managers of UK equity unit
trusts/OEICs and UK unit-linked personal pensions show very little evidence of ab-
normal performance. These results are robust to the factor model used and whether
the model is unconditional or conditional. There is also no evidence that fund man-
agers can successfully time the market. Using unconditional factor models both
unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds show strong evidence of
a statistically significant negative market timing effect which becomes insignificant
though still negative when using conditional models. Limited evidence of market
timing ability based on UK data is consistent with Clare et al. (2010) and Cuth-
bertson et al. (2010b). Using US monthly holding data Elton et al. (2011b) find
that sector rotation with respect to high-tech stocks is a major factor of negative
market timing for their US data set. Further research on the timing of UK collective
investment schemes could implement the methodology of Elton et al. (2011b) but
it requires comprehensive holding data for collective investment schemes. There is
also no evidence that the performance of unit trusts/OEICs is significantly different
from that of unit-linked personal pension funds. This is perhaps not that surprising
as some of the unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds have the
same fund manager and underlying portfolio and therefore performance.
The same general conclusions apply to the unit-linked personal pension funds cate-
gorised by FundID. Both the unit-linked personal pension funds that have FundID’s
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that include only personal pensions and the unit-linked personal pension funds that
include at least a unit trust/OEIC provide very little evidence of superior stock pick-
ing skills or successful market timing abilities. There is also no significant different
between the performance of the two pension fund samples categorised by FundID
across all factor models.
With no evidence of differential skill between unit/trust and unit-linked personal
pension fund managers it suggests investors saving for retirement should use unit-
linked personal pensions rather than unit trust/OEICs since personal pensions have
tax advantages and the potential option of contributions from employers. How-
ever, since active managers show no evidence of abnormal performance and active
unit-linked personal pension funds generally charge higher fees than passive funds
it suggests investors investing for retirement purposes would be better off using an
index/passive equity fund to maximise their pension value at the end of the accu-
mulation phase. However, these results are based on average alpha and therefore
further research is needed to analyse the distribution of returns and whether there
are a significant number of active fund managers who produce on average positive
abnormal returns and whether they accrue to the investors.
Chapter 6
Fund Performance Persistence
6.1 Introduction
The Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows predicts that we should not
observe persistence in mutual fund performance because money flows into funds that
have performed well and out of funds that have performed badly. In Berk and Green
(2004) fund managers face diseconomies of scale managing fund flows resulting in
fund flows being the equilibrating mechanism that means abnormal performance
should not persist. Berk and Green (2004) argue that performance is not persistent
because investors chase good performance and punish bad performance. In this
chapter I propose an empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) by comparing the
performance persistence of UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked
personal pensions. Since unit-linked personal pension funds have high switching
costs and are a long term contractual savings vehicle inaccessible until retirement the
flow of funds in personal pensions should not be as responsive to past performance
as that of unit trusts/OEICs. Previous evidence to support the more attenuated
fund flow relationship for pensions can be found in Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)
and further supporting evidence is given in Chapter 7. If the Berk and Green (2004)
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model of mutual fund flows is correct we should find more performance persistence
in unit-linked personal pensions where the performance fund flow relationship is
more attenuated in comparison to unit trusts/OEICs.
Whilst the previous literature on persistence in fund performance is extensive most
studies are motivated by empirically testing the EMH and the value added by ac-
tive portfolio managers rather than testing the Berk and Green (2004) model of
mutual fund flows. This is in part due to Berk and Green (2004) being a relatively
recent publication. Fletcher (1997), Blake and Timmermann (1998), Allen and Tan
(1999) Quigley and Sinquefield (2000), Fletcher and Forbes (2002), Cuthbertson
et al. (2008) and Cuthbertson et al. (2008) assess performance persistence in UK
unit trusts/OEICs and find conflicting results. Differences across the studies include
varying sample periods, type of funds analysed, risk factor models used, charges in-
corporated into returns, holding periods and whether the issue of survivorship bias
has been assessed. Whether the aforementioned papers find significant performance
persistence is divided but the interesting result from Fletcher and Forbes (2002) is
that the persistence found in other factor models is eliminated when performance is
evaluated to a model similar to Carhart’s (1997). Thus, the Carhart (1997) model
seems to be the most stringent model across both the US mutual fund data and
UK unit trust data when testing for performance persistence and hence I use it
to test for performance persistence for both unit-linked personal pensions and unit
trusts/OEICs in this research.
The literature on UK pension funds has been more limited in quantity in comparison
to unit trusts/OEICs and has been primarily based on occupational pension schemes.
Brown et al. (1997) and Blake et al. (1999) find no strong evidence of performance
persistence. Tonks (2005) examines performance persistence in UK occupational
schemes using both contingency tables and performance ranked portfolio strategies.
Tonks (2005) finds stronger evidence of persistence than previous studies at one
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year horizons and weaker evidence in the long run. Gregory and Tonks (2004)
examine the performance and performance persistence in UK personal pensions and
find negative persistence at short horizons, but over six months to a year significant
positive performance persistence, even when using the Carhart (1997) four factor
model. In this chapter I extend the current literature of performance persistence
by empirically testing the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows by
comparing the performance persistence of UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK
equity unit-linked personal pensions.
I compare the performance persistence between UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and
UK equity unit-linked personal pensions using the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC
Survivor-Bias-Free and UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension databases respec-
tively. In both datasets each fund is restricted to one primary share class/unit and
one FundID only. The datasets therefore proxy the underlying portfolios for unit
trust/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions where only one return series per un-
derlying fund is permitted. I use these datasets for a general comparative analysis of
the difference in performance persistence between two different investment vehicles
as the funds in the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension Database will contain
fund managers who also manage unit trusts/OEICs in their underlying portfolio and
hence in these cases the fund flow to the fund manager and underlying portfolio are
not restricted to only personal pension funds. I would still however expect more per-
formance persistence in the personal pension funds as not all of the personal pension
funds will have fund flows from unit trusts/OEICs which will obviously not be the
case for the unit trust/OEIC sample. For a more rigorous and meaningful empirical
test of Berk and Green (2004) I perform the performance persistence tests using
the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database. Since the database
contains sub samples of unit-linked personal pension funds based on their FundID,
a proxy for the underlying portfolio, there should be more performance persistence
in the unit-linked personal pension funds that contain FundIDs that only relate to
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personal pensions since they are not exposed to fund flows from unit trusts/OEICs.
6.2 Performance Persistence Tests
The performance persistence tests I use in this chapter are based on abnormal per-
formance. I calculate monthly abnormal performance for each fund by comparing
the realised monthly return on the fund with the return predicted from an asset
pricing model. The asset pricing models I use include the single index (CAPM)
model, the Fama and French three factor model and the Carhart four factor model.
The Carhart four factor model is shown in Equation 6.1.
Rpt − rft = αp + βp (Rmt − rft) + γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + εpt (6.1)
For each fund, Rt− rft is regressed against the four factors in Equation (6.1), where
Rt is the monthly return at time t on the fund and rft is the monthly return on
the risk free asset at time t. The (Rmt − rft) variable is the excess return on the
market; SMB is the size factor, which is the difference between the returns on
a portfolio of small companies and the returns on a portfolio of large companies;
HML is the book to market factor which is the difference in returns between a
portfolio of high book to market companies and low book to market companies
and MOM is the one year momentum factor portfolio originally cited in Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993). When λp = 0 in Equation (7.4) the Fama and French three
factor model is obtained. The CAPM model is obtained from Equation (7.4) when
γp = 0, δp = 0 and λp = 0. The regressions coefficients are based on whole sample
regressions and are calculated individually for each fund in order to obtain monthly
abnormal returns for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds. For
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robustness in addition to the unconditional factor models I also calculate abnormal
returns for the performance persistence tests using an unconditional Carhart four
factor model.
6.2.1 Contingency Tables
The contingency table tests are based on abnormal returns. In each sample I classify
funds as winners (W) or losers (L) based on the median abnormal return over the
relevant ranking period. Over two consecutive time periods a two by two table is
formed such that a fund can have one of four outcomes, (WW ), (WL), (LW ) or
(LL) where W represents being above the median abnormal return and a winner and
L means being below the median abnormal return and a loser. I use the following
four statistical procedures to test for performance persistence:
1. Cross-product ratio (CP)
CP =
(WW × LL)
(WL× LW ) (6.2)
The statistical significance of the CP ratio can be tested as log(CP)/σlogCP
has a standard normal distribution where
σlogCP =
[(
1
WW
)
+
(
1
WL
)
+
(
1
LW
)
+
(
1
LL
)] 1
2
(6.3)
and allows the significance of the deviations of CP ratio from unity to be
tested.
2. Percentage of repeat winners, where
PRW =
WW(
N
2
) (6.4)
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3. Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f, where
CHI =
(
WW − N
4
)2
+
(
WL− N
4
)2
+
(
LW − N
4
)2
+
(
LL− N
4
)2(
N
4
) (6.5)
4. A regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnor-
mal returns with a t-stat assessing the statistical significance of the slope
coefficient.
6.2.2 Performance Ranked Portfolio Tests
The performance ranked portfolio persistence tests are performed using abnormal
returns based on whole sample regressions using the single (CAPM) index model,
Fama and French three factor model and the Carhart four factor model. I sort unit-
linked personal pensions and unit trusts/OEICs separately into quintile portfolios
based on past abnormal performance in a specified ranking period. Then during the
subsequent evaluation period I calculate the average monthly equally weighted port-
folio return of the top and bottom quintile portfolios. The ranking and subsequent
evaluation periods are calculated with overlapping periods throughout the sample
period. I test the difference between the average equally weighted abnormal returns
in the top and bottom portfolios using a t-stat where allowance is made for the
autocorrelation from overlapping periods. No persistence in performance is signified
by a t-stat statistically insignificant from zero. The performance ranked portfolio
tests are based on symmetrical ranking and evaluation periods. The ranking and
evaluation periods I analyse include 1MR1ME, 3MR3ME, 6MR6ME, 12M12ME and
36MR36ME. For 1MR1ME this notation implies a 1 month ranking period and a
subsequent 1 month evaluation period. The same logic in notation applies to the
other ranking and evaluation periods. Carpenter and Lynch (1999) advocate the
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use of performance ranked portfolio tests and therefore more weight will be placed
on the results from the performance ranked portfolio tests.
6.2.3 Rolling Regressions
The aforementioned contingency table and portfolio ranked portfolio tests across
the various factor models are all based on factor regression coefficients based on
whole sample regressions. This could potentially result in look-ahead bias and does
not allow for time varying factor coefficients. I therefore re-estimate the factor
coefficients for each fund based on the Carhart four factor model, which is the
base case model, and calculate new abnormal returns for each fund using 36 month
rolling regressions and test for performance persistence using the aforementioned
contingency table and performance ranked portfolio tests.
6.3 Data
The performance persistence tests are based on returns data from the UK Eq-
uity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free Database, UK Equity Unit-linked Per-
sonal Pension Database and the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID
Database. The returns for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked
personal pensions are calculated on a monthly basis over the sample period January
1980 to December 2007 based on bid-to-bid prices gross of tax. Details of these
datasets including summary statistics and analysis are given in Chapter 4. I use
the exact same datasets for the performance persistence tests and the performance
tests and thus brief summary statistics and analysis for the raw returns used in the
performance persistence tests can also be found in section 5.2. In summary the UK
Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Survivor-Bias-Free and UK Equity Unit-linked Personal
Pension databases restrict each fund to one primary share class/unit and one Fun-
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dID only. The UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database identifies
unit-linked personal pensions in relation to their FundID, a proxy for the under-
lying portfolio, so underlying portfolios that are only exposed to personal pension
funds can be identified in addition to those that have at least a unit trust/OEIC as
part of their underlying portfolio. Unit-linked personal pension funds that have an
underlying portfolio that only includes personal pension funds should have a more
attenuated performance fund flow relationship due to the illiquid nature of personal
pensions and therefore in accordance with Berk and Green (2004) more performance
persistence.
6.4 Results
Table 6.1 displays the results of the performance ranked portfolio tests based on
abnormal returns from the single index (CAPM) model. At the very short hori-
zon, based on a one month ranking and one month evaluation period (1MR1ME),
unit trusts/OEICs have significant positive persistence at the 1% significance level
whereas the entire sample of unit-linked personal pension funds show reversals in
performance, although it is not significantly significant. However, the entire sample
of unit-linked personal pension funds only show evidence of reversals in performance
at the short term horizon of one month ranking and one month evaluation. At in-
termediate horizons the entire sample of unit-linked personal pension funds show
positive performance persistence though it is only significant at the 6MR6ME and
12MR12ME time horizons. Unit trusts/OEICs however show significant positive
performance persistence at all intermediate time horizons up to one year ranking
and one year evaluation (12MR12ME). At the shorter term horizons evidence of
performance persistence may not be that surprising as to exploit this strategy to
earn abnormal returns would require an investor to frequently change the composi-
tion of their portfolio. Since the fund returns are based on bid-bid prices gross of
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tax an investor would have to factor in the costs associated with constantly entering
and exiting different funds in addition to the other costs incurred with investing
in actively managed funds. The most significant difference between top and bot-
tom quintiles for the entire unit trust/OEIC sample in Table 6.1 is at the 6MR6MR
time horizon where the average monthly difference from holding the top quintile and
shorting the bottom quintile is 39 basis points. Over 6 months this is on average
just under 2.5% which would not even be sufficient to cover the average cost of a
front end load. At the longest horizon of three year ranking and three year evalua-
tion period (36MR36ME) there is no evidence of performance persistence based on
single factor abnormal returns for both unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal
pension funds.
At the short horizon of 1MR1ME unit-linked personal pension funds that have
FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC display significant positive per-
formance persistence similar to the entire unit trust/OEIC sample. In comparison
the unit-linked personal pension funds that have FundIDs relating only to personal
pensions show significant reversals in performance similar to the entire unit-linked
personal pension fund sample. At the 6MR6ME horizon unit-linked personal pen-
sions that have a FundID only relating to personal pensions show significant positive
performance at the 1% significant level whilst unit-linked personal pensions that have
FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC do not show significant perfor-
mance persistence. This pattern is also seen at the 12MR12ME and 36MR36ME
horizons although at the 36MR36ME the performance persistence in the unit-linked
personal pension funds that have FundIDs associated only with personal pensions
is not significant. These findings based on the composition of the underlying port-
folio for unit-linked personal pension funds generally support the Berk and Green
(2004) model of mutual fund flows since fund managers of unit-linked personal pen-
sion funds that have FundIDs associated with only personal pensions show greater
persistence in performance than the unit-linked personal pension funds that have
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Table 6.1: Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on Single Factor (CAPM) Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample No. periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 335 .0015 -.0017 .0032 2.58??
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 335 -.0009 .0007 -.0016 -1.19
FundID -Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 257 .0034 -.0036 .0070 3.43??
FundID - PP FundID only Entire Sample 334 -.0026 .0021 -.0046 -4.14??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 331 .0014 -.0018 .0031 2.42?
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 326 .0008 -.0008 .0017 1.52
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 253 .0014 -.0014 .0029 1.35
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 323 .0006 -.0010 .0016 1.80
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 325 .0020 -.0020 .0039 3.50??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 321 .0021 -.0013 .0034 3.43??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 246 .0018 -.0014 .0031 1.86
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 315 .0014 -.0020 .0035 3.61??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 313 .0010 -.0011 .0021 2.18?
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 307 .0015 -.0007 .0023 2.29?
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 235 -.0002 -.0008 .0006 .38
FundID - Underlying only Entire Sample 296 .0012 -.0015 .0027 2.92??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 265 -.0001 .0004 -.0004 -0.50
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 254 .0001 -.0008 .0009 1.73
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 178 .0012 .0015 -.0001 -.14
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 246 -.0007 -.0013 .0006 1.16
For performance ranked tests, funds are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on past abnormal fund performance over the relevant ranking period. The equally weighted
average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the subsequent evaluation period are computed. AV5 and AV1 are the average abnormal returns of the top
and bottom portfolios in the evaluation period respectively. There are five different ranking and evaluation periods e.g. 36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year
evaluation period and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. This procedure is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period
of the dataset where DIF is AV5-AV1 and TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF allowing for the autocorrelation induced by using overlapping observations. Significance at the 5% and 1%
levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 6.2: Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on Single Factor (CAPM) Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample N PRW CP Z Stat CHI TCS
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 121,355 .524 1.197 15.64?? 245.24?? 32.59??
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 35,708 .498 .949 -2.47? 7.44?? -4.50??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 11,298 .532 1.170 4.18?? 21.31?? 3.42??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 17,626 .488 .842 -5.69?? 35.24?? -11.29??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 37,934 .536 1.315 13.31?? 178.13?? 29.20??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 11,306 .520 1.140 3.48?? 12.42?? 6.90??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 3,555 .549 1.323 4.16?? 18.89?? 3.45??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 5,614 .516 1.068 1.22 2.21 5.59??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 18,140 .536 1.309 9.04?? 82.50?? 12.25??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 5,393 .530 1.256 4.18?? 17.50?? 3.75??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 1,657 .552 1.313 2.76?? 8.73?? 1.78
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 2,723 .523 1.153 1.86 3.64 4.39??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 7,793 .568 1.658 11.07?? 125.17?? 12.74??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,380 .561 1.724 6.58 44.00 7.11??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 701 .568 1.591 3.05?? 9.60?? .56
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 1,241 .546 1.469 3.37?? 11.43?? 7.98??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 1,518 .510 .813 -2.00? 11.98?? -4.61??
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 449 .517 1.504 2.14? 7.29?? -.31
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 84 .571 1.333 .66 .86 -1.11
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 281 .491 .990 -.04 .61 -2.13?
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser
winner (LW) and loser-loser (LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x
LL)/(WL x LW); where log(CP)/σlog(CP ) has a standard normal distribution, and σlog(CP ) = [(1/WW ) + (1/WL) + (1/LW ) + (1/LL)]
1/2; c) Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f.
where CHI = (WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2 + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2/N/4, and N is the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled
cross-section OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC.
However, it must be acknowledged that FundID is only a proxy for the underlying
fund and I am assuming that the performance fund flow sensitivity is weaker for
unit-linked personal pensions than for unit trust/OEICs as in Del Guercio and Tkac
(2002). Chapter 7 adds to the evidence and supports the idea that unit trust/OEIC
flows are more sensitive to past performance although this may only be the case
for the extreme performers at both the best and worst ends of the performance
distribution. Although unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs only asso-
ciated with personal pensions have more evidence of significant performance per-
sistence than the unit-linked personal pension funds that have FundIDs associated
with at least a unit trust/OEIC the two main anomalies in Table 6.1 are why unit
trusts/OEICs have significant performance persistence and stronger evidence of per-
formance persistence than the entire sample of unit-linked personal pensions and
why unit-linked personal pension funds have significant reversals at the 1MR1ME
horizon? A potential reason for the former could be related to the unit trust/OEIC
sample being survivor-bias free. Unit trusts/OEICs that have died at some point
during the sample period typically would have done so due to being consistently
poor performers. These persistently repeating loser unit trusts/OEICs may ex-
plain the greater performance persistence in unit trusts/OEICs in comparison to
the unit-linked personal pension funds which only contains live funds. However, the
only potential survior-bias in the unit-linked personal pensions data is from personal
pensions funds that have been merged during the sample period.
Table 6.2 evaluates performance persistence using single index (CAPM) abnormal re-
turns based on contingency tables. At the short term horizon of 1MR1ME the results
from the performance ranked portfolio tests and contingency tables are similar. Unit
trusts/OEICs display significant positive persistence and the entire sample of unit-
linked personal pension funds display significant reversals in performance as shown
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by the Z stats and TCS t stats. At the intermediate horizon unit trusts/OEICs
generally display significant positive performance persistence. The entire sample of
unit-linked personal pensions also show positive performance persistence but not
as strong as that of unit trusts/OEICs. This is again broadly similar to the per-
formance ranked portfolio results in Table 6.1. At the long term horizon of three
year ranking three year evaluation (36MR36ME) there is evidence of reversals for
unit trusts/OEICs and positive performance persistence for the entire sample of
unit-linked personal pension funds according to the Z stats. Although significant at
the 36MR36ME horizon the general level of performance persistence significance is
lower at the long term horizon in comparison to the intermediate horizon.
For the datasets from the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension FundID Database
the results are similar at the short horizon to the performance ranked portfolio tests
with significant positive persistence in unit-linked personal pensions that have Fun-
dIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC and significant reversals for unit-
linked personal pensions that have FundIDs only associated with personal pensions.
Interestingly, apart from the 12ME12MR horizon, the results for the intermediate
horizon in general show more persistence in performance for unit-linked personal
pensions that have FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC in com-
parison to unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs only associated with
personal pensions. This contradicts the performance ranked portfolio tests which
finds the opposite result. At the long term horizon (36MR36ME) there is little
evidence of significant performance persistence for both unit-linked personal pen-
sions that have FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC and unit-linked
personal pensions that have FundIDs only associated with personal pensions.
The contradictory evidence between performance ranked portfolio tests and contin-
gency tables could be related to the point of the performance distribution on which
winners and losers are determined. Contingency tables use the median whereas the
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Table 6.3: Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on Three Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample No. periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 335 -.0008 .0008 -.0016 -2.49?
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 335 -.0021 .0027 -.0049 -5.02??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 257 .0005 .0006 -.0001 -.13
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 334 -.0029 .0033 -.0061 -6.35??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 331 .0009 -.0014 .0023 5.02??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 328 .0008 -.0005 .0013 2.19?
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 253 .0017 -.0006 .0024 2.42?
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 324 .0007 -.0008 .0014 2.12?
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 325 .0013 -.0020 .0033 7.64??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 320 .0016 -.0011 .0027 4.36??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 246 .0021 -.0011 .0031 3.08??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 315 .0014 -.0017 .0031 4.30??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 313 .0010 -.0016 .0026 6.50??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 307 .0014 -.0009 .0023 4.66??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 235 .0011 -.0004 .0015 1.57
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 295 .0013 -.0014 .0027 4.05??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 265 .0004 -.0008 .0013 3.97??
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 254 .0002 -.0011 .0014 4.28??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 185 .0021 .0014 .0008 .72
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 246 -.0004 -.0016 .0013 3.26??
For performance ranked tests, funds are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on past abnormal fund performance over the relevant ranking period. The equally weighted
average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the subsequent evaluation period are computed. AV5 and AV1 are the average abnormal returns of the top
and bottom portfolios in the evaluation period respectively. There are five different ranking and evaluation periods e.g. 36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year
evaluation period and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. This procedure is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period
of the dataset where DIF is AV5-AV1 and TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF allowing for the autocorrelation induced by using overlapping observations. Significance at the 5% and 1%
levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 6.4: Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on Three Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample N PRW CP Z Stat CHI TCS
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 121,355 .499 .983 -1.50 2.63 -8.67??
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 35,708 .478 .813 -9.77?? 96.56?? -23.07??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 11,298 .508 .962 -1.03 4.45? -10.12??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 17,626 .474 .755 -9.31?? 89.48?? -21.16??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 37,934 .537 1.335 14.04?? 197.80?? 25.14??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 11,306 .524 1.189 4.61?? 21.36?? 3.24??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 3,555 .548 1.342 4.37?? 20.11?? -.42
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 5,614 .528 1.176 3.04?? 9.92?? 4.8??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 18,140 .532 1.265 7.90?? 63.75?? 16.98??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 5,393 .537 1.337 5.32?? 28.50?? 5.33??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 1,657 .543 1.270 2.42? 6.53? 1.31
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 2,723 .535 1.234 2.74?? 8.00?? 7.21??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 7,793 .555 1.492 8.79?? 81.20?? 16.55??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,380 .553 1.616 5.81?? 34.67?? 8.01??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 689 .569 1.805 3.83?? 14.84?? 1.72
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 1,241 .535 1.395 2.92?? 8.85?? 9.44??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 1,518 .582 1.568 4.34?? 28.49?? 1.37
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 449 .486 1.503 2.13? 11.75?? 1.68
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 84 .548 1.332 .65 .48 -.38
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 281 .484 1.210 .79 2.86 0.69
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser
winner (LW) and loser-loser (LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x
LL)/(WL x LW); where log(CP)/σlog(CP ) has a standard normal distribution, and σlog(CP ) = [(1/WW ) + (1/WL) + (1/LW ) + (1/LL)]
1/2; c) Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f.
where CHI = (WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2 + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2/N/4, and N is the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled
cross-section OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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performance ranked portfolio tests in this thesis use the top and bottom quintiles.
Thus, winners and losers are at the more extreme ends of the performance distribu-
tion in the performance ranked portfolio tests in comparison to winners and losers
from the contingency tables. Why might this be important? Chapter 6 on fund
flows provides evidence that the the major difference between the sensitivity of the
performance fund flow relationship for unit-linked personal pension funds and unit
trusts/OEICs may be at the extreme tails of the performance distribution. The per-
formance ranked portfolio tests are more likely to pick up this effect and therefore
greater emphasis is placed on the performance ranked portfolio tests.
Table 6.3 displays the performance ranked portfolio tests based on abnormal returns
from the Fama and French three factor model. At the short term horizon 1MR1ME
both unit trusts/OEICs and the entire sample of unit-linked personal pensions show
significant reversals in performance which for unit trusts/OEIC is the reverse of the
result in Table 6.1. At the intermediate time horizons both unit trusts/OEICs and
unit-linked personal pensions display significant positive performance persistence
with greater persistence in unit trusts/OEICs although the difference diminishes as
the time horizon increases. At the long term horizon of 36MR36ME it is surprising
to find significant positive persistence in performance for both unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pensions although there is slighter stronger evidence of
persistence for unit-linked personal pensions. Although the results are statistically
significant at the 36MR36ME horizon a strategy that is long in the top (winner)
quintile and short in the the bottom (loser) quintile generates for unit trusts/OEICs
and the unit-linked personal pension funds on average 13 and 14 basis points per
month respectively over 36 months. Over three years this approximately implies
abnormal returns of under 5% which economically speaking is not significant as this
would not be enough to be exploited by investors after investment costs.
For the unit-linked personal pensions datasets based on FundID the results in Ta-
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ble 6.3 support the results in Table 6.1. Unit-linked personal pensions that have
FundIDs only associated with personal pensions display significant positive perfor-
mance persistence across all the intermediate and long term time horizons whereas
the unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs associated with at least a unit
trust/OEIC show less evidence of performance persistence and no significant ev-
idence at the longer term horizons. These results support the Berk and Green
(2004) model since the equilibrating mechanism of fund flows is restricted in unit-
linked personal pensions that have FundIDs only associated with personal pensions
in comparison to unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs associated with
at least a unit trust/OEIC. However, the the anomalies from Table 6.1 are still
present in Table 6.3. Unit trusts/OEICs show more evidence of performance persis-
tence than the entire sample of unit-linked personal pension funds and for the three
factor model the unit trusts/OEICs actually show greater performance persistence
than the unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs only associated with per-
sonal pensions. This evidence is troubling in regards Berk and Green (2004) but as
discussed previously it could relate to survivor-bias issues in the pension datasets.
Since any survivor-bias that potentially could be present in the personal pension
data will be present in both the unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs
only associated with personal pensions dataset and the unit-linked personal pen-
sions that have FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC dataset greater
emphasis is placed on the evidence regarding those datasets for the empirical test
of Berk and Green (2004).
Table 6.4 displays the performance persistence results based on the Fama and French
three factor model using contingency tables. For unit trusts/OEICs and the entire
sample of unit-linked personal pension funds the results mirror the performance
ranked portfolio results based on the three factor model. For unit-linked personal
pension funds that have FundIDs only associated with personal pensions there is ev-
idence of significant positive performance persistence but at some horizons there is
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stronger evidence for performance persistence in unit-linked personal pensions that
have FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC. This contradicts what I
would have expected in relation to Berk and Green (2004) and contradicts the ev-
idence in the performance ranked portfolio tests. However, as previously discussed
this could be due to the difference in fund flows between unit-linked personal pen-
sions and unit trusts/OEICs being predominantly located at the extreme tails of
the performance distribution. In addition the TCS column which represents the re-
gression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns
is more supportive of the performance ranked portfolio tests with more performance
persistence in the unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs associated only
with personal pensions.
Table 6.5 displays the results from the performance ranked portfolio tests based on
abnormal returns from the four factor model which is the standard Fama and French
three factor model with the additional of a momentum factor. The results in Tables
6.3 and 6.5 are very similar. There are significant reversals at the short term hori-
zon of 1MR1ME with significant positive performance for both unit trusts/OEICs
and the entire sample of unit-linked personal pension funds across the intermediate
and long term periods. Initially there is more significant positive persistence in unit
trusts/OEICs which diminishes over time until there is slightly stronger evidence of
positive performance persistence for the entire sample of unit-linked personal pen-
sion funds at the long term horizon of 36MR36ME. For the unit-linked personal
pensions dataset based on FundID both the unit-linked personal pensions that have
FundIDs associated only with personal pensions and FundIDs associated with at
least a unit trust/OEIC show significant positive persistence in performance over
the intermediate term with unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs only as-
sociated with personal pensions having stronger performance persistence in general.
At the 36MR36ME horizon the unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs
only associated with personal pensions have significant positive performance per-
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Table 6.5: Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample No. periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 335 -.0011 .0006 -.0016 -2.67?
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 335 -.0023 .0026 -.0049 -5.15??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 257 .0003 .0001 .0002 .20
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 334 -.0028 .0028 -.0056 -6.00??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 331 .0007 -.0017 .0023 5.21??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 328 .0008 -.0006 .0014 2.32?
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 253 .0015 -.0006 .0021 2.07?
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 324 .0007 -.0009 .0015 2.22?
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 325 .0010 -.0022 .0033 7.56??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 320 .0015 -.0013 .0029 4.70??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 246 .0018 -.0015 .0033 3.31??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 315 .0014 -.0018 .0032 4.30??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 313 .0007 -.0017 .0025 6.04??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 307 .0013 -.0010 .0024 4.43??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 235 .0010 -.0009 .0019 2.14?
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 296 .0012 -.0017 .0029 4.23??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 265 .0002 -.0009 .0011 5.75??
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 254 .0003 -.0014 .0017 6.00??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 172 .0018 .0009 .0009 1.13
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 246 -.0004 -.0018 .0014 3.26??
For performance ranked tests, funds are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on past abnormal fund performance over the relevant ranking period. The equally weighted
average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the subsequent evaluation period are computed. AV5 and AV1 are the average abnormal returns of the top
and bottom portfolios in the evaluation period respectively. There are five different ranking and evaluation periods e.g. 36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year
evaluation period and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. This procedure is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period
of the dataset where DIF is AV5-AV1 and TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF allowing for the autocorrelation induced by using overlapping observations. Significance at the 5% and 1%
levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 6.6: Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample N PRW CP Z Stat CHI TCS
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 121,355 .498 .977 -2.01? 4.48? -9.38??
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 35,708 .479 .821 -9.31?? 87.92?? -23.60??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 11,298 .509 .972 -.75 4.21? -10.78??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 17,626 .475 .762 -8.98?? 83.63?? -21.05??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 37,934 .539 1.359 14.91?? 223.19?? 26.12??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 11,306 .525 1.194 4.72?? 22.51?? 4.51??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 3,555 .550 1.363 4.60?? 22.21?? 0.69
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 5,614 .534 1.228 3.84?? 15.56?? 5.81??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 18,140 .534 1.285 8.42?? 72.05?? 18.30??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 5,393 .546 1.428 6.51?? 42.64?? 6.25??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 1,657 .553 1.339 2.96?? 9.72?? 1.88
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 2,723 .543 1.297 3.39?? 12.21?? 8.19??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 7,793 .563 1.615 10.49?? 113.49?? 16.08??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,380 .555 1.644 6.02?? 37.17?? 8.42??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 701 .588 1.872 4.10?? 17.10?? 1.79
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 1,241 .543 1.470 3.37?? 11.60?? 10.02??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 1,518 .568 1.344 2.86?? 19.92?? -.67
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 449 .512 1.674 2.69?? 11.75?? 1.39
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 84 .571 1.778 1.30 1.71 -1.48
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 281 .520 1.616 1.99 6.13? 0.98
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser
winner (LW) and loser-loser (LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x
LL)/(WL x LW); where log(CP)/σlog(CP ) has a standard normal distribution, and σlog(CP ) = [(1/WW ) + (1/WL) + (1/LW ) + (1/LL)]
1/2; c) Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f.
where CHI = (WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2 + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2/N/4, and N is the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled
cross-section OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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sistence whereas the unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs associated
with at least a unit trust/OEIC show no significant performance persistence. In
the previous literature the Carhart four factor model is generally used as the base
model since the addition of a momentum factor, particularly for US data, explains
much of the previous performance persistence with the main exception being per-
sistently poor performers. In a UK setting Fletcher and Forbes (2002) find similar
evidence with a momentum factor explaining much of the performance persistence
in their data. Given these previous findings the level of performance persistence
in Table 6.5 using the four factor model is surprising. In comparison to Fletcher
and Forbes (2002) different time periods and fund databases possibly explain the
differences in results. In addition since the factor data is from different sources and
uses slightly different methods it would be interesting to rule out factor data and
factor construction influencing the results.
Table 6.8 displays the results for the contingency table tests based on the four factor
model. Again both unit trusts/OEICs and the entire sample of unit-linked personal
pensions show significant evidence of reversals at the short term horizon of 1MR1ME
and significant positive performance across both intermediate and long terms. As
with the previous contingency table tests there is more evidence of performance
persistence in the unit trust/OEICs.
The unit-linked personal pension funds that have FundIDs associated only with per-
sonal pensions show stronger evidence of reversals at the 1ME1MR horizon in com-
parison to those person pension funds that also include at least a unit-trust in their
FundID. At intermediate horizons there is generally slightly more evidence of pos-
itive performance persistence for unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs
associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC. However, there is again stronger evi-
dence of positive performance persistence for unit-linked personal pension funds that
have FundIDs associated only with personal pensions in comparison to unit-linked
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Table 6.7: Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on Conditional Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Perfor-
mance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample No. periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 335 -.0003 .0007 -.0011 -1.89
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 335 -.0016 .0023 -.0039 -4.29??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 257 .0009 .0015 -.0006 -.54
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 334 -.0022 .0028 -.0051 -5.54??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 331 .0013 -.0014 .0027 9.32??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 327 .0016 -.0003 .0019 3.27??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 253 .0024 .0000 .0024 2.53?
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 325 .0013 -.0005 .0018 2.63??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 325 .0016 -.0019 .0035 8.69??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 319 .0020 -.0010 .0030 5.02??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 247 .0023 -.0010 .0034 3.44??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 313 .0018 -.0014 .0033 4.12??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 313 .0013 -.0015 .0027 7.42??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 301 .0016 -.0007 .0025 4.52??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 235 .0016 -.0004 .0020 2.29?
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 296 .0014 -.0014 .0028 4.12??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 265 .0006 -.0007 .0013 7.00??
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 254 .0007 -.0009 .0016 6.41??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 169 .0018 .0012 .0008 .81
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 246 -.0001 -.0014 .0013 3.38??
For performance ranked tests, funds are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on past abnormal fund performance over the relevant ranking period. The equally weighted
average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the subsequent evaluation period are computed. AV5 and AV1 are the average abnormal returns of the top
and bottom portfolios in the evaluation period respectively. There are five different ranking and evaluation periods e.g. 36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year
evaluation period and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. This procedure is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period
of the dataset where DIF is AV5-AV1 and TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF allowing for the autocorrelation induced by using overlapping observations. Significance at the 5% and 1%
levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 6.8: Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on Conditional Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample N PRW CP Z Stat CHI TCS
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 121,355 .499 .982 -1.59 2.30 -3.67??
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 35,708 .482 .840 -8.23?? 68.83?? -19.52??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 11,298 .509 .972 -.75 4.61? -9.36??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 17,626 .479 .787 -7.93?? 65.46?? -17.99??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 10,269 .541 1.385 15.80?? 250.69?? 28.04??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 11,306 .537 1.317 7.31?? 53.67?? 8.04??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 3,555 .552 1.385 4.83?? 24.51?? 3.27??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 5,614 .538 1.282 4.64?? 22.13?? 7.75??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 18,140 .539 1.350 10.08?? 103.26?? 18.80??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 5,393 .544 1.430 6.54?? 43.12?? 6.29??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 1,657 .547 1.353 3.07?? 9.78?? 1.37
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 2,723 .544 1.316 3.58?? 13.37?? 8.59??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 7,793 .561 1.632 10.73?? 118.96?? 16.40??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,380 .564 1.779 6.95?? 49.82?? 8.67??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 701 .593 1.987 4.48?? 20.53?? 2.76??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 1,241 .551 1.499 3.54?? 12.75?? 8.97??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 1,518 .568 1.417 3.37?? 20.61?? .60
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 449 .508 1.584 2.41? 9.91?? 1.67
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 84 .595 1.618 1.09 1.62 -1.68
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 281 .548 1.982 2.81?? 9.78?? 1.37
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser
winner (LW) and loser-loser (LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x
LL)/(WL x LW); where log(CP)/σlog(CP ) has a standard normal distribution, and σlog(CP ) = [(1/WW ) + (1/WL) + (1/LW ) + (1/LL)]
1/2; c) Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f.
where CHI = (WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2 + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2/N/4, and N is the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled
cross-section OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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personal pensions that have FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC
when using the regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period
abnormal returns.
Whilst the previous performance persistence results are based on abnormal returns
derived from unconditional factor models Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show the performance
persistence results based on abnormal returns from a four factor conditional model
(Equation 5.3) as previously used in the performance tests. Using a conditional
model does not alter the general conclusions drawn from the unconditional perfor-
mance persistence tests. Evidence of reversals is still seen at the short horizon of
1MR1ME as well as significant positive performance persistence across the inter-
mediate and long term horizons for both unit trusts/OEICs and the entire sample
of unit-linked personal pension funds. There is stronger evidence of performance
persistence for unit trusts/OEICs but the difference diminishes as the ranking and
evaluation horizon increases. The unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs
associated only with personal pensions show evidence of positive performance persis-
tence over the intermediate to long horizon. In comparison the unit-linked personal
pensions that have FundIDs associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC also show
evidence of significant positive performance persistence but the evidence is not as
strong and there is no evidence of performance persistence at the long term horizon
of 36MR36ME.
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show the performance persistence results based on abnormal
returns from the four factor model but allowing the factor loadings to vary over
time. Look-ahead bias as discussed in Carhart (1997) could be a potential problem
since all the previous unconditional models use factor loadings that are estimated
over the entire twenty eight year sample period. However, the results for performance
persistence using time varying factor loadings are generally the same as the time
invariant factor models.
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Table 6.9: Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Rolling Coefficients Abnormal Returns of Fund
Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample No. periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 300 -.0002 -.0003 .0002 0.30
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 300 -.0010 .0012 -.0021 -2.60??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 221 -.0012 -.0001 -.0013 -1.04
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 300 -.0016 .0005 -.0021 -2.49?
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 296 .0013 -.0019 .0032 5.67??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 296 .0014 -.0019 .0033 4.87??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 218 .0008 -.0017 .0025 2.92??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 296 .0014 -.0021 .0034 4.60??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 290 .0015 -.0023 .0038 8.07??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 289 .0015 -.0023 .0038 5.56??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 209 .0007 -.0017 .0022 2.97??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 290 .0014 -.0025 .0039 4.75??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 278 .0013 -.0020 .0034 7.15??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 275 .0012 -.0023 .0034 3.97??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 194 .0016 -.0009 .0024 2.52?
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 277 .0006 -.0023 .0030 2.61??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 230 .0000 -.0007 .0007 2.28?
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 222 -.0004 -.0020 .0015 2.00
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 140 .0006 .0014 -.0007 -.86
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 222 -.0010 -.0022 .0012 1.40
For performance ranked tests, funds are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on past abnormal fund performance over the relevant ranking period. The equally weighted
average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the subsequent evaluation period are computed. AV5 and AV1 are the average abnormal returns of the top
and bottom portfolios in the evaluation period respectively. There are five different ranking and evaluation periods e.g. 36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year
evaluation period and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. This procedure is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period
of the dataset where DIF is AV5-AV1 and TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF allowing for the autocorrelation induced by using overlapping observations. Significance at the 5% and 1%
levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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Table 6.10: Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Rolling Coefficients Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sample N PRW CP Z Stat CHI TCS
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 91,796 .503 1.011 .818 1.173 1.98?
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 27,123 .481 .823 -8.02?? 65.76?? -16.53??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 7,568 .503 .894 -2.44? 10.23?? -7.06??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 14,265 .486 .825 -5.75?? 35.88?? -13.85??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 28,674 .542 1.384 13.70?? 188.41?? 31.67??
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 8,603 .527 1.208 4.39?? 19.50?? 7.14??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 2,368 .549 1.257 2.77?? 9.76?? 1.65
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 4,566 .531 1.198 3.04?? 9.93?? 8.51??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 13,694 .553 1.488 11.57?? 134.96?? 19.59??
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 4,079 .548 1.401 5.36?? 29.31?? 7.93??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 1,087 .554 1.258 1.89 5.00? -.19
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 2,210 .546 1.381 3.78 14.64?? 11.75??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 6,030 .583 1.901 12.31?? 153.74?? 18.47??
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 1,806 .545 1.447 3.91?? 15.80?? 10.47??
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 446 .565 1.57 2.36? 5.70? 3.26??
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 1,022 .544 1.402 2.69?? 7.44?? 10.27??
Unit Trust/OEIC Entire Sample 1,151 .566 1.423 2.97?? 14.48?? -1.09
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 351 .507 1.220 .93 1.99 1.66
FundID - Underlying PP and at least a UT/OEIC Entire Sample 57 .456 .710 -.64 .75 -1.04
FundID - Underlying PP only Entire Sample 228 .500 1.288 .95 2.35 2.36?
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser
winner (LW) and loser-loser (LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x
LL)/(WL x LW); where log(CP)/σlog(CP ) has a standard normal distribution, and σlog(CP ) = [(1/WW ) + (1/WL) + (1/LW ) + (1/LL)]
1/2; c) Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f.
where CHI = (WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2 + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2/N/4, and N is the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled
cross-section OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ? and ?? respectively.
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6.5 Conclusion
The evidence for performance persistence using the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal
Pension FundID Database with performance ranked portfolio tests generally sup-
ports the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows. Unit-linked personal
pension funds that have a FundID, a proxy for the underlying portfolio, only associ-
ated with personal pensions show significant positive performance at intermediate to
long horizons. In comparison the unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs
associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC show weaker evidence of performance
persistence particularly at longer horizons where there is no significant evidence of
performance persistence1. The illiquid nature of unit-linked personal pension funds
from an investor’s perspective is the central reason why in accordance to Berk and
Green (2004) we should observe more performance persistence in unit-linked per-
sonal pensions that have FundIDs associated with only personal pension funds. The
underlying portfolios for these funds will only receive fund flows from personal pen-
sions and due to the illiquid nature of personal pensions the attenuated fund flow
relationship should restrict the equilibrating mechanism in Berk and Green (2004).
For unit-linked personal pensions that have FundIDs associated with at least a unit
trust/OEIC their underlying portfolios and fund managers do not have fund flows
restricted to personal pension funds.
The evidence supporting Berk and Green (2004) is much stronger in the performance
ranked portfolio tests in comparison to the contingency tables. A potential explana-
tion for the contradictory evidence could be related to the point of the performance
distribution on which winners and losers are determined. The evidence in Chap-
ter 7 suggests unit trusts/OEICs have a greater performance fund flow relationship
in comparison to unit-linked personal pensions in the extreme tails of performance
distribution. The contingency table tests determine winners and losers based on
1These results are relatively robust to the sample period analysed. See Appendix A.9 to A.12.
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the median abnormal return and hence do not concentrate on the extreme tails of
the performance distribution. The performance ranked portfolio tests however use
quintiles and hence winner funds are located in the top 20% and loser funds in the
bottom 20% of the performance distribution. The concentration on the more ex-
treme tails of the distribution may explain the variation in results across methodolo-
gies particularly given the evidence on the performance fund flow relationship given
in Chapter 6. A potential line of further research is to examine the compare unit
trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions using performance ranked portfolio
tests but based on deciles or higher but this requires having a sufficient amount of
funds.
For the entire samples of unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions the
results are surprising. I find more evidence of performance persistence for unit
trusts/OEICs in comparison to the entire sample of unit-linked personal pension
funds. Although the entire sample of unit-linked personal pensions will include
some underlying portfolios that also include a unit trust/OEIC this is not the case
for all the unit-linked personal pensions. In contrast all unit trusts/OEICs will ob-
viously have fund flows from a unit trust/OEIC. Even more concerning is that the
evidence of persistence for unit trusts/OEICs is greater than for the unit-linked per-
sonal pensions that have FundIDs associated with only personal pension funds. A
potential reason for this could be that the unit trust/OEIC database is survivor-bias
free whereas the UK Equity Unit-linked Personal Pension Database has a unknown
but assumed small level of survivor-bias due to no data being available on merged
pension funds. Non surviving funds typically cease to exist due to be being con-
sistently poor performers and hence any excluded dead funds would presumably
reduce the level of performance persistence. Also since liquidations are negligible
for personal pension funds the higher level of non-surviving funds in the UK Equity
Unit Trust/OEIC Database could be a major influence on performance persistence
results. However, Appendix A.6 to A.8 displays the percentage of repeat loser funds
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from the contingency table tests across factor models and losers funds do not seem to
overly dominate the results. Further research is needed to assess the level of merged
funds in personal pensions and also to try and explain the reason for significant
reversals at the short term horizon of 1ME1MR. However, there are some promising
results from the performance persistence tests in regards the Berk and Green (2004)
model of mutual fund flows that warrants further research.
The performance persistence results for both unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pensions generally show greater evidence of performance persistence at
medium term horizons in comparison to longer term horizons. As discussed in Elton
et al. (2011a) a potential reason for this in relation to the Berk and Green (2004)
model of mutual fund flows could be due to either investors taking time to reallocate
funds or due to investors taking time to receive and process the relevant data. If
this is the case then it could potentially explain why there is minimal persistence
in performance at the longer term horizons but stronger evidence at medium term
horizons.
From an investor’s perspective the evidence suggests that active fund managers can
produce persistence in performance but decreasing returns to scale from fund flows
reduces performance persistence over the longer term. Since this research is based
on the performance of the fund due to the investment decisions of fund managers
further research needs to examine the net performance of the fund after taxes and
charges to assess whether any persistence in abnormal performance accrues to the
investor. At present the lack of availability of comprehensive datasets for expense
ratios, fees etc for collective investment schemes limits the possibility of this future
valuable research for UK investors and society in general.
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Chapter 7
Fund Flows
Previous research based on US data by Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and
Tufano (1998) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find a strong relationship between
past performance and subsequent fund flows for US mutual funds. The seminal work
of Carhart (1997) concludes that after taking into consideration his four-factor model
there is little evidence of performance persistence which raises the question of why
fund flows respond to past performance when performance is not persistent? Berk
and Green (2004) try to answer this question by producing a rational equilibrium
model of active portfolio management that ensures managers cannot consistently
achieve abnormal returns as they are competed away due to decreasing returns to
scale. Berk and Tonks (2007) test the Berk and Green model of mutual fund flows,
using US mutual fund data from 1962 to 2004, by primarily examining the one
anomaly in Carhart (1997), the relative continual under performance by the worst
performing funds. Berk and Tonks (2007) find that the continual under performance
by the worst performing funds can be attributed to an attenuated performance flow
of funds relationship which supports the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual
fund flows. In this chapter I examine the performance fund flow relationship for UK
equity unit-linked personal pension funds and UK equity unit trusts/OEICs. I also
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propose another empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) by analysing UK equity
unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds but based on underlying
portfolio flows using actual fund/underlying portfolio size data.
7.1 Methodology
7.1.1 Fund Flows
The previous literature generally uses two measures to calculate fund flows. The
relative fund flow measure, as shown in Equation (7.1), is typically the most fre-
quently used measure in the literature. In Equation (7.1) the NAVit is the total
NAV (net asset value) i.e. fund size for fund i at time t, NAVit−1 is the total NAV
at t−1 and (1 + rit) is the realised return on the fund between t and t−1 assuming
all distributions are reinvested.
Flowit ≡ NAVit − NAVit−1 (1 + rit)
NAVit−1
(7.1)
Berk and Tonks (2007) highlight a potential problem with this measure. If a poorly
performing fund in the sample enters liquidation the relative flow of funds measure
would expected to be -100%. However, Equation (7.1) will not produce a relative
flow of funds measure of -100% in liquidation1. To overcome this potential problem,
Berk and Tonks (2007) modify the denominator of Equation (7.1) and use Equation
(7.2), where now in liquidation a fund’s flow in its last period will be equal to -100%.
The implication of using either formula should be minimal since they only differ by
a factor of 1/(1 + rit). In this research I use Equation (7.2) for the calculation of
the relative fund flow for the aforementioned reason.
1Unless, the return over the period is 0 i.e. rit is equal to zero.
7.1. METHODOLOGY 195
Flowit ≡ NAVit − NAVit−1 (1 + rit)
NAVit−1 (1 + rit)
(7.2)
For robustness, in addition to using the relative fund flow measure, I also use the
absolute fund flow measure which I calculate using Equation (7.3).
Flowit ≡ NAVit − NAVit−1 (1 + rit) (7.3)
7.1.2 Abnormal Returns
To examine the performance fund flow relationship I primary use risk adjusted
returns for the performance measure. I calculate monthly abnormal performance
for each fund by comparing the realised monthly return on the fund with the return
predicted from the Carhart four factor model. The Carhart four factor model is
shown in Equation (7.4).
Rpt − rft = αp + βp (Rmt − rft) + γpSMBt + δpHMLt + λpMOMt + εpt (7.4)
For each fund, Rt− rft is regressed against the four factors in Equation (7.4), where
Rt is the monthly return at time t on the fund and rft is the monthly return on
the risk free asset at time t. The (Rmt − rft) variable is the excess return on the
market, SMB is the size factor, HML is the book to market factor and MOM is the
one year momentum factor. The regression coefficients are based on whole sample
regressions and are calculated individually for each fund in order to obtain monthly
abnormal returns for each unit trust/OEIC and unit-linked personal pension fund.
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7.1.3 Performance Fund Flow Relationship
The empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) in Chapter 6 assumes that unit-linked
personal pension funds have a more attenuated performance fund flow relationship
in comparison to unit trusts/OEICs due to the illiquid nature of personal pensions.
Whilst Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) offer evidence in a US setting, in this chapter I
extend the evidence to UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds and UK equity
unit trusts/OEICs. I examine the performance fund flow relationship following the
method of Sirri and Tufano (1998). I rank funds based on their previous 1 year
abnormal return, where abnormal returns are calculated from a Carhart four factor
model. The funds are ranked into 4 equal bins based on past performance over
the ranking period and I then calculate the subsequent one year relative fund flow
(growth rate). This procedure is followed for overlapping time periods throughout
the sample. As highlighted by Berk and Tonks (2007) a problem with using the
relative flow measure is the recent growth in the number of small funds2. The re-
sult of having a disproportionately large number of small funds is that the relative
flows can be abnormally large and these outliers can dominate the results. Also,
mergers between funds can cause extreme relative fund flow outliers which domi-
nate the performance fund flow results. To account for these outliers I analyse the
performance fund flow relationship for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal
pensions based on the relative fund flow data between the fifth and ninety fifth
percentiles. I then calculate the average relative fund flow for each bin, where bin
1 contains the funds with the lowest abnormal returns in the performance ranking
period and bin 4 contains the funds with the highest abnormal returns in the perfor-
mance ranking period. I then graph the performance fund flow relationship based
on the average relative fund flow to each bin. I apply this method separately to both
unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds to enable a comparative
2Berk and Tonks (2007) find a large number of small funds in the last 10 year of their 1962 to
2004 US sample.
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analysis to be made. I also examine the performance fund flow relationship using 10
and 20 bins in the performance ranking period. This provides evidence of whether
the fund flow relationship varies at the extreme tails of the performance fund flow
distribution for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions which poten-
tially otherwise would not be captured using only 4 bins. For robustness I also
examine the performance fund flow relationship using raw returns in the one year
ranking period although I focus the main analysis on the abnormal returns since
they are risk adjusted.
7.1.4 Empirical Test of Berk and Green (2004)
The empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) in Chapter 6 predicts greater per-
formance persistence in unit-linked personal pension funds that have a FundID, a
proxy for the underlying portfolio, only associated with personal pensions in com-
parison to unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds that have a
FundID associated with at least a unit trust/OEIC. The illiquid nature of personal
pensions should imply an attenuated fund flow relationship and thus for unit-linked
personal pension funds that have an underlying portfolio that only contains fund
flows from personal pensions we should see more more performance persistence since
the equilibrating mechanism of fund flows in Berk and Green (2004) is restricted.
The motivation for the empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) in Chapter 6 is part
driven by the lack of available fund size data for UK funds, the lack of consistency
in how fund size is reported and the problem of calculating accurate underlying
portfolio sizes and portfolio flows. However, the empirical test of Berk and Green
(2004) in Chapter 6 has the advantage that we can look at a large sample of unit
trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds without actually having fund
size data. It does however rely on the assumption of a more attenuated perfor-
mance fund flow relationship for unit-linked personal pensions in comparison to
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unit trusts/OEICs. Previous evidence in the academic literature to support this
assumption can be found in Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) in addition to the new ev-
idence for the performance fund flow relationship for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs
and UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds presented in this chapter.
Given the assumption of a more attenuated fund flow relationship for unit-linked
personal pensions in comparison to unit trusts/OEICs I propose another empirical
test of Berk and Green (2004) using actual fund flow data. Since I imply that the
diseconomies of scale fund managers face in Berk and Green (2004) are at the under-
lying portfolio level I empirically test Berk and Green (2004) using funds flows at the
underlying portfolio level, where I use FundID as a proxy for the underlying port-
folio. Since I do not have comprehensive fund size data it is impossible to compute
underlying portfolio sizes across all funds. My second best alternative involves using
the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database and the UK Equity
Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database to empirically test Berk
and Green (2004) using fund flows at the underlying portfolio level. The aforemen-
tioned databases are discussed in detail in Section 7.2. In short, each fund has an
underlying FundID, a proxy for the underlying portfolio, only composed of a unit
trust/OEIC for the unit trust/OEIC database and a unit-linked personal pension
for the personal pension database that consists of only one unit/share class. Due
to these aforementioned restrictions the fund sizes in the aforementioned databases
are also the underlying portfolio sizes. Therefore fund flows calculated from these
databases can therefore be considered as the underlying portfolio flows. The main
disadvantage of this restriction to create underlying portfolio flows is the small num-
ber of funds in the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database and
the UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database since
most underlying portfolios contain more than one investment vehicle and more than
one unit/share class.
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To perform the empirical test I rank funds into quartiles based on their previous
1 year performance, where performance is measured by abnormal returns from the
Carhart four factor model. The funds in the top quartile are then sorted into into
two groups based on the past 1 year median relative fund flow across all funds. This
double sorting results in two portfolios, TQTH and TQBH, where TQTH stands
for the portfolio which contains funds in the top quartile based on past 1 year
performance and the top half based on past 1 year relative fund flows. Likewise
TQBH represents the portfolio of funds that are in the top quartile based on past
1 year performance and the bottom half based on past 1 year relative fund flows. I
follow the same procedure for the bottom quartile based on past 1 year performance.
BQTH represents the portfolio of funds that are in the bottom quartile based on
past 1 year performance ranking period and are in the top half in the past 1 year
relative fund flow ranking. Likewise, BQBH represents the portfolio of funds that
are in the bottom quartile based on past 1 year performance ranking period and are
in the bottom half in the past 1 year relative fund flow ranking. For the funds in the
portfolios that represent TQTH, TQBH, BQTH and BQBH the subsequent post
formation 1 year abnormal return from the Carhart 4 factor model is calculated.
This procedure is followed using overlapping time periods throughout the sample. I
then calculate the average abnormal return for each portfolio along with its t stat
where the t stat has been calculated to allow for the autocorrelation from using
overlapping periods. I also analyse spread portfolios using the same procedure.
I apply the aforementioned procedures separately to unit trusts/OEICs and unit-
linked personal pensions. For robustness I also apply the methodology using absolute
fund flows.
Bessler et al. (2010) employ a similar methodology to empirically examine Berk
and Green (2004) but it is not clear whether the fund flows in Bessler et al. (2010)
are a close approximation to the underlying portfolio flows a fund manager would
face diseconomies of scale investing. In addition Bessler et al. (2010) use deciles
200 CHAPTER 7. FUND FLOWS
for the past 1 year performance ranking and also deciles for the past 1 year fund
flow ranking. Bessler et al. (2010) can employ deciles in both the past performance
ranking and fund flow ranking due to examining US data where the number of funds
with comprehensive fund size data is much greater. However, their deciles for the
past 1 year fund flow are past performance decile specific. For example the top decile
with the past performance winners are sorted into past fund flow deciles based on
fund flow data for funds only in the top decile not all funds across all performance
deciles. Since they have enough data to use deciles in both performance and fund
flow rankings the difference in fund flows between the past performance winner decile
with the highest fund flows and the past performance winner decile with the lowest
fund flows can still be significantly difference. Since I am using such a small number
of funds using deciles is not feasible. For the past 1 year flow ranking I split the
funds into two groups based on the median fund flow. However unlike Bessler et al.
(2010) this is not specific to the past 1 year performance quartile but is measured
across all funds. Since I have so few funds ranking the past 1 year fund flows across
all funds should capture extremes in the fund flows across performance quartiles.
The Bessler et al. (2010) methodology has the advantage that each portfolio based
on past performance and fund flows at any given point in time will always contain
funds. For the methodology I employ this may not be the case. For instance, the
funds in the top quartile based on past 1 year performance at a given point in time
may all belong to the top half of funds when split by the median past fund flow
across all funds. This would imply that no funds would be part of the top quartile
based on past 1 year performance and bottom half based on past 1 year relative
fund flows i.e. no funds in TQBH. This would not be the case if the past 1 year
fund flow ranking was quartile specific. However, this is just a extreme example for
a given point in time during the sample. Since the ranking based on past 1 year
performance and relative fund flows is based on overlapping periods each portfolio
i.e. TQTH, TQBH, BQTH and BQBH, has sufficient data to empirically examine
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Berk and Green (2004).
7.2 Data
I analyse the performance fund flow relationship for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs
and UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds using the using data from the
UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size and the UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal
Pension Fund Size databases. For the emprical test of Berk and Green (2004) using
fund size data I use the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size and the
UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund Size databases. All the
aforementioned databases have a sample period of January 2000 to December 2007
and include monthly returns based on bid-bid prices and monthly fund size data.
Details of the construction of these databases has previously been discussed at length
in Section 4.7.
In summary the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database includes all UK
equity unit trusts/OEICs where both returns and fund size data are available. Like-
wise, the UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension Fund Size Database includes
all UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds where both returns and fund size
data are available. I use these datasets to examine the performance fund flow rela-
tionship. The UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database contains
those UK equity unit trusts/OEICs that have an underlying FundID, a proxy for
the underlying portfolio, only composed of a unit trust/OEIC that only has one
unit/share class. Likewise, the UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID
Fund Size Database contains those UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds
that have an underlying FundID composed only of a unit-linked personal pension
that only has one unit/share class. The fund sizes in these two databases therefore
proxy for the underlying portfolio size for each fund and hence any fund flow cal-
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Table 7.1: Fund Size and Flow Summary Statistics for Fund Size Databases - 2000 to 2007
UK Equity UK Equity UK Equity Unit UK Equity
Unit Trust/OEIC Unit-Linked Personal Trust/OEIC FundID Unit-Linked Personal
Fund Size Database Pension Fund Size Fund Size Database Pension FundID Fund
Database Size Database
Number of funds 291 211 39 34
Mean monthly fund size 305.65 159.86 118.55 289.10
S.D monthly fund size 575.82 498.16 233.32 580.98
10th percentile monthly fund size 16.17 1.11 11.58 4.10
Median monthly fund size 118.39 10.34 62.09 55.40
90th percentile monthly fund size 740.20 346.00 270.44 1164.38
Mean monthly absolute net flow .74 .67 .26 .88
S.D monthly absolute net flow 42.47 53.33 39.88 74.85
10th percentile monthly absolute net flow -6.03 -.67 -2.95 -1.64
Median monthly monthly absolute net flow -.08 .01 -.19 .00
90th percentile monthly absolute net flow 7.53 1.54 1.16 2.63
Mean monthly relative net flow 4.37% 44.61% 3.26% .96%
S.D monthly relative net flow 42.47% 1823.74% 161.93% 18.96%
10th percentile monthly relative net flow -6.03% -2.19% -3.34% -1.39%
Median monthly monthly relative net flow -.08% .09% -.39% .00%
90th percentile monthly relative net flow 7.53% 5.18% 2.24% 2.47%
Fund sizes are in millions of GBP.
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culations will proxy the underlying portfolio flows. I therefore use these last two
aforementioned datasets to perform an empirical test of the Berk and Green (2004)
model of mutual fund flows based on underlying portfolio flows, where the FundID
is a proxy for the underlying portfolio.
Table 7.1 summaries the four databases I use in Chapter 7. There are relatively
few funds in the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC FundID Fund Size Database and
the UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pension FundID Fund Size Database since
these databases restrict funds to having an underlying FundID that only contains
a unit trust/OEIC or a unit-linked personal pension that only has one unit/share
class. Although these databases have a limited number of funds they allow the
fund size and flow figures to proxy for the underlying portfolio sizes and flows. For
the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size Database and the UK Equity Unit-
Linked Personal Pension Fund Size Database the flows in general do not represent
the underlying portfolio size and underlying portfolio flows. The flows in Table
7.1 for the UK Equity Unit Trust/OEIC Fund Size and the UK Equity Unit-Linked
Personal Pension Fund Size databases are susceptible to outliers due to exceptionally
large relative fund flows from mergers between funds and relatively small funds
experiencing large growth. This potentially explains the large variation in fund flows
Table 7.1. The performance fund flow relationship is examined based on the fund
flows between the fifth to ninety fifth percentiles to eliminate outliers dominating
the results.
7.3 Results
Figure 7.1 displays the performance fund flow relationship for UK equity unit
trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked personal pension funds over the sample
period January 2000 to December 2007 based on ranking performance into 4 bins.
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Figure 7.1: Abnormal Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Four Perfor-
mance Bins
Funds are ranked based on their one year abnormal returns from the Carhart four factor model
at time t and divided equally into four bins where the highest bin signals the best performers
and lowest bin signals the worst performers. The average equally weighted one year growth rate
(relative fund flow) at time t + 1 year is then calculated for each bin. This procedure is followed
for overlapping time periods throughout the sample to allow the entire sample mean growth rate
for each bin to be calculated.
The relative flow (growth rate) is always larger for unit-linked personal pensions in
comparison to unit trust/OEICs. For bin 4, the winners in the past 1 year abnormal
performance ranking period, this is particularly surprising as it suggests that the
performance fund flow relationship for unit-linked personal pension funds is stronger
than that of unit trusts/OEICs. Does this imply that the set of unit-linked personal
pension fund investors are more responsive and sensitive to past performance for
winners in term of investing new money than unit trust/OEIC investors? We have
to be careful with our interpretation of Figure 7.1 as whilst Figure 7.1 shows the
average relative fund flows it does not necessarily result from investors investing in
response to past performance. In particular the fund flows for unit-linked personal
pensions are a complex mixture of flows from various channels. Some of these chan-
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nels may have a highly sensitive performance fund flow relationship. Other channels
may have a less sensitive performance fund flow relationship. An approximate clas-
sification of fund flows for unit-linked personal pensions is as follows.
• Outflows due to investors in unit-linked personal funds retiring and entering
the deccumulation phase and converting their accumulated money in the per-
sonal pension fund into an annuity or an annuity and a lump sum.
• Current investors in a unit-linked personal pension fund continuing to con-
tribute through regular i.e. monthly, contributions.
• Current investors in a unit-linked personal pension changing their contribution
level whether through an increase or decrease in contributions.
• Current investors in the unit-linked personal pension funds switching funds.
• New investors investing into a unit-linked personal pension for the first time.
• Mergers between unit-linked personal pension funds.
For two or perhaps three of these fund flow channels it seems highly unlikely that the
past 1 year abnormal return would be the cause of the subsequent 1 year relative
flow. In particular outflows from the fund through unit-linked personal pension
investors retiring and converting their accumulated money into an annuity or an
annuity and lump sum is likely to be much less sensitive to the past performance of
the fund since retirements are generally predetermined long before the event.
In addition any fund flows from mergers are not a direct result of investors investing
in response to past performance. In the month the fund size data records the
merged fund size the fund flow calculations produce abnormally large figures that
potentially bias the performance fund flow results. Figure 7.1 should already have
excluded most mergers as it only analyses fund flow data between the fifth and
ninety fifth percentiles. Also, most individual investors do not have the sufficient
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available capital to invest a one off lump sum into a unit-linked personal pension
to generate enough income for retirement. Most individual investors will invest into
their pension through monthly contributions. Whilst this perhaps may be sensitive
to past performance of the fund i.e. for consistently poorly performing personal
pension funds investors may stop contributing, in general investors have to continue
to contribute to accumulate enough money in their pension to fund their retirement.
Investors who stop contributing to a personal pension still incur management fees
each year and cannot directly access their funds. They can switch into another
personal pension but investors generally will occur a switching cost and the level
of switching is estimated to be low in the UK, Alfon (2002). Hence the continual
contributions of exiting unit-linked personal pension holders is generally expected to
persist and be less sensitive to past performance than new personal pension investors
or investors in general in unit trusts/OEICs.
In addition to the higher relative fund flows for unit-linked personal pension funds
in all bins in comparison to unit trusts/OEICs, unit-linked personal pension funds
do not have an average outflow in the bottom bin i.e. the bin that contains the
poorest abnormal performers from the ranking period. Although the classification
of channels for fund flows for unit-linked personal pensions is complex a potential
explanation for this relates to the fund flows from existing unit-linked personal pen-
sion holders continuing to make monthly pre-determined contributions far exceeding
the outflows due to current unit-linked personal holders retiring. It must be stressed
that these potential explanations are only suggestions as without detailed fund flow
data based on the above classification we have no direct evidence. From Berk and
Green (2004) we would expect an outflow from the worst preforming funds to result
in the fund being managed more efficiently. Hence, poor performers continuing to
perform poorly would be more likely on average for unit-linked personal pension
funds in comparison to unit trusts/OEICs.
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Figure 7.2: Abnormal Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Ten Perfor-
mance Bins
Funds are ranked based on their one year abnormal returns from the Carhart four factor model
at time t and divided equally into ten bins where the highest bin signals the best performers
and lowest bin signals the worst performers. The average equally weighted one year growth rate
(relative fund flow) at time t + 1 year is then calculated for each bin. This procedure is followed
for overlapping time periods throughout the sample to allow the entire sample mean growth rate
for each bin to be calculated.
Whilst the higher general level of fund flows for unit-linked personal pension funds
can be potentially explained by the majority of current unit-linked personal pen-
sion investors continuing to make regular pre agreed contributions to their personal
pension fund it does not explain the general similarities of the relative sensitivi-
ties of investors to different levels of past performance for both unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pensions. Figure 7.1 suggests that the sensitivities of unit
trust/OEIC investors and unit-linked personal pension fund investors to past per-
formance is not significantly different which is surprising given the highly illiquid
nature of unit-linked personal pension funds. The gradients of fund performance
fund flow lines for both the unit trust/OEIC and unit-linked personal pension funds
is virtually identical between bins 2, 3 and 4. This evidence is puzzling but poten-
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tially suggests that the difference in the fund flow performance relationship between
unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions, due to the illiquid nature of
personal pensions, could be concentrated in the extreme tails of the distribution
which is not captured when performance is only divided into 4 bins.
Figure 7.3: Abnormal Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Twenty Per-
formance Bins
Funds are ranked based on their one year abnormal returns from the Carhart four factor model
at time t and divided equally into twenty bins where the highest bin signals the best performers
and lowest bin signals the worst performers. The average equally weighted one year growth rate
(relative fund flow) at time t + 1 year is then calculated for each bin. This procedure is followed
for overlapping time periods throughout the sample to allow the entire sample mean growth rate
for each bin to be calculated.
Figure 7.2 displays the performance fund flow relationship between unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pensions based on ranking funds into 10 equal bins based
on their previous one year abnormal returns from the Carhart four factor model.
The rationale to increase the number of bins in the ranking period is to expose the
extreme tails of the performance fund flow relationship. Figure 7.2 shares some sim-
ilar characteristics with Figure 7.1. The average relative fund flow (growth rate) for
unit-linked personal pensions is positive for all bins and is generally always greater
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than the average relative fund flow of unit trusts/OEICs. The one exception to this
is bin 10 which contains the funds with the highest abnormal returns in the ranking
period. Figure 7.2 also displays a more convex performance fund flow relationship
for unit trusts/OEICs in comparison to unit-linked personal pensions when using
10 bins. This difference in the performance fund flow relationship is not captured
when only using 4 bins. The range between the average relative fund flow for the top
and bottom bins is much greater for unit trusts/OEICs in comparison to unit-linked
personal pensions. It seems that the the main differences between the performance
fund flow relationship for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions is at
the extreme tails of the distribution. Any test of Berk and Green (2004) based on a
comparative analysis of personal pensions and unit trusts/OEICs would potentially
produce stronger results by using methodologies that focus on the extreme tails of
the performance fund flow distribution.
Figure 7.3 displays the performance fund flow relationship between unit trusts/OEICs
and unit-linked personal pensions based on ranking funds into 20 equal bins based
on their previous one year abnormal returns from the Carhart four factor model.
The performance fund flow relationship is less smooth than the 10 bin case but this
is probably due to having an insufficient number of funds in the sample to use 20
bins. In all other regards Figure 7.3 is very similar to Figure 7.2. The general shape
of the performance fund flow relationship for unit trusts/OEICs is very similar to the
performance fund flow relationship for US mutual funds in Sirri and Tufano (1998).
Unit trusts/OEICs have a steeper performance fund flow relationship in comparison
to unit-linked personal pension funds. The response to past performance is also
much larger in the top bin for unit trusts/OEICs. The results for the performance
fund flow relationship based on 4, 10 and 20 bins is fairly robust to the performance
measure used. If the 1 year past performance ranking is based on raw returns3 the
3Appendices A.13, A.14 and A.15 display the performance fund flow relationships for unit
trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pensions based on using raw returns in the performance
ranking.
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Table 7.2: Performance of Funds Based on Past 1 Year Performance and 1 Year Absolute Fund Flow
Ranking Period Investment Vehicle Fund Flow Measurement Ranking Evaluation Period Mean Return t stat
Unit trust/OEIC All Funds -.007 -.61
Unit trust/OEIC Absolute TQTH -.011 -.68
Unit trust/OEIC Absolute TQBH -.015 -.96
1 Year Ranking (Abnormal) Unit trust/OEIC Absolute BQTH -.065 -2.29?
Unit trust/OEIC Absolute BQBH -.029 -2.07?
Unit trust/OEIC Absolute TQTH - TQBH .011 .75
Unit trust/OEIC Absolute BQTH - BQBH -.041 -2.49?
Unit trust/OEIC Absolute TQTH - BQBH .019 1.64
Unit trust/OEIC Absolute TQBH - BQBH .044 1.78
Personal Pension All Funds -.006 -1.50
Personal Pension Absolute TQTH .004 .40
Personal Pension Absolute TQBH -.001 -.22
1 Year Ranking (Abnormal) Personal Pension Absolute BQTH -.007 -1.14
Personal Pension Absolute BQBH -.016 -2.63??
Personal Pension Absolute TQTH - TQBH .006 .64
Personal Pension Absolute BQTH - BQBH .011 1.65
Personal Pension Absolute TQTH - BQBH .022 2.19?
Personal Pension Absolute TQBH - BQBH .004 .78
Funds are ranked into quartiles based on their past 1 year abnormal return from the Carhart 4 factor model. The funds in the top quartile are then
sorted into two groups based on the past 1 year median absolute fund flow across all funds. The same procedure is applied to the funds in the bottom
quartile. TQTH stands for top quartile top half where the quartile represents the past 1 year performance ranking and the half represents the past 1
year absolute fund flow. Likewise, BQBH stands for bottom quartile bottom half where the quartile represents the past 1 year performance ranking and
the half represents the past 1 year absolute fund flow. Following this convention TQBH stands for top quartile bottom half and BQTH stands for
bottom quartile top half. For the portfolios that represent TQTH, TQBH, BQTH and BQBH the subsequent post formation 1 year abnormal return
from the Carhart 4 factor model is calculated. This procedure is followed using overlapping time periods throughout the sample. I then calculate the
average abnormal return for each portfolio along with its t stat where the t stat has been calculated to allow for the autocorrelation. I follow the same
procedure for the spread portfolios.
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Table 7.3: Performance of Funds Based on Past 1 Year Performance and 1 Year Relative Fund Flow
Ranking Period Investment Vehicle Fund Flow Measurement Ranking Evaluation Period Mean Return t stat
Unit trust/OEIC All Funds -.007 -.61
Unit trust/OEIC Relative TQTH -.016 -1.02
Unit trust/OEIC Relative TQBH -.006 -.35
1 Year Ranking (Abnormal) Unit trust/OEIC Relative BQTH -.075 -2.78??
Unit trust/OEIC Relative BQBH -.028 -1.77
Unit trust/OEIC Relative TQTH - TQBH .000 -.02
Unit trust/OEIC Relative BQTH - BQBH -.052 -2.78??
Unit trust/OEIC Relative TQTH - BQBH .012 .76
Unit trust/OEIC Relative TQBH - BQBH .068 2.68??
Personal Pension All Funds -.006 -1.50
Personal Pension Relative TQTH .006 .55
Personal Pension Relative TQBH .003 .62
1 Year Ranking (Abnormal) Personal Pension Relative BQTH -.004 -.74
Personal Pension Relative BQBH -.022 -3.32??
Personal Pension Relative TQTH - TQBH .004 .37
Personal Pension Relative BQTH - BQBH .021 2.97??
Personal Pension Relative TQTH - BQBH .032 2.37??
Personal Pension Relative TQBH - BQBH .006 1.25
Funds are ranked into quartiles based on their past 1 year abnormal return from the Carhart 4 factor model. The funds in the top quartile are then
sorted into two groups based on the past 1 year median relative fund flow across all funds. The same procedure is applied to the funds in the bottom
quartile. TQTH stands for top quartile top half where the quartile represents the past 1 year performance ranking and the half represents the past 1
year relative fund flow. Likewise, BQBH stands for bottom quartile bottom half where the quartile represents the past 1 year performance ranking and
the half represents the past 1 year relative fund flow. Following this convention TQBH stands for top quartile bottom half and BQTH stands for bottom
quartile top half. For the portfolios that represent TQTH, TQBH, BQTH and BQBH the subsequent post formation 1 year abnormal return from the
Carhart 4 factor model is calculated. This procedure is followed using overlapping time periods throughout the sample. I then calculate the average
abnormal return for each portfolio along with its t stat where the t stat has been calculated to allow for the autocorrelation. I follow the same procedure
for the spread portfolios.
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same general findings are observed particularly for the worst performers where unit
trusts/OEICs on average have fund outflows whereas unit-linked personal pensions
have on average inflows. The evidence of the performance fund flow relationship for
the best performers based on raw returns is less supportive of a more attenuated
performance fund flow relationship for personal pension funds in comparison to risk
adjusted returns.
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 display the results for the empirical test of Berk and Green (2004)
based on underlying portfolio flows. Table 7.3 based on relative fund flows offers the
slightly stronger results in favour of Berk and Green (2004) although the general
conclusions from Table 7.3 also apply to the results based on absolute fund flows in
Table 7.2. For unit trusts/OEICs the BQTH portfolio shows evidence of significance
average under performance. The BQTH portfolio contains the unit trusts/OEICs
that have the worst performance but are in the half with the highest fund flows
in the ranking period. Berk and Green (2004) suggest an outflow for the worst
performing funds would allow the funds to be managed more efficiently and poor
performance will not persist. For the funds in the BQTH this is not the case as
they experience on average high inflows and the significantly negative performance
of the BQTH portfolio in the evaluation period is supportive of Berk and Green
(2004). For funds in the BQBH their evaluation period mean return is negative
but not significantly different from zero. As shown in the performance fund flow
graphs unit trusts/OEICs with the worst performance on average experience the
greatest subsequent fund outflows which according to Berk and Green (2004) would
allow the fund to be managed more efficiently. Since the BQBH funds do have
greater average performance than the BQTH portfolio it provides empirical support
for Berk and Green (2004). In addition the spread portfolios of TQBH-BQBTH and
BQTH-BQBH are both significant at the 1% level. This suggests profitable strategies
are potentially possible although the evidence does not include transactions costs
and fees. It also suggest that is the worst performing unit trusts/OEICs with the
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largest inflows that drive the results. The fund managers of the winner funds in
terms of performance with the highest inflows would face the highest diseconomies
of scale and hence we would expect in accordance in Berk and Green (2004) worse
performance in the TQTH portfolio in comparison to the TQBH portfolio. For the
top performing unit trusts/OEICs in the ranking period in Table 7.3 the TQBH
portfolio displays a greater mean return in the evaluation period in comparison to
the TQTH portfolio which supports Berk and Green (2004). However the spread
portfolio of TQTH-TQBH is not significantly different form zero. This is perhaps
surprising as the best performers in the ranking period who subsequently have the
smallest net flows would be expected to have persistence in performance since the
fund manager would not have to deal with decreasing returns to scale from large
inflows.
For unit-linked personal pension funds the performance fund flow relationship is
less convex and sensitive to past performance particularly in the extreme tails of
the performance distribution. Due to the illiquid nature of personal pensions in-
vestors do not respond to past performance as much as unit trust/OEIC investors
particularly in the extreme tails. Also, for the worst performing unit-linked per-
sonal pension funds the performance fund flow relationship still results in inflows
on average rather than outflows. This is not that surprising as the illiquid nature
of personal pensions means that investors can only exit the fund by switching funds
incurring large costs and they cannot withdraw and access their money until retire-
ment. Given these two features a spread portfolio of long TQBH and short BQTH
would be the likely candidate to produce significant abnormal returns. However the
mean return on the spread portfolio is not significantly different from zero. However
the spread portfolio of TQTH-BQBH is significant at the 1% level. Taken in isolation
this makes economic sense in regards Berk and Green (2004) since the performance
fund flow relationship for the best performing unit-linked personal pensions is less
convex and the worst performing funds are likely to continue to under perform since
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on average there are inflows rather than outflows. However, it does not explain why
the TQTH-BQBH spread portfolio is significant and TQBH-BQTH spread portfolio
is not significantly different from zero. The driver of these results if the BQBH port-
folio which is significantly negative at the 1% level. This anomaly is also present
in Table 7.2 based on abnormal flows but the evidence is not as statistically strong
in comparison to the relative flow. Further research and investigation is required to
understand and explain this anomaly but a potential explanation is due to separat-
ing fund flows on the median and performance on quartiles. Using deciles or higher
for ranking both performance and fund flows would capture the extremes in fund
flows but is dependent on a large and comprehensive dataset being available which
is currently not the case for UK funds.
7.4 Conclusion
The empirical evidence of a convex performance fund flow relationship for unit
trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension funds is consistent with the evidence
based on US data in Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and Sirri and Tufano (1998). The
convex nature of the performance fund flow relationship suggests investors chase
future out performance but do not punish under performance by the same margin.
For the worst performing unit-linked personal pension funds the subsequent fund
flows are actually inflows on average. The evidence in Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3
suggests that the performance fund flow relationships for unit trusts/OEICs and
unit-linked personal pension funds are only significantly different at the extreme tails
of the performance distribution. Investors in unit trusts/OEICs respond to extreme
fund performance more than unit-linked personal pension fund investors. For the
worst performing unit trust/OEIC investors withdraw capital on average producing
fund outflows whereas the worse performing unit-linked personal pension funds still
experience fund inflows on average. For the best performing unit trusts/OEICs the
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performance fund flow relationship is stronger than unit-linked personal pensions but
only in the extreme tail of the performance distribution. The empirical evidence
on the performance fund flow relationship for unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked
personal pension funds suggests performance persistence tests that concentrate on
the extreme tails of the performance distribution will provide stronger evidence in
favour of Berk and Green (2004).
The performance ranked portfolio tests based on underlying portfolios and flows
offers some evidence in support of the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund
flows but most of the evidence comes from the unit trust/OEIC sample. The worst
performing unit trusts/OEICs in the ranking period who also have the highest net
fund flows have much worse performance in the evaluation period than the worst
performing unit trusts/OEICs who have the smallest net fund flows. This empirical
evidence which is robust to relative and absolute measures supports Berk and Green
(2004) where fund managers face diseconomies of scale investing fund flows. The
evidence presented here for unit trusts/OEIC is broadly similar to the evidence in
Bessler et al. (2010) based on single sorting on fund flows for US mutual funds.
However, the evidence from the unit-linked personal pension fund sample is more
difficult to interpret and in general offers little support for Berk and Green (2004).
Since the performance fund flow relationship for unit-linked personal pension funds
is less convex using only quartiles to rank performance and the median to rank fund
flows may not pick up the difference between the extreme in the performance and
fund flow distributions.
Empirically testing Berk and Green (2004) based on underlying portfolio flows is a
unique feature of this research. Unfortunately the lack of fund size data that is reli-
able and comprehensive has forced the focus to be on underlying portfolios that hold
only a unit trust/OEIC or a unit-linked personal pension fund which consist of only
one unit/share class. Whilst this second best approach allows underlying flows to be
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approximated funds who meet this requirement are only a very small subset of the
entire population of UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and unit-linked personal pension
funds. Future research needs to extend the evidence between performance and un-
derlying portfolio fund flows ideally using a comprehensive and reliable survivor-bias
free database.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Research
8.1 Conclusion
This thesis examines the performance, performance persistence and the performance
fund flow relationship for UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-linked
personal pension funds. The main motivation for the comparative analysis is to
empirically test the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual fund flows. In addition
to the empirical test of Berk and Green (2004) another unique feature of this research
is the emphasis on underlying portfolio fund flows since I infer that fund managers
face diseconomies of scale investing fund flows at the underlying portfolio level rather
than the fund level.
I find stronger evidence of performance persistence for UK equity unit-linked per-
sonal pension funds that have FundIDs, a proxy for the underlying portfolio, that
only contain personal pensions in comparison to UK equity unit-linked personal pen-
sions that have FundID’s that include at least a unit trust/OEIC. Due to the highly
illiquid nature of personal pensions and their attenuated performance fund flow re-
lationship underlying portfolios that only have fund flows from personal pensions
exhibit more evidence of performance persistence than the underlying portfolios of
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personal pensions that also include at least a unit trust/OEIC. The empirical per-
formance persistence evidence using performance ranked portfolio strategies based
on the composition of the underlying portfolio for personal pension funds offers
support for the Berk and Green (2004) model. The performance tests do provide
anomalies. However, the large differential between non-surviving funds in the unit
trust/OEIC and unit-linked personal pension fund samples could potentially explain
the performance persistence anomalies.
The performance fund flow relationship is more attenuated for unit-linked personal
pension funds in comparison to unit trusts/OEICs with the main differences lo-
cated at the extreme tails of the performance distribution. These empirical findings
are consistent with Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). The performance ranked port-
folio tests conditional on the underlying portfolio fund flows for unit trusts/OEICs
provides more evidence in support of the Berk and Green (2004) model. Unit
trusts/OEICs in the bottom performance quartile with the highest net fund flows
in the ranking period have significantly worse performance in the evaluation period
than the unit trusts/OEICs in the bottom performance quartile with the lowest
net fund flows. These empirical results are consistent with Berk and Green (2004)
where fund managers face decreasing returns to scale from fund flows. However, the
evidence for the unit-linked personal pensions is less convincing.
There is little evidence that UK equity unit trusts/OEICs and UK equity unit-
linked-personal pensions produce significantly positive alphas with these findings
robust across conditional and unconditional factor models. In addition there is little
evidence that unit trusts/OEICs can successfully time the market with the results
robust across unconditional and conditional factor models. There is evidence of a
significantly negative timing effect in the unconditional factor models but it becomes
insignificant in the conditional models.
From a fund manager’s perspective the evidence suggests that they should concen-
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trate on stock picking rather than market timing. However, a more rigorous test
of market timing would be to select only those fund managers who claim in their
investment mandate to be able to time the market and this is a potential line for fu-
ture research. There is also no evidence that the performance of unit trusts/OEICs
is significantly different from the performance of unit-linked personal pension funds
or that the underlying portfolio structure influences fund performance. The empir-
ical performance evidence suggests that the UK equity market is informationally
efficient.
In addition to the empirical evidence this thesis also highlights the lack of a com-
prehensive survivor-bias-free UK collective investment database with an academic
bias. An academic bias implies that fund data for non-surviving fund is not deleted
and every variable is treated as a time series in comparison to commercial databases
that treat most data variables as time invariant and if the data does change over
time they simply just change the data point in the database. This process loses vast
amounts of important data and potentially biases any studies based on analysing
cross sectional data over time. Whilst I have created numerous databases in this
thesis, they have been built with a particular research motivation in mind rather
than to provide a database for general use. Also, unless a database is continually
updated it becomes outdated as soon as it is finished. Of particular importance is
the fund size data variable. The fund flow literature has become an increasingly
important research area since the Berk and Green (2004) paper which infers that
decreasing returns to scale from fund flows are the equilibrating mechanism that
results in no performance persistence. Hence, any empirical research on fund flows
is dependent on the availability and quality of the fund size data. The reporting
of fund size needs to be consistent across the fund industry, needs to be accurate
and needs to be enforced by regulation if the fund size data in the UK is to become
comprehensive and error free. In addition, the evidence in this thesis and the related
literature emphasises that fund size as a data variable needs to be viewed by the
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investment community with the same level of importance as a fund’s return.
From a policy perspective fund research in a UK setting lacks that of the US mainly
due to a suitable database not existing. Numerous studies that would be highly
beneficial to UK investors, particularly in regards to personal pensions where new
research could provide evidence and proposals to increase the returns and value of
pensions in the accumulation phase, are not possible due to insufficient UK data or
data of poor quality. Since investment management companies have no real incentive
to provide data comprehensively over time with exact precision the only way the
creation of a comprehensive UK collective investment database seems viable is for the
regulatory authority (FSA) to undertake this project with the aim of maintaining
an updated database over time. Until a comprehensive UK collective investment
database is available cutting edge research on fund performance and fund flows will
be directed towards other markets and economies where reliable data is available
which is to the detriment of the UK’s economy and society.
8.2 Further Research
A potential avenue for further research is to apply the comparative analysis of per-
sonal pension funds and mutual funds to the US market. The US data has com-
prehensive fund size data and a large set of funds to study. This would allow the
extreme tails of the performance fund flow distribution to be analysed using deciles
or higher with a much larger number of funds than in the UK. It would however
require an analysis of the US fund industry to ascertain whether I can identify under-
lying portfolios and calculate their flows to empirically test Berk and Green (2004).
It again points to the issue that academics tend towards a US bias in empirical fund
research due to the ease in which comprehensive and reliable data is available which
is to the detriment of the UK fund industry and the investors it serves.
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Another avenue for further research is to investigate the increasing popularity of
different personal pension providers to use the same fund manager and underlying
portfolio. It would be interesting to analyse individually the performance fund flow
relationship for these personal pension funds since ultimately all funds will have the
same performance before fees and charges. All personal pensions across providers
sharing the same underlying portfolio would be advertising the same past perfor-
mance record and hence any differential in the performance fund flow relationships is
not be due to the performance of the underlying portfolio. If there are large differen-
tials the key factors driving the differential in fund flows needs to be determined. It
could be that investors are responding to differences in fees across pension providers
or perhaps due to different levels of marketing. It would be interesting to analyse
the variation in the fee structure for the various pension providers as ceteris paribus
a rational investor in Berk and Green (2004) who infers managerial skill from past
performance would only invest in the fund with the lowest fees.
This thesis and future related research will hopefully build on the Berk and Green
(2004) model of mutual fund flows with the aim to improve our understanding of
performance and fund flows for collective investment schemes. From a pensions per-
spective hopefully research focused on the Berk and Green (2004) model of mutual
fund flows will improve our understanding of the fund industry to ensure investments
in unit-linked personal pension funds maximise future pension values to ensure fu-
ture retirees have sufficient income in retirement.
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Appendix A
A.1 IMA Sector Definitions
UK All Companies
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in UK equities which have a primary
objective of achieving capital growth.
UK Equity Income
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in UK equities and which aim to
have a yield which is in excess of 110% of the yield of the FT All Share Index.
UK Smaller Companies
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in UK equities of companies which
form part of the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index or have an equivalent or
lower market capitalisation.
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A.2 ABI Sector Definitions
UK All Companies
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on the UK stock
market. Funds have the primary objective of achieving capital growth or total re-
turn.
UK Equity Income
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on the UK stock
market. Net of tax yield on the underlying portfolio of at least 110% of the FTSE
All Share yield.
UK Smaller Companies
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on the UK stock
market which form the bottom 10% by market capitalisation.
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A.3 QS2 December 2003 Unit Trusts/OEICs
Table A.1: Destination of QS2 2003 Funds in Relation to the S&P Micropal QS3 2007 List.
Funds still alive
Initial Number of funds Explanation for fund Number of dropped funds Final Number of funds
150 Same sedol and same fund name 17 133
156 Same sedol but different fund name 22 134
13 Change of fund class advertised 13
7 Change of fund structure: UT to OEIC 7
2 Both change of structure and class advertised 2
2 Unknown reason for change of sedol 1 1
5 Moved out of equity sectors 5
Funds that died
Initial Number of funds Explanation for fund Number of dropped funds Final Number of funds
23 Liquidated 4 19
65 Merged 5 60
Unresolved funds
Initial Number of funds Explanation for fund Number of dropped funds Final Number of funds
28 Fund could not be located in QS3. 28
Total Total Total
451 77 374
The 253 dead funds from QS2 combined with the 451 funds in A.1 account for all 704 funds in QS2.
226
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
A
.
A.4 QS3 S&P Micropal December 2007 Unit Trusts/OEICs
Table A.2: QS3 2007 list
Funds still alive
Initial Number of funds Explanation for fund Number of dropped funds Final Number of funds
150 Same sedol and same fund name 17 133
156 Same sedol but different fund name 22 134
101 Funds born after 31 Dec 2003 3 98
13 Change of fund class advertised 13
7 Change of fund structure: UT to OEIC 7
2 Both change of structure and class advertised 2
2 Unknown reason for change of sedol 1 1
Unresolved funds
Initial Number of funds Explanation for fund Number of dropped funds Final Number of funds
29 Funds born prior to Jan 2004 not on QS2 list 29
Total Total Total
460 72 388
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A.5 Descriptive Statistics for Unit-Linked Personal Pensions
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics for UK Equity Unit-Linked Personal Pensions 1980 to 2007
PP Entire Sample PP UK All Companies PP UK Equity Income PP UK Smaller Companies
Mean 0.85% 0.83% 0.90% 0.84%
Std. Dev. 4.22% 4.20% 3.78% 5.16%
Distribution
of returns:
10% -4.62% -4.67% -4.07% -5.36%
25% -1.18% -1.24% -0.77% -1.76%
50% 1.42% 1.40% 1.46% 1.47%
75% 3.28% 3.29% 3.04% 3.96%
90% 5.19% 5.19% 4.67% 6.37%
Obs. 50,056 34,415 10,875 4,766
No. of 594 388 143 63
schemes
The table restricts each unit-linked personal pension to one unit/share class only. Due to the nature/structure of the unit-linked personal pension
industry the FundID for each personal pension may not be unique even with the restriction of one unit/share class only per fund. This implies that there
are more personal pension funds in the diagram than unique underlying portfolios i.e. some funds, although from different pension providers, have the
same underlying portfolio. Table A.3 excludes index/tracker funds, inet funds, funds with duplicated sedol numbers, funds with missing sedol numbers
and funds with no returns data in S/P Micropal.
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A.6 Contingency Table Summary based on the Single Factor (CAPM) Model
Table A.4: Contingency Table Summary based on Single Factor (CAPM) Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Investment Vehicle Sector N WW LL WL LW
Period
Unit Trust Entire Sample 121,355 31,772 (26.18%) 31,631 (26.06%) 29,007 (23.90%) 28,945 (23.85%)
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 35,708 8,888 (24.89%) 8,733 (24.46%) 9,051 (25.35%) 9,036 (25.31%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 11,298 3,008 (26.62%) 2,864 (25.35%) 2,720 (24.08%) 2,706 (23.95%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 17,626 4,299 (24.39%) 4,137 (23.47%) 4,598 (26.09%) 4,592 (26.05%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 37,934 10,157 (26.78%) 10,107 (26.64%) 8,889 (23.43%) 8,781 (23.15%)
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 11,306 2,940 (26.00%) 2,898 (25.63%) 2,736 (24.20%) 2,732 (24.16%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 3,555 976 (27.45%) 926 (26.05%) 831 (23.38%) 822 (23.12%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 5,614 1,448 (25.79%) 1,405 (25.03%) 1,386 (24.69%) 1,375 (24.49%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 18,140 4,857 (26.78%) 4,822 (26.58%) 4,267 (23.52%) 4,194 (23.12%)
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 5,393 1,428 (26.48%) 1,422 (26.37%) 1,274 (23.62%) 1,269 (23.53%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 1,657 457 (27.58%) 428 (25.83%) 385 (23.23%) 387 (23.36%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 2,723 712 (26.15%) 698 (25.63%) 660 (24.24%) 653 (23.98%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 7,793 2,213 (28.40%) 2,173 (27.88%) 1,745 (22.39%) 1,662 (21.33%)
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,380 668 (28.07%) 683 (28.70%) 523 (21.97%) 506 (21.26%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 701 199 (28.39%) 192 (27.39%) 158 (22.54%) 152(21.68%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 1,241 339 (27.32%) 341 (27.48%) 282 (22.72%) 279 (22.48%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 1,518 387 (25.49%) 333 (21.94%) 427 (28.13%) 371 (24.44%)
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 449 116 (25.84%) 131 (29.18%) 111 (24.72%) 91 (20.27%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 84 24 (28.57%) 21 (25.00%) 18 (21.43%) 21 (25.00%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 281 69 (24.56%) 71 (25.27%) 75 (26.69%) 66 (23.49%)
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser
winner (LW) and loser-loser (LL) are counted. N is the number of pairs.
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A.7 Contingency Table Summary based on the Three Factor Model
Table A.5: Contingency Table Summary based on Three Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Investment Vehicle Sector N WW LL WL LW
Period
Unit Trust Entire Sample 121,355 30,280 (24.95%) 30,137 (24.83%) 30,497 (25.13%) 30,441 (25.08%)
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 35,708 8,536 (23.91%) 8,395 (23.51%) 9,396 (26.31%) 9,381 (26.27%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 11,298 2,867 (25.38%) 2,728 (24.15%) 2,852 (25.24%) 2,851 (25.23%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 17,626 4,176 (23.69%) 4,019 (22.80%) 4,721 (26.78%) 4,710 (26.72%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 37,934 10,187 (26.85%) 10,148 (26.75%) 8,842 (23.31%) 8,757 (23.08%)
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 11,306 2,962 (26.20%) 2,936 (25.97%) 2,707 (23.94%) 2,701 (23.89%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 3,555 974 (27.40%) 934 (26.27%) 828 (23.29%) 819 (23.04%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 5,614 1,482 (26.40%) 1,439 (25.63%) 1,347 (23.99%) 1,346 (23.98%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 18,140 4,822 (26.58%) 4,780 (26.35%) 4,320 (23.81%) 4,218 (23.25%)
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 5,393 1,449 (26.87%) 1,443 (26.76%) 1,260 (23.36%) 1,241 (23.01%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 1,657 450 (27.16%) 428 (25.83%) 392 (23.66%) 387 (23.36%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 2,723 728 (26.74%) 705 (25.89%) 651 (23.91%) 639 (23.47%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 7793 2,161 (27.73%) 2,123(27.24%) 1,815(23.29%) 1,694 (21.74%)
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,380 658 (27.65%) 674 (28.32%) 537 (22.56%) 511 (21.47%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 701 208 (29.67%) 202 (28.82%) 149 (21.26%) 142 (20.26%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 1,241 332 (26.75%) 340 (27.40%) 290 (23.37%) 279 (22.48%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 1,518 442 (29.11%) 400 (26.35%) 377 (24.84%) 299 (19.69%)
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 449 109 (24.28%) 138 (30.73%) 115 (25.61%) 87 (19.38%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 84 23 (27.38%) 22 (26.19%) 20 (23.81%) 19 (22.62%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 281 68 (24.20%) 79 (28.11%) 74 (26.33%) 60 (21.35%)
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser
winner (LW) and loser-loser (LL) are counted. N is the number of pairs.
230
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
A
.
A.8 Contingency Table Summary based on the Four Factor Model
Table A.6: Contingency Table Summary based on Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Investment Vehicle Sector N WW LL WL LW
Period
Unit Trust Entire Sample 121,355 30,240 (24.92%) 30,088 (24.79%) 30,547 (25.17%) 30,480 (25.12%)
1MR1ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 35,708 8,559 (23.97%) 8,415 (23.57%) 9,374 (26.25%) 9,360 (26.21%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 11,298 2,877 (25.46%) 2,733(24.19%) 2,844 (25.17%) 2,844 (25.17%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 17,626 4,190 (23.77%) 4,027 (22.85%) 4,705 (26.69%) 4,704 (26.69%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 37,934 10,230 (26.97%) 10,190 (26.86%) 8,805 (23.21%) 8,709 (22.96%)
3MR3ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 11,306 2,969 (26.26%) 2,935 (25.96%) 2,706 (23.93%) 2,696 (23.85%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 3,555 977 (27.48%) 938 (26.39%) 826 (23.23%) 977 (27.48%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 5,614 1,499 (26.70%) 1,452 (25.86%) 1,333 (23.74%) 1,330 (23.69%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 18,140 4,840 (26.68%) 4,797 (26.44%) 4,298 (23.69%) 4,205 (23.18%)
6MR6ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 5,393 1,473 (27.31%) 1,463 (27.13%) 1,235 (22.90%) 1,222 (22.66%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 1,657 458 (27.64%) 431 (26.01%) 383 (23.11%) 385 (23.23%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 2,723 739 (27.14%) 711 (26.11%) 643 (23.61%) 630 (23.14%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 7,793 2,193(28.14%) 2,167 (27.81%) 1,771 (22.73%) 1,662 (21.33%)
12MR12ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,380 660 (27.73%) 677 (28.45%) 535 (22.48%) 508 (21.34%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 701 206 (29.39%) 199 (28.39%) 149 (21.26%) 147 (20.97%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 1,241 337 (27.16%) 343 (27.64%) 285 (22.97%) 276 (22.24%)
Unit Trust Entire Sample 1,518 431 (28.39%) 382 (25.16%) 394 (25.96%) 311 (20.49%)
36MR36ME Personal Pension Entire Sample 449 115 (25.61%) 138 (30.73%) 109 (24.28%) 87 (19.38%)
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 84 24 (28.57%) 24 (28.57%) 18 (21.43%) 18 (21.43%)
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 281 73 (25.98%) 84 (29.89%) 69 (24.56%) 55 (19.57%)
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser
winner (LW) and loser-loser (LL) are counted. N is the number of pairs..
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A.9 Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on the Four Factor
Model - Jan 1980 to Dec 1999
Table A.7: Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sector No. periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF
1MR1ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 239 -.0022 .0010 -0.0032 -4.82??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 239 -.0029 .0029 -.0058 -4.69??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 161 -.0001 -.0012 .0010 0.69
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 238 -.0028 .0036 -.0064 -5.19??
3MR3ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 235 .0001 -.0020 .0021 4.84??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 212 .0014 -.0013 .0026 3.79??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 157 .0012 -.0016 .0028 2.06?
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 212 .0015 -.0013 .0027 3.02??
6MR6ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 229 .0004 -.0024 .0028 6.46??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 207 .0019 -.0013 .0032 3.86??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 112 .0024 -.0023 .0048 2.83??
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 207 .0023 -.0018 .0041 3.74??
12MR12ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 217 .0002 -.0019 .0021 5.05??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 203 .0018 -.0010 .0028 4.13??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 139 .0007 -.0016 .0023 1.86
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 198 .0019 -.0017 .0037 3.97??
For performance ranked tests, funds are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on past performance of the funds - abnormal returns of each fund over the ranking period.
The equally weighted average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the subsequent evaluation period is computed; AV5 and AV1 are the abnormal
returns of the top and bottom portfolios in the evaluation period, averaged over all time periods in the sample. There are four different ranking and evaluation periods:
36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year evaluation period, and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. This procedure
is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period of the dataset, and DIF is AV5-AV1, and TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF, allowing for the autocorrelation induced by
using overlapping observations.
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A.10 Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on the Four Fac-
tor Model - Jan 2000 to Dec 2007
Table A.8: Performance Ranked Portfolio Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sector No. periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF
1MR1ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 95 .0013 -.0006 .0020 1.71
Personal Pension Entire Sample 95 -.0010 .0017 -.0028 -2.31?
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 95 .0007 .0021 -.0014 -.91
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 95 -.0028 .0011 -.0040 -3.29??
3MR3ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 91 .0013 -.0016 .0029 2.56?
Personal Pension Entire Sample 91 .0007 -.0004 .0011 1.00
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 91 .0012 .0001 0.0011 0.85
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 91 -.0007 -.0011 .0003 0.39
6MR6ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 85 .0011 -.0022 .0034 6.88??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 85 .0011 -.0016 .0027 5.28??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 85 .0013 -.0011 .0024 4.38??
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 85 -.0001 -.0020 .0019 4.47??
12MR12ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 73 .0012 -.0020 .0032 3.01??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 73 .0011 -.0016 .0027 3.54??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 73 .0013 -.0011 .0025 2.13?
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 73 -.0001 -.0021 .0020 3.77??
For performance ranked tests, funds are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on past performance of the funds - abnormal returns of each fund over the ranking period.
The equally weighted average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the subsequent evaluation period is computed; AV5 and AV1 are the abnormal
returns of the top and bottom portfolios in the evaluation period, averaged over all time periods in the sample. There are four different ranking and evaluation periods:
36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year evaluation period, and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. This procedure
is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period of the dataset, and DIF is AV5-AV1, and TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF, allowing for the autocorrelation induced by
using overlapping observations.
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A.11 Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on the Four Factor Model -
Jan 1980 to Dec 1999
Table A.9: Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sector N PRW CP Z Stat CHI TCS
1MR1ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 85,362 .493 .937 -4.76?? 22.91?? -19.26??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 15,323 .483 .823 -6.01?? 37.47?? -17.46??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 2,900 .548 1.144 1.81 8.80?? -6.52??
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 9,281 .476 .755 -6.74?? 47.72?? -14.56??
3MR3ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 26,267 .536 1.325 11.36?? 129.82?? 17.98??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 4,757 .543 1.328 4.88?? 24.45?? 9.25??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 886 .609 1.765 4.18?? 20.56?? 2.58??
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 2,905 .539 1.241 2.90?? 9.33?? 8.69??
6MR6ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 12,554 .529 1.232 5.82?? 35.12?? 13.81??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,286 .522 1.146 1.63 2.96 6.05??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 414 .570 1.180 .84 2.73 .12
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 1,414 .525 1.094 .845 1.30 7.96??
12MR12ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 5,236 .554 1.503 7.33?? 56.17?? 10.65??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 987 .549 1.448 2.89?? 8.54?? 6.75??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 165 .630 1.486 1.258 3.99? -.23
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 631 .536 1.366 1.95 3.97? 8.47??
36MR36ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 868 .576 1.550 3.19 15.55?? 2.12?
Personal Pension Entire Sample 166 .542 1.913 2.05? 5.71? 1.30
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 20 .800 6 1.76 4? -.43
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 113 .566 2.530 2.38?? 7.11?? .54
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser winner (LW) and loser-loser
(LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x LL)/(WL x LW); where log(CP)/σlog(CP ) has a standard
normal distribution, and σlog(CP ) = [(1/WW ) + (1/WL) + (1/LW ) + (1/LL)]
1/2; c) Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f. where CHI = (WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2 + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2/N/4, and N is
the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled cross-section OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns.
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A.12 Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Model - Jan
2000 to Dec 2007
Table A.10: Contingency Table Persistence Tests based on Four Factor Abnormal Returns of Fund Performance
Ranking and Evaluation Period Investment Vehicle Sector N PRW CP Z Stat CHI TCS
1MR1ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 35,599 .510 1.066 3.04?? 9.54?? 10.81??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 20,248 .477 .818 -7.14?? 51.14?? -17.28??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 8,356 .495 .914 -2.06? 4.98? -10.04??
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 8,274 .475 .774 -5.81?? 34.54?? -16.57??
3MR3ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 11,289 .546 1.427 9.41?? 88.84?? 12.07??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 6,423 .514 1.121 2.28? 5.23? -4.39??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 2,631 .529 1.247 2.83?? 8.04?? -3.16??
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 2,644 .532 1.244 2.80?? 7.96?? -4.17??
6MR6ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 5,231 .545 1.415 6.26?? 39.30?? 7.86??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 2,988 .569 1.766 7.69?? 59.62?? 3.15??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 1,210 .547 1.412 2.99?? 9.02?? 1.82??
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 1,246 .568 1.644 4.35?? 19.16?? 2.27??
12MR12ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 2,222 .580 1.889 7.40?? 55.65?? 6.32??
Personal Pension Entire Sample 1,285 .559 1.832 5.36?? 30.07?? 5.66??
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 508 .571 2.05 3.97?? 16.30?? 1.53??
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 551 .555 1.606 2.76?? 7.69?? 5.16??
36MR36ME Unit Trust Entire Sample 215 .567 1.087 .30 1.69 -.46
Personal Pension Entire Sample 126 .524 1.663 1.41 2.57 1.58
Underlying - PP and at least a UT Entire Sample 35 .571 1.429 .52 .54 -.49
Underlying - PP only Entire Sample 68 .529 1.425 .73 .59 0.95
Funds are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser winner (LW) and loser-loser
(LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x LL)/(WL x LW); where log(CP)/σlog(CP ) has a standard
normal distribution, and σlog(CP ) = [(1/WW ) + (1/WL) + (1/LW ) + (1/LL)]
1/2; c) Chi-Squared test with 1 d.o.f. where CHI = (WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2 + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2/N/4, and N is
the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled cross-section OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns.
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A.13 Raw Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Four Performance
Bins
Figure A.1: Raw Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Four Performance Bins
Funds are ranked based on their one year raw returns at time t and divided equally into four bins where the highest bin signals the best performers and
lowest bin signals the worst performers. The average equally weighted one year growth rate (relative fund flow) at time t + 1 year is then calculated for
each bin. This procedure is followed for overlapping time periods throughout the sample to allow the entire sample mean growth rate for each bin to be
calculated.
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A.14 Raw Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Ten Performance
Bins
Figure A.2: Raw Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Ten Performance Bins
Funds are ranked based on their one year raw returns at time t and divided equally into ten bins where the highest bin signals the best performers and
lowest bin signals the worst performers. The average equally weighted one year growth rate (relative fund flow) at time t + 1 year is then calculated for
each bin. This procedure is followed for overlapping time periods throughout the sample to allow the entire sample mean growth rate for each bin to be
calculated.
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A.15 Raw Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Twenty Perfor-
mance Bins
Figure A.3: Raw Performance Fund Flow Relationship Based on Twenty Performance Bins
Funds are ranked based on their one year raw returns at time t and divided equally into twenty bins where the highest bin signals the best performers
and lowest bin signals the worst performers. The average equally weighted one year growth rate (relative fund flow) at time t + 1 year is then calculated
for each bin. This procedure is followed for overlapping time periods throughout the sample to allow the entire sample mean growth rate for each bin to
be calculated.
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